Steven Arango is a 3L at the University of Alabama School of Law and a First Lieutenant in the Marine Corps. After graduating from law school, Steven and his wife will live in Texas for a year while he clerks for U.S. District Judge Fernando Rodriguez, Jr. After completion of this clerkship, he will return to active duty in the Marine Corps for at least five years.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Marine Corps, Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Introduction
If you turn on the news today, you will most likely hear about the recent government shutdown, our military presence in the Middle East, or a number of other domestic and international issues.[1] But what will most likely not be discussed, or at least at length, is the threat the Venezuelan crisis poses to the United States.[2]
Although Nicholas Maduro, the current dictator of Venezuela, cannot be solely blamed for this crisis (see: Hugo Chávez) he has exasperated it by enabling government corruption and implementing socialist policies.[3] Corruption is so prevalent that narcotraffickers are not only embedded within the Maduro regime, they are supported by Maduro himself.[4] And revenues from these endeavors have benefited some of the most dangerous international terrorist organizations in the world, from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to Hezbollah.[5] All these factors, coupled with a crumbling healthcare system and systemic violations of human rights, created a migrant crisis of biblical proportions.[6] Simply put, Venezuela is a “ticking time bomb.”[7]
Less than 20 years ago, Venezuela had the highest per capita gross domestic product in South America, with roughly 18% annual growth.[8] Now, it boasts barren grocery stores, an inflation rate of 1,000,000 percent, and water bottles that cost more than a tank of gas.[9] As Dr. Evan Ellis, Latin America research professor at the U.S. Army War College, writes, “[i]n even marginally democratic regimes, a government manifesting such gross levels of corruption and incompetence in managing its economy and the well-being of its people would quickly be voted out of office.”[10] Unfortunately, the Venezuelan people do not have the luxury of even a marginally democratic regime.[11]
On January 5, 2019, the Venezuelan people received a glimmer of hope: “[T]he democratically elected Venezuelan National Assembly (VNA) voted to select Juan Guaidó as its president.”[12] The Venezuelan Constitution authorized the VNA to appoint Guaidó until democratic elections were held.[13] Guaidó offers a chance, albeit slim, for Venezuelans and the international community to coalesce behind a unifying force that can prevent, what Ellis appropriately forecasts as, “a more extensive disintegration into violence and chaos.”[14]
But even with Guaidó as a possible counteracting force to Maduro, the United States must be “proactive in the face of this crisis.”[15] Venezuela sits in the United States’ geopolitical backyard, and to continue to ignore it will not only seal the fate of millions of Venezuelans, but also create dangerous consequences for the United States.[16]
National Security Risk for the United States
Venezuela’s governmental crisis presents serious national security implications for the entire Western Hemisphere, especially the United States.[17] For instance, Maduro’s harboring of illicit enterprises exacerbates the international drug and money laundering problems Latin America and the United States have fought for decades. But the Maduro regime not only allows drug trafficking, it is a willing participant in this criminal enterprise.[18] With military assets and state-controlled companies at his disposal, Maduro has supported groups like FARC and their narco-trafficking operations for years.[19] And in this administration, being accused of drug trafficking is actually good for your career – “Maduro has promoted [these people] to the highest offices.”[20]
Because of Venezuela’s geographical position, drugs can be transported to both hemispheres more efficiently and securely.[21] According to the Venezuela Investigative Unit at InSight Crime, narcotraffickers in Venezuela include “both state and non-state actors, but all operate with the blessing and protection of senior figures in the Venezuelan government.”[22]
As cocaine production continues to rise in South America, Venezuela’s dictatorship will only grow more profitable from these operations.[23] Not only will terrorist organizations continue to benefit from this revenue, but since the United States is the number one cocaine consumer in the world, it must appreciate the public health crisis that can emanate from this corruption.[24]
Narcotrafficking provides Maduro a conduit to “support regional and international terrorist groups,” such as FARC and Hezbollah,[25] both of which are on the U.S. State Department list of terrorist organizations.[26] Specifically, Maduro’s regime has provided FARC with weapons, operational support, and even government IDs – a dangerous combination for any extremist group.[27] In conjunction with alleged financial support, Maduro also provides Hezbollah sanctuary, allowing it to traffic drugs and launder money within Venezuela’s borders.[28] Maduro and his predecessors have created “a rabidly anti-American administration which supports narco-trafficking and jihadism in America’s own backyard.”[29] If this trend continues, Venezuela will careen into becoming the most dangerous narco-terrorist-state in the world.[30]
The United States’ geopolitical adversaries, including Russia, Iran, and China, also have strong ties to Venezuela.[31] Currently, Venezuela owes China and Russia an estimated $60 and $17 billion in oil-backed loans, respectively.[32] Moreover, Russia recently supplied mercenaries to Maduro to protect him and his administration.[33] As the economic situation continues to deteriorate, Maduro will look to strengthen his relationships with China and Russia, Venezuela’s two top investors.[34] Venezuelan leadership has also collaborated with Iran for several decades, supporting “sanctions evasion, terror finance, and ideological subversion.”[35] There is no evidence that suggests this support will cease anytime soon, either; the more problems Venezuela causes for the United States, the less attention Iran itself might receive from the United States.[36] Venezuela’s abundant natural resources, both oil and uranium, and its “willingness to engage in arms trade and nuclear cooperation with countries that do not align with U.S. interests,”[37] provide significant reasons for all three of these countries to further develop their relationships with Venezuela.[38] If the United States does not help stabilize Venezuela, then China, Russia, and Iran will continue to exploit this crisis for their benefit.[39]
Moral Obligation
Venezuelans are experiencing a humanitarian crisis that rivals the one produced by the recent Syrian Civil War.[40] Venezuela is afflicted by a severe food shortage – three quarters of the Venezuelan population has lost nearly 20 pounds over the past year.[41] And when there is food available, the Maduro-controlled military handles distribution.[42] With corruption pervasive throughout the military, a large amount of this food supply is sold on the black market, creating a potentially fatal bidding war for most citizens.[43] With inflation rates skyrocketing daily, the average Venezuelan cannot afford to purchase food from a store (if food is even stocked), let alone the black market.[44]
Accompanying these food shortages is a crumbling health care system.[45] 22,000 doctors, one-third of all the doctors in the country, have fled Venezuela.[46] Because of this exodus, preventable diseases are on the rise and killing Venezuelans at an alarming rate.[47] In 2016, infant and maternal mortality rates increased by 30 and 60 percent, respectively.[48] Medical supplies are almost non-existent in the country – more than 85 percent of basic medicines are in short supply, and some patients have even had to provide their own scalpels for surgery.[49] These conditions, coupled with “salaries that are often less than $10 a month – not enough to buy two chickens,” are why doctors continue to flee the country.[50]
The shocking health conditions in Venezuela provides the perfect breeding ground for a global pandemic.[51] Venezuela’s increasingly malnourished population is extremely susceptible to diseases.[52] Health organizations have already observed thousands of patients with tuberculosis, diphtheria, chagas, and malaria.[53] Combined with decreasing immunization rates, the question is not a matter of if, but when a country wide outbreak will occur.[54] If an epidemic were added to the already dismal situation in Venezuela, mass emigration from the country would intensify, and trigger “a health crisis across the Americas.”[55] Maduro has also stopped sharing health surveillance statistics with the World Health Organization, so the rest of the world could be unaware of a sudden outbreak and unable to properly prepare for its likely spread.[56]
Maduro has also committed a variety of human rights violations throughout the country.[57] Over the past four years, Maduro has arbitrarily detained more than 12,000 political opponents.[58] Political prisoners have little to no hope of survival.[59] If they do not succumb to the torture, some medical condition contracted from the torture will most likely be their demise.[60] And, if not, the execution will be; since 2014, Maduro has carried out more than 8,000 unlawful killings.[61]
These inhumane conditions within Venezuela are exasperating the ongoing refugee crisis.[62] To date, roughly 4 million Venezuelans—over 10 percent of the country’s population—have fled the country.[63] For context, roughly 6.3 million Syrians fled their country over the past few years.[64] Since Venezuela’s circumstances deteriorate by the day, its number will continue to increase – rapidly.[65]
Although most Venezuelan refugees have fled to Venezuela’s neighboring countries, the United States is beginning feel the effects of this migrant crisis: Roughly 30,000 Venezuelan refugees applied for asylum in the United States in 2017, “five times as many as in 2015.”[66] Additionally, Venezuelan immigration to the United States “increased by 21 percent or almost 61,000 people between 2016 and 2017, the largest significant increase in immigrants from one country that year.”[67] If this crisis continues to intensify, an already overloaded U.S. immigration system will fall further into disarray. To alleviate these symptoms, the United States must confront their source: Maduro.
Figure 1: Venezuelan Migration in Comparison to Major Global Refugee Crises[68]
Approach to Venezuela
The Trump administration presented U.S. military intervention in Venezuela as one option to combat this crisis.[69] But a large-scale, long term military intervention would most likely produce more harm to the United States’ international reputation and regional relationships than it would benefit regional stability.[70] Moreover, although the United States may strive to conduct a limited military campaign, any military option could trigger a civil war, which Vice President of the Council on Foreign Relations Shannon O’Neil notes “would [most likely] require…a full-blown invasion and occupation.”[71] “Venezuela is double the size of Iraq; to secure it, the U.S. military would need to plan for the presence of 150,000 or more troops.”[72] This type of operation would also require a reconstruction plan to help the new government maintain security and rebuild infrastructure.[73]
Nevertheless, this reality should not preclude the United States from utilizing its military in regional humanitarian missions.[74] At the request of Venezuela’s neighboring countries, U.S. forces should deploy to provide aid for the current humanitarian crisis.[75] This type of deployment would serve three purposes: 1) to provide aid to refugees, 2) to provide security to these countries in case of a Venezuelan civil war, and 3) to provide protection for U.S. diplomatic personnel should the Maduro regime physically engage them.[76]
But any type of unprovoked military intervention within Venezuela, combat or humanitarian, will be currently unsupported by the international community at large.[77] It would also most likely provoke other Latin American countries to further embrace countries like China and Russia.[78] And no matter how lawful the military intervention is, numerous international actors will brand this effort “as self-interested gringo military interventionism.”[79] Although a controversial U.S. military operation could help Guaidó take control of the country, the negative effects far outweigh any positive benefits; guerrilla warfare would most likely occur, factions would splinter, and the United States would be responsible for a failed state.[80] The United States cannot afford another “expensive long-term security deployment” like Iraq or Afghanistan.[81]
In lieu of a military invasion, some U.S. officials have argued for an internal military coup in Venezuela.[82] But Jose Arocha, a retired Venezuelan Army Lieutenant Colonel and former Maduro political prisoner, argues that a coup will only intensify the situation.[83] Even with several previous military plots to overthrow Maduro, the military still largely backs his regime.[84] Consequently, a military coup would most likely “provoke a civil war,…be entirely one-sided, and only play to the benefit of the Maduro regime and [its] international allies.”[85] Furthermore, even if the Venezuelan military led an anti-Maduro uprising, the “armed organizations that protect the [military] hierarchy and serve to counterbalance each other” would most likely prevail.[86] With this system in place, Maduro controls “the monopoly of violence in Venezuela,”[87] which markedly diminishes the likelihood that a military mutiny could depose of this regime.[88]
Sanctions are another method to combat Maduro’s control over Venezuela.[89] The current U.S. administration has levied harsh sanctions against Maduro’s illegitimate government.[90] Targeted sanctions against state-owned oil companies should reduce revenue for Maduro, hampering his ability to pay his armed forces.[91] Without timely payments for the military, “cracks of dissent” will continue to spread.[92] The United States can also implement “secondary sanctions on foreign entities that conduct business with Venezuela,” similar to the sanctions levied against Chinese institutions working with North Korea.[93] However, the longer sanctions are imposed, the greater the hardship the Venezuelan people will experience.[94] A natural consequence of increased hardship for Venezuelans is more Venezuelan refugees.[95] Sanctions are a double-edged sword that must be employed carefully – especially given that even Guaidó’s domestic supporters are generally opposed to sanctions.[96] Sanctions can help alleviate this crisis, but sanctions alone cannot solve it.[97]
Developing an international coalition that focuses on debilitating the current illegitimate government in Venezuela[98] is important, but “leveraging the democratic legitimacy of Guaidó and the [VNA]”[99] is the best available option for the United States.[100] The United States must implore the international community to recognize Guaidó as the rightful President of Venezuela; as of this writing, more than 50 countries have already done so.[101] The greater the number of states that respond positively to this overture, the more consequential Guaidó’s standing will be both domestically and internationally.[102]
This legitimate recognition extends beyond diplomatic influence, though; it also allows Guaidó’s administration to access Venezuela’s official financial accounts held by allied governments.[103] Formal recognition of Guaidó’s government will also affect Maduro’s credibility on the international stage; the validity of Maduro’s international contracts will be called into question if he is not recognized as Venezuela’s leader.[104] Correspondingly, more states will have to engage with Guaidó. Even U.S. adversaries like China and Russia will interact with Guaidó since they will want “to protect their long-term legal and strategic interests in the country.”[105] Broad international recognition also provides a fail-safe: If Venezuela does careen into further anarchy, a working relationship with Guaidó and the VNA creates the opportunity for the government to lawfully invite military forces to restore order.[106]
Conclusion
Maduro’s regime will never voluntarily cede power.[107] And without action from the United States, “Venezuela could become a ‘North Korea in the tropics.’”[108] Therefore, the United States must embrace options that respect “national sovereignty, democratic practices, and the rule of law” to counteract Maduro’s influence in Venezuela.[109] First, the United States should deploy humanitarian missions throughout the region if other South American countries permit them. This action will serve several purposes, none more pressing at the moment than providing aid for the millions of refugees pouring out of Venezuela. Also, to neutralize Maduro’s revenue sources, the United States should continue to levy sanctions against the Maduro regime and urge the international community to “reciprocate the sanctions as well.”[110] However, the United States must be wary of the effect sanctions are having on the citizens of Venezuela. If the effect is minimal for Maduro, but drastic for Venezuelan citizens, the United States must rethink this approach.
Lastly, the United States must continue to support Guaidó in any way it can – both financially and diplomatically. He is the first real democratic hope Venezuelans have experienced in the last two decades. International support for Guaidó will legitimize his constitutional authority and provide Venezuela a legitimate government if and when the Maduro regime falls. Creating a more secure and stable Venezuela is in the best interest of the United States.[111] If the United States fails to actively oppose Maduro’s regime, it will come to reap the chaos that Maduro has sown.
Endnotes
[1] Edwin J. Feulner & Ana Quintana, “Venezuela is a Ticking Time Bomb,” The Heritage Foundation, February 22, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/international-economies/commentary/venezuela-ticking-time-bomb.
[2] Roger F. Noriega, “The US is Watching From the Sidelines as Venezuela Destabilizes the Region,” American Enterprise Institute, October 3, 2018, http://www.aei.org/publication/the-u-s-is-watching-from-the-sidelines-as-venezuela-destabilizes-the-region/.
[3] R. Evan Ellis, “The Approaching Implosion of Venezuela and Strategic Implications for the United States,” The U.S. Army War College, July 10, 2015, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/index.cfm/articles/the-approaching-implosion-of-venezuela/2015/07/10.
[4] Venezuela Investigative Unit, “Drug Trafficking Within the Venezuelan Regime: The ‘Cartel of the Suns,’” InSight Crime, May 17, 2018, https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/drug-trafficking-venezuelan-regime-cartel-of-the-sun/; R. Evan Ellis, “The Approaching Implosion of Venezuela and Strategic Implications for the United States,” The U.S. Army War College, July 10, 2015, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/index.cfm/articles/the-approaching-implosion-of-venezuela/2015/07/10.
[5] Ana Quintana, “U.S. Must Take Action on Venezuela’s Humanitarian Crisis,” The Heritage Foundation, January 9, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/americas/commentary/us-must-take-action-venezuelas-humanitarian-crisis.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Edwin J. Feulner and Ana Quintana, “Venezuela is a Ticking Time Bomb,” The Heritage Foundation, February 22, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/international-economies/commentary/venezuela-ticking-time-bomb.
[8] “GDP Growth (Annual %),” The World Bank, 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=VE; Ted Galen Carpenter, “A U.S. Attack on Maduro’s Venezuela Would Be a Mistake,” Cato Institute, September 9, 2018, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-attack-maduros-venezuela-would-be-mistake.
[9] Ibid.; Tim Padgett, “Venezuela’s Cheap Gas Will Be More Expensive – Unless You Sign Up For Regime ID,” WLRN, August 14, 2018, http://www.wlrn.org/post/venezuelas-cheap-gas-will-be-more-expensive-unless-you-sign-regime-id.
[10] R. Evan Ellis, “The Approaching Implosion of Venezuela and Strategic Implications for the United States,” The U.S. Army War College, July 10, 2015, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/index.cfm/articles/the-approaching-implosion-of-venezuela/2015/07/10.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Evan Ellis, “The Struggle for Control of Occupied Venezuela,” CSIS, January 23, 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/struggle-control-occupied-venezuela. (“According to Article 233 of the Venezuelan Constitution, if at the end of a president’s term there is not a legitimately elected successor who can assume the office, power devolves into the hands of the National Assembly until new elections can be called.”)
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ted Galen Carpenter, “A U.S. Attack on Maduro’s Venezuela Would Be a Mistake,” Cato Institute, September 9, 2018, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-attack-maduros-venezuela-would-be-mistake.
[16] Ibid.
[17] R. Evan Ellis, “The Approaching Implosion of Venezuela and Strategic Implications for the United States,” The U.S. Army War College, July 10, 2015, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/index.cfm/articles/the-approaching-implosion-of-venezuela/2015/07/10.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Venezuela Investigative Unit, “Drug Trafficking Within the Venezuelan Regime: The ‘Cartel of the Suns,’” InSight Crime, May 17, 2018, https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/drug-trafficking-venezuelan-regime-cartel-of-the-sun/; Moises Rendon, “Why Venezuela Should be a U.S. Foreign Policy Priority,” CSIS, August 17, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-venezuela-should-be-us-foreign-policy-priority.
[20] Ana Quintana, “U.S. Must Take Action on Venezuela’s Humanitarian Crisis,” The Heritage Foundation, January 9, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/americas/commentary/us-must-take-action-venezuelas-humanitarian-crisis (The United States has designated “more than 100 of [Maduro’s] associates for drug trafficking, dozens of them current or former high ranking government officials.” “The U.S. equivalent of these officials would be the heads of Homeland Security, FBI, and CIA.”); Venezuela Investigative Unit, “Drug Trafficking Within the Venezuelan Regime: The ‘Cartel of the Suns,’” InSight Crime, May 17, 2018, https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/drug-trafficking-venezuelan-regime-cartel-of-the-sun/.
[21] R. Evan Ellis, “The Approaching Implosion of Venezuela and Strategic Implications for the United States,” The U.S. Army War College, July 10, 2015, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/index.cfm/articles/the-approaching-implosion-of-venezuela/2015/07/10.
[22] Venezuela Investigative Unit, “Drug Trafficking Within the Venezuelan Regime: The ‘Cartel of the Suns,’” InSight Crime, May 17, 2018, https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/drug-trafficking-venezuelan-regime-cartel-of-the-sun/.
[23] Moises Rendon, “Why Venezuela Should be a U.S. Foreign Policy Priority,” CSIS, August 17, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-venezuela-should-be-us-foreign-policy-priority.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ana Quintana, “U.S. Must Take Action on Venezuela’s Humanitarian Crisis,” The Heritage Foundation, January 9, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/americas/commentary/us-must-take-action-venezuelas-humanitarian-crisis; Lt. Col. Geoffrey Demarest, “The Cubazuela Problem,” Army University Press, May 29, 2018, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2018-OLE/May/Cubazuela/fbclid/IwAR0_WIaW8eyUmxG4gIsMLK2oZ82FsFOz-0fuU5Vfics3suQUGOLzUtu_1Lk/; Roger F. Noriega, “Out of Good Options for Venezuela,” American Enterprise Institute, May 11, 2018, http://www.aei.org/publication/out-of-good-options-for-venezuela/; Moises Rendon, “Why Venezuela Should be a U.S. Foreign Policy Priority,” CSIS, August 17, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-venezuela-should-be-us-foreign-policy-priority. (Former Vice President Tareck Al Aissami has been linked to narcotrafficking and international terrorist groups. Although Maduro removed Al Aissami from his Vice-Presidential role, he is still a senior official in the administration.)
[26] “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, n.d., https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
[27] Ana Quintana, “U.S. Must Take Action on Venezuela’s Humanitarian Crisis,” The Heritage Foundation, January 9, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/americas/commentary/us-must-take-action-venezuelas-humanitarian-crisis; Moises Rendon, “Why Venezuela Should be a U.S. Foreign Policy Priority,” CSIS, August 17, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-venezuela-should-be-us-foreign-policy-priority.
[28] Venezuela Investigative Unit, “Hezbollah’s Backing of Maduro May Shine Light on Links With Venezuela,” InSight Crime, January 19, 2019, https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/does-hezbollah-backing-maduro-confirm-venezuela-terrorist-links/.
[29] Emanuele Ottolenghi & John Hannah, “In Venezuela’s Toxic Brew, Failed Narco-State Meets Iran-Backed Terrorism,” Foreign Policy, March 23, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/23/in-venezuelas-toxic-brew-failed-narco-state-meets-iran-backed-terrorism/.
[30] Roger F. Noriega, “Out of Good Options for Venezuela,” American Enterprise Institute, May 11, 2018, http://www.aei.org/publication/out-of-good-options-for-venezuela/.
[31] Moises Rendon, “Why Venezuela Should be a U.S. Foreign Policy Priority,” CSIS, August 17, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-venezuela-should-be-us-foreign-policy-priority.
[32] Katya Golubkova, Olesya Astakhova, Oksana Kobzeva, Polina Devitt, and Tatiana Voronova, “Factbox: Oil, Loans, Military – Russia’s Exposure to Venezuela,” Reuters, January 24, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-russia-factbox/factbox-oil-loans-military-russias-exposure-to-venezuela-idUSKCN1PI1T4; Moises Rendon, “Why Venezuela Should be a U.S. Foreign Policy Priority,” CSIS, August 17, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-venezuela-should-be-us-foreign-policy-priority; Kevin P. Gallagher and Margaret Myers, “China-Latin America Finance Database,” Washington: Inter-American Dialogue, 2017, https://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/.
[33] Evan Ellis, “Beginning the Endgame in Venezuela,” Global Americans, January 30, 2019, https://theglobalamericans.org/2019/01/beginning-the-endgame-in-venezuela/.
[34] Clare Ribando Seelke, “Venezuela: Background and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, June 14, 2017, https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc990687/m2/1/high_res_d/R44841_2017Jun14.pdf.
[35] Emanuele Ottolenghi & John Hannah, “In Venezuela’s Toxic Brew, Failed Narco-State Meets Iran-Backed Terrorism,” Foreign Policy, March 23, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/23/in-venezuelas-toxic-brew-failed-narco-state-meets-iran-backed-terrorism/.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Moises Rendon, “Why Venezuela Should be a U.S. Foreign Policy Priority,” CSIS, August 17, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-venezuela-should-be-us-foreign-policy-priority.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Evan Ellis, “Beginning the Endgame in Venezuela,” Global Americans, January 30, 2019, https://theglobalamericans.org/2019/01/beginning-the-endgame-in-venezuela/.
[40] Moises Rendon, “Why Venezuela Should be a U.S. Foreign Policy Priority,” CSIS, August 17, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-venezuela-should-be-us-foreign-policy-priority.
[41] Dany Bahar, “Venezuela’s Refugee Crisis Will Exceed Syria’s; We Must Help,” Brookings Institution, February 12, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/venezuelas-refugee-crisis-will-exceed-syrias-we-must-help/; Moises Rendon, “Why Venezuela Should be a U.S. Foreign Policy Priority,” CSIS, August 17, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-venezuela-should-be-us-foreign-policy-priority.
[42] Shannon K. O’Neil, “A Venezuelan Refugee Crisis,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 15, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/report/venezuelan-refugee-crisis.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Antonio Maria Delgado, “Doctors in Violent Venezuela Work Under Threat of Death if Patients Die,” Miami Herald, March 29, 2018, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/article207281029.html.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Dany Bahar, “Venezuela’s Refugee Crisis Will Exceed Syria’s; We Must Help,” Brookings Institution, February 12, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/venezuelas-refugee-crisis-will-exceed-syrias-we-must-help/.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Antonio Maria Delgado, “Doctors in Violent Venezuela Work Under Threat of Death if Patients Die,” Miami Herald, March 29, 2018, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/article207281029.html.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Shannon K. O’Neil, “A Venezuelan Refugee Crisis, Council on Foreign Relations,” February 15, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/report/venezuelan-refugee-crisis.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid. (“More than 500,000 Venezuelans have contracted malaria.”)
[54] Clare Ribando Seelke, “Venezuela: Background and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, June 14, 2017, https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc990687/m2/1/high_res_d/R44841_2017Jun14.pdf. (Vaccines are essentially nonexistent.)
[55] Shannon K. O’Neil, “A Venezuelan Refugee Crisis,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 15, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/report/venezuelan-refugee-crisis.
[56] Clare Ribando Seelke, “Venezuela: Background and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, June 14, 2017, https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc990687/m2/1/high_res_d/R44841_2017Jun14.pdf.
[57] Shannon Van Sant, “Latin American Countries Urge Investigation of Venezuela for Crimes Against Humanity,” NPR, September 27, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/09/27/652330896/latin-american-countries-urge-investigation-of-venezuela-for-crimes-against-huma.
[58] “Human Rights Violations in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: a Downward Spiral With No End in Sight,” Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, June 2018, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/VE/VenezuelaReport2018_EN.pdf.
[59] Ibid. (One mother visiting her son in prison, who was suffering from scabies, “had to inject her son…with dog medicine” since the prison would not provide treatment.)
[60] Ibid.
[61] Shannon Van Sant, “Latin American Countries Urge Investigation of Venezuela for Crimes Against Humanity,” NPR, September 27, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/09/27/652330896/latin-american-countries-urge-investigation-of-venezuela-for-crimes-against-huma.
[62] Dany Bahar, “Venezuela’s Refugee Crisis Will Exceed Syria’s; We Must Help,” Brookings Institution, February 12, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/venezuelas-refugee-crisis-will-exceed-syrias-we-must-help/.
[63] Ibid.
[64] “Population, Total,” The World Bank, 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=SY; “Forced to flee: Top Countries Refugees are Coming From,” World Vision, June 26, 2018, https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/forced-to-flee-top-countries-refugees-coming-from.
[65] Shannon K. O’Neil, “A Venezuelan Refugee Crisis, Council on Foreign Relations,” February 15, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/report/venezuelan-refugee-crisis; Dany Bahar, “Venezuela’s Refugee Crisis Will Exceed Syria’s; We Must Help,” Brookings Institution, February 12, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/venezuelas-refugee-crisis-will-exceed-syrias-we-must-help/. (“Following the Cuban example, the Maduro government is already encouraging migration as a way to diminish internal opposition – a trend likely to continue, if not escalate, in the months to come.”)
[66] Gisela Salomon, “Venezuelans Find US Asylum Surprisingly Elusive,” Associated Press, August 28, 2018, https://apnews.com/6af09ae70e554cab8403c29012ad00b1; Jenny Manrique, “More Venezuelans are Seeking Asylum in the U.S. Than From Any Other Country,” Dallas News, April 9, 2018, https://www.dallasnews.com/news/immigration/2018/04/09/more-venezuelans-are-seeking-asylum-in-the-us-than-from-any-other-country.
[67] Tim Henderson, “Venezuelan Immigrants Get Trump Sympathy but Not Status,” Pew Trusts, October 2, 2018, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/10/02/venezuelan-immigrants-get-trump-sympathy-but-not-status.
[68] “Forced to flee: Top Countries Refugees are Coming From,” World Vision, June 26, 2018, https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/forced-to-flee-top-countries-refugees-coming-from; Dany Bahar, “Venezuela’s Refugee Crisis Will Exceed Syria’s; We Must Help,” Brookings Institution, February 12, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/venezuelas-refugee-crisis-will-exceed-syrias-we-must-help/.
[69] Deirdre Shesgreen, “Oil Sanctions. Deadly Violence. Dire Economy. How the Venezuelan Crisis Could Affect US,” USA Today, January 30, 2019, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2019/01/30/four-ways-crisis-venezuela-affects-americans-and-foreign-policy/2709432002/.
[70] R. Evan Ellis, “The Approaching Implosion of Venezuela and Strategic Implications for the United States,” The U.S. Army War College, July 10, 2015, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/index.cfm/articles/the-approaching-implosion-of-venezuela/2015/07/10.
[71] Shannon K. O’Neil, “A Venezuelan Refugee Crisis,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 15, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/report/venezuelan-refugee-crisis.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Evan Ellis, “Beginning the Endgame in Venezuela,” Global Americans, January 30, 2019, https://theglobalamericans.org/2019/01/beginning-the-endgame-in-venezuela/.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid.
[77] R. Evan Ellis, “The Approaching Implosion of Venezuela and Strategic Implications for the United States,” The U.S. Army War College, July 10, 2015, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/index.cfm/articles/the-approaching-implosion-of-venezuela/2015/07/10.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Evan Ellis, “Beginning the Endgame in Venezuela,” Global Americans, January 30, 2019, https://theglobalamericans.org/2019/01/beginning-the-endgame-in-venezuela/.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Jose Gustavo Arocha, “Venezuela: More Than a Brutal Regime it’s an Evil Revolution That Must be Stopped,” Latin America Policy Journal, December 10, 2018, http://lapj.hkspublications.org/venezuela-more-than-a-brutal-regime/; Matthew Bristow, “Talk of U.S. Military Intervention in Venezuela Suddenly Gains Traction,” Bloomberg, September 26, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-26/trump-s-venezuela-military-option-gains-backers-as-millions-flee (“Jose Cardenas, who’s being considered for a position in the State Department, wrote an op-ed in June titled ‘It’s Time for a Coup in Venezuela.’” See José R. Cárdenas, “It’s Time for a Coup in Venezuela,” Foreign Policy, June 5, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/05/its-time-for-a-coup-in-venezuela-trump/); Pete Kasperowicz, “Marco Rubio Encourages Military Coup in Venezuela,” The Washington Examiner, February 9, 2018, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/marco-rubio-encourages-military-coup-in-venezuela.
[83] Jose Gustavo Arocha, “Venezuela: More Than a Brutal Regime it’s an Evil Revolution That Must be Stopped,” Latin America Policy Journal, December 10, 2018, http://lapj.hkspublications.org/venezuela-more-than-a-brutal-regime/.
[84] Ana Vanessa Herrero & Neil MacFarquhar, “Russia Warns U.S. Not to Intervene in Venezuela as Military Backs Maduro,” The New York Times, January 24, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/24/world/americas/venezuela-news-maduro-russia.html.
[85] Jose Gustavo Arocha, “Venezuela: More Than a Brutal Regime it’s an Evil Revolution That Must be Stopped,” Latin America Policy Journal, December 10, 2018, http://lapj.hkspublications.org/venezuela-more-than-a-brutal-regime/. (An internal coup would “only serve to further [Maduro’s] iron grip on the country,” “much like the failed coup against Chávez in 1992.”)
[86] Lt. Col. Geoffrey Demarest, “The Cubazuela Problem,” Army University Press, May 29, 2018, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2018-OLE/May/Cubazuela/fbclid/IwAR0_WIaW8eyUmxG4gIsMLK2oZ82FsFOz-0fuU5Vfics3suQUGOLzUtu_1Lk/. (These organizations include the “Bolivarian National Guard, Bolivarian National Police, Bolivarian National Armed Forces, Cuban advisory units (Ministry of Intelligence), the Colectivos, the Colombian FARC, the Colombian ELN, and armed civilian militias.”)
[87] Jose Gustavo Arocha, “Venezuela: More Than a Brutal Regime it’s an Evil Revolution That Must be Stopped,” Latin America Policy Journal, December 10, 2018, http://lapj.hkspublications.org/venezuela-more-than-a-brutal-regime/.
[88] Lt. Col. Geoffrey Demarest, “The Cubazuela Problem,” Army University Press, May 29, 2018, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2018-OLE/May/Cubazuela/fbclid/IwAR0_WIaW8eyUmxG4gIsMLK2oZ82FsFOz-0fuU5Vfics3suQUGOLzUtu_1Lk/.
[89] Evan Ellis, Beginning the Endgame in Venezuela, Global Americans, January 30, 2019, https://theglobalamericans.org/2019/01/beginning-the-endgame-in-venezuela/; Dany Bahar, “Venezuela’s Refugee Crisis Will Exceed Syria’s; We Must Help,” Brookings Institution, February 12, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/venezuelas-refugee-crisis-will-exceed-syrias-we-must-help/.
[90] Ibid.
[91] Ibid.
[92] Matthew Bristow, “Talk of U.S. Military Intervention in Venezuela Suddenly Gains Traction,” Bloomberg, September 26, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-26/trump-s-venezuela-military-option-gains-backers-as-millions-flee.
[93] Shannon K. O’Neil, “A Venezuelan Refugee Crisis,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 15, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/report/venezuelan-refugee-crisis.
[94] Ibid.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Jose Gustavo Arocha, “Venezuela: More Than a Brutal Regime it’s an Evil Revolution That Must be Stopped,” Latin America Policy Journal, December 10, 2018, http://lapj.hkspublications.org/venezuela-more-than-a-brutal-regime/.
[99] Evan Ellis, “The Struggle for Control of Occupied Venezuela,” CSIS, January 23, 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/struggle-control-occupied-venezuela.
[100] Ibid.
[101] Sam Meredith, “Venezuela’s Guaido Vows to Return to Caracas Despite ‘Life-Threatening’ Risks,” CNBC, March 1, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/01/venezuela-crisis-guaido-vows-to-return-despite-life-threatening-risks.html; Evan Ellis, “The Struggle for Control of Occupied Venezuela,” CSIS, January 23, 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/struggle-control-occupied-venezuela.
[102] Evan Ellis, Beginning the Endgame in Venezuela, Global Americans, January 30, 2019, https://theglobalamericans.org/2019/01/beginning-the-endgame-in-venezuela/.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid.; Evan Ellis, “The Struggle for Control of Occupied Venezuela,” CSIS, January 23, 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/struggle-control-occupied-venezuela.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Roger F. Noriega, “Out of Good Options for Venezuela,” American Enterprise Institute, May 11, 2018, http://www.aei.org/publication/out-of-good-options-for-venezuela/.
[108] Moises Rendon, “Why Venezuela Should be a U.S. Foreign Policy Priority,” CSIS, August 17, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-venezuela-should-be-us-foreign-policy-priority.
[109] Evan Ellis, “The Struggle for Control of Occupied Venezuela,” CSIS, January 23, 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/struggle-control-occupied-venezuela.
[110] Ana Quintana, “The US Military Will Not Solve the Venezuela Crisis,” The Heritage Foundation, August 21, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/americas/commentary/the-us-military-will-not-solve-the-venezuela-crisis.
[111] Shannon K. O’Neil, “A Venezuelan Refugee Crisis,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 15, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/report/venezuelan-refugee-crisis.
