Diplomacy for Democracy: Why Venezuela Did Not Defy the Odds like Guatemala

On January 15, 2024, after months of a tumultuous post-election political and democratic crisis that placed Guatemala at the top of the political agenda in the Americas, Bernardo Arévalo was sworn in as president of Central America’s largest economy. Basic democratic principles prevailed in Guatemala as the presidential candidate of Movimiento Semilla, the small underdog party that campaigned around anti-corruption policies, shocked the establishment with its surprise win. Almost exactly a year after the resolution of the Guatemalan election crisis brought an end to attempts to block Arévalo from power, a less promising scenario for regional democracy unfolds in Venezuela. The winner of the Venezuelan 2024 presidential election, the opposition coalition Plataforma Unitaria Democrática (PUD) candidate Edmundo González, was not sworn into the Miraflores Palace on January 10, 2025. González had been in exile for months in Europe amid fears for his safety, and his attempt to reenter Venezuela failed after a tour of the Americas, where he visited various Heads of State, as 2025 began. On the eve of the transition of power ceremony, María Corina Machado, the popular opposition leader banned from running for office and whom González replaced on the PUD presidential ticket, faced arbitrary detention after leading a peaceful rally.

The level of international pressure exerted from the European Union (EU), the United States, and the Organization of American States (OAS) on the authorities attempting to overturn election results in Guatemala and Venezuela had a significant effect on the transition-of-power outcome. The international response varied mainly because of the costs associated with defending democracy in a fragile democracy versus defending democracy in an authoritarian regime. Even though the context in these post-election crises differed, there is some correspondence between the process that led Arévalo to the presidency on January 15, 2024, and the one leading up to the Venezuelan transfer of power on January 10, 2025. These cases are examples of presidential election crises in which there were anti-status quo winners, concerted efforts from national authorities and establishment elites to overturn the results, and observable responses from the international community.

Decisive opposition wins met with concerted efforts to overturn the election

Arévalo won Guatemala’s runoff election on August 20, 2023, with 60% of the vote, per official figures from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE, for its Spanish acronym). After Semilla’s surprising first-round election result, the Office of the Attorney General—known as the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público, MP)—spearheaded a campaign to delegitimize the election outcome and prevent Semilla’s candidate from contesting the ballotage[1] and, later, from taking office.[2] The Attorney General María Consuelo Porras and the Chief of the Special Prosecutor’s Office Against Impunity, Rafael Curruchiche, pursued an investigation to block Semilla, alleging irregularities in the party’s registration process back in 2018, as well as individual criminal prosecutions against Arévalo and Vice-President-elect Karin Herrera. The United States, since May 2022, has sanctioned[3] Porras for obstructing and undermining “anticorruption investigations in Guatemala to protect her political allies and gain undue political favor.” Clashes intensified between institutions involving the TSE, the MP, the Guatemalan Congress, and the Courts. Among the outcomes[4], Semilla was suspended as a political party, its representatives in Congress were declared independent, and four TSE magistrates were stripped of their immunity to be prosecuted for various charges. Images of armed raids on the TSE, during which the MP even seized ballot boxes, shocked the international community and generated widespread condemnation. Thousands of Guatemalans went out to the streets to protest the legal and political attempts to overturn the election results by members of the political and economic elite—colloquially known as the ‘Pact of the Corrupt.’[5] Following months of upheaval, in December 2023 the Constitutional Court ruled[6] that the elected candidates had to take office as planned on January 14, 2024. In what was seen as an uphill battle against Guatemala’s elite, who have historically maintained control over the economic and political spheres, Arévalo and Guatemala thus defied the odds.[7]

The situation in Venezuela mirrored some aspects of the Guatemalan case. Since the pre-electoral period, it was evident that the ruling regime had no intention to honor its international commitment to electoral safeguards and guarantees under the October 2023 Barbados Agreement,[8] which was reached with the support of Norway’s mediation efforts. Seasoned political opposition leader Machado won the PUD primary election by a landslide in October 2023, but the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, TSJ), which is under the firm grasp of Nicolás Maduro’s regime, banned[9] her from running for office. González took her place as presidential candidate and won the July 28 election with over 60% of the vote, according to official tally sheets made public by the opposition. However, the regime-controlled National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral, CNE) announced instead that Maduro had won the election, with no supporting evidence or disaggregated results. Thousands of Venezuelans went out to the streets to protest, and the Maduro regime responded with brutal repression, consistent with its decade-long record and evidence of human rights violations. In an effort to eliminate the opposition to Maduro, the regime intensified politically-motivated human rights violations, especially after the elections. In its report from September 17, 2024, the United Nations (UN) Fact-Finding Mission determined[10] that the protests and the regime’s repressive response “marked a new milestone in the deterioration of the rule of law. The main public authorities abandoned all semblance of independence and openly deferred to the executive.”

Two distinct regimes

An obvious difference between Guatemala and Venezuela is the type of regime. Guatemala is a democracy, albeit flawed, while Venezuela is an authoritarian regime. According to the Democracy Index[11] published by The Economist Intelligence Unit, from 2015 to 2023, Guatemala was consistently categorized as a ‘hybrid regime,’ and so was Venezuela from 2015 to 2016. However, from 2017 to 2023, Venezuela was characterized as authoritarian. Furthermore, Freedom House’s Freedom of the World methodology consistently considered Guatemala from 2015 to 2024 as ‘Partly Free.’ The same measurement places Venezuela in the ‘Partly Free’ category from 2015 to 2016, but since 2017 it has been classified as ‘Not Free.’ Among the countries of the Western Hemisphere that the Democracy Index report covers, four are considered authoritarian: Haiti, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela. The same result is observed in the 2024 Freedom of the World report, as these four countries are characterized as ‘Not Free.’

The context, recent political history, and governance challenges of Guatemala and Venezuela are also dissimilar. While Guatemala is indeed the largest economy in Central America, it does not hold the world’s largest oil reserves. That distinction belongs to Venezuela, which is also endowed other abundant natural resources, making it a strategic political, geopolitical, and economic hub that attract powerful state and non-state actors, who operate within both legal and illicit spheres. The differences in regime and relative power of Venezuela and Guatemala help explain the diverging responses by the international democratic community to their post-election crises; Guatemala’s democracy enjoyed strong international support, while Venezuela’s situation elicited a more polarized and fragmented global reaction.

International community responses

The EU, the United States, and the Inter-American community, through the OAS, responded distinctly to these two cases when domestic authorities and elites attempted to prevent a president-elect from assuming power. For example, the average number of OAS Permanent Council meetings addressing the post-electoral crisis in Guatemala in 2023 was two per month, which was double the ratio of convocations dedicated to discussing the situation in Venezuela in 2024. The number of resolutions and declarations regarding the situation in Guatemala was three (September 1, November 15, and December 12, 2023), while for Venezuela there was only one resolution approved on August 16, 2024, in the aftermath of the elections after a failed attempt to pass a resolution on July 31 in the same year.

None of the resolutions regarding Guatemala failed to pass: the November 15 resolution passed with 20 votes in favor and the December 12 resolution passed with 29 votes.[12] The resolutions and declaration strongly condemned the attempts by the MP and mandated the General Secretariat of the OAS (GS/OAS) to deploy diplomatic missions with representatives from the Permanent Council and the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. On the other hand, in the July 31st vote that urged Maduro to release the electoral records, there were not enough votes[13] to approve draft resolution CP/doc. 6032 (17 in favor, 11 abstentions, and 5 absent). The Permanent Council eventually approved a resolution (CP/Res. 1261) on August 16[14] but by consensus, rather than a roll call vote. This resolution did not include a mandate to deploy a good offices mission from OAS representatives as in the case of Guatemala. In one of the most noticeable displays of double standards, Mexico participated in all the Permanent Council meetings regarding the situation in Guatemala and took part in the good offices mission to Guatemala City in the Fall 2023, but did not show up to vote on July 31, 2024, when the Venezuelan election crisis was escalating and unfolding. The OAS has no coercive power, but an Inter-American community that is aligned is stronger than a fragmented and polarized membership.

Furthermore, the average word count of the operative clauses in comparison to the word count of footnotes is greater in the Guatemala resolutions than in the Venezuela resolution. In the case of the resolution of August 2024 regarding Venezuela, for every operative clause word, there were 2.83 footnote words. In contrast, the average ratio for operative clause words to footnote words in the case of Guatemalan 2023 resolutions and declarations, was 1 to 0.20. Member States are known to employ footnotes to explain their vote, whether in favor, against, or abstention; this is especially common when a justification or excuse is deemed as politically necessary, or, in other words, when the political costs of voting in a particular way are high. Footnotes can be interpreted as a saving-face device when there is a controversial vote, to communicate a political and diplomatic message and have it formally stated on record.

The deployment of professional electoral observation missions in Guatemala from the OAS and the European External Action Service[15] (EEAS) played a key role in ensuring that Arévalo assumed the presidency. These electoral observation missions, based on the fieldwork and presence of more than 200 observers in all 22 departments of the country, validated Arévalo’s election victory and defended democratic principles against the attempts to delegitimize the results. In Venezuela, neither the OAS nor the EEAS were present in the country before, during and after the election. The OAS was not invited, and the Maduro regime revoked the invitation it had extended to the EEAS in May 2024, defaulting on its commitments under the Barbados Agreement. The Carter Center[16] deployed a technical electoral observation mission with 17 experts and observers in four cities. Despite the limited number of polling centers visited, the Carter Center could not “verify or corroborate the results of the election,” and stated that the electoral process “did not meet international standards of electoral integrity at any of its stages.”

In terms of sanctions imposed during the electoral crisis, the EU and the United States sent clear signals of increased pressure to Guatemalan authorities, while their approach to Venezuela oscillated between tightening and relaxing sanctions. Both the United States and the EU increased targeted sanctions during the Guatemalan electoral crisis, especially after November 30, when the Guatemalan Congress voted to strip immunity from TSE magistrates, a clear pattern of increased pressure.[17] In December 2023, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed Global Magnitsky Act-related sanctions on Luis Miguel Martínez, a close presidential collaborator, and the U.S. Department of State[18] revoked hundreds of visas, including from 100 Guatemalan lawmakers. As previously stated, Attorney General Porras had already been designated for corruption since 2022. Given the campaign to overturn election results, the European Council adopted[19] targeted financial and travel sanctions on five Public Ministry authorities.

The pattern of sanctions[20] in the Venezuelan case is not straightforward, but it is, at a minimum, a story of mixed signals between expanding and easing sanctions. To incentivize the Maduro Regime to ensure a free and fair electoral process as agreed in the Barbados Agreement, the United States and the EU took a number of measures to temporarily lift sanctions during the election season, including a six-month general license [21] from the United States government for transactions in gold and hydrocarbon sectors. The United States government revoked the gold sector license (License 43 involving Minerven) in January 2024 and did not renew the oil sector general license (License 44) in the following April. The EU eased sanctions after the signing of the October agreement, as a concession to Maduro in exchange for the regime’s promise to hold a free and fair election in 2024. Despite the regime’s failure to fulfill its obligations, the EU initially tried to induce its cooperation by limiting the extension of  restrictive measures such as travel bans and asset freezes of  54 individuals [22] to only 6 months instead of the standard 12 months. However, following the disputes over the election’s fairness, the EU joined other countries in applying new sanctions, extending restrictive measures through January 10, 2026, and adding 15 more individuals to the sanctions list. Additionally, the United States and the EU appeared more aligned in the Guatemalan case than in the Venezuelan crisis. While the United States government recognized González as the president-elect, the EU did not recognize him as the winner of the election.[23] The international community lifted pressure from the Maduro regime a priori without a guarantee except for the regime’s promise of conducting a free and fair election. The United States and the EU sent a comprehensive, clear signal to Guatemala, contrasting the mixed signals sent the Maduro regime.

Varying costs of defending democracy

While assertive and aligned diplomatic efforts from the international community supported Arévalo and a peaceful transition of power in Guatemala, the response to the Venezuelan 2024 election crisis was less assertive and coordinated. The variation in responses to these crises is partly due to the costs of defending democracy when stakes are high and dependent on the asymmetrical balance of power between the international community and the country in question. The cost of exerting extensive and intense diplomatic pressure on Guatemalan authorities, in a fragile democracy, is less than the cost of doing so on the Maduro regime, a consolidated authoritarian system. These two cases of an election crisis in Latin America show that staunch defense for democracy from international actors weakens as political, geopolitical, and individual costs increase.

The power relation between the international community and Guatemala is asymmetrical, in favor of the former. In contrast, the power relation between the international community and Venezuela is symmetrical, often appearing in favor of the latter given its blatant indifference towards violating the “political rights for all” and “electoral guarantees for all” negotiated commitments stemming from the 2023 Barbados Agreement. The ex-ante concessions and easing of sanctions to the regime, despite evidence of intentional and systematic meddling with the electoral process, are signs of a more balanced power equation between international actors and the regime. The cost for international actors, in terms of publicly displaying a moral adherence to democratic principles and international norms, is relatively low in a small country with limited capacity to resist and retaliate or with no tangible support from international allies with hard and soft power. The cost of putting maximum diplomatic pressure on a larger state is high, given the transnational economic interests in the oil, gold, and other sectors, and given the regime’s proven record of adopting—with the counsel and support of its fellow international authoritarian allies—intimidating and deadly tactics to silence internal and external foes.

If the international community responds strongly to a situation in Guatemala, there are limited economic losses for foreign actors from exerting such pressure. However, if the international community strongly urges and forces the adoption of measures on Venezuelan authorities, there are significant economic and geopolitical interests at stake for foreign individuals, businesses, and organizations. There are also additional costs associated with interfering with the self-serving interests that other state and non-state actors have in perpetuating the Maduro regime, such as Iran, Russia, Cuba, Hezbollah, and drug cartels. In this sense, the Guatemalan election crisis presented the opportunity for low-hanging fruit, a rare moment of international coordination and alignment, and democratic success in modern times. The Venezuelan election crisis, however, has not provided such a chance given the high costs associated with vested interests and the menacing nature of the Venezuelan regime and its allies.

Moreover, while Guatemala has kept an open door to scrutiny and support from the democratic international community, the Venezuelan regime has not. Since the return to democracy in the 1990s, Guatemala has experienced several political crises. Regardless, Guatemala has welcomed and engaged with the international community and organizations in domestic affairs. This was not only the case during the civil war period and the path leading to the 1996 Peace Accords, but notably in recent times through the implementation of a unique UN-designed experiment of supranational justice against impunity and corruption, the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), which resulted, among other consequences, in the arrest of a former president and vice president due to corruption crimes. Although recently Guatemala had been more reticent[24] to welcome international presence, its bargaining power vis-à-vis hefty actors like the United States remains restricted.

 In contrast, Venezuela has persistently resisted international scrutiny since before the Maduro period. The last election that professional, international organizations widely observed with privileges and immunities for electoral observation missions was the 2006 presidential process. The regime strictly limits invitations to the democratic international community to observe and scrutinize with all guarantees of access and immunity. It does invite foreign actors who are overtly biased towards the regime, where the possibility of criticism is little to none. In recent years the regime has allowed certain international missions under limited conditions, such as the fact-finding mission of the UN, the International Criminal Court, and the electoral technical mission of the Carter Center, over which the regime maintained tight monitoring and oversight. The cost of denouncing and speaking up to the regime is high. In fact, on February 2024, Maduro shut down the UN human rights office in Venezuela and gave the staff 72 hours to leave. In the post-election, Maduro expelled diplomats from other Latin American countries because their governments did not recognize him as the winner of the 2024 election.

A silver lining

The different responses from the international community to the president-elect crises in Guatemala in 2023 and Venezuela in 2024 are part of a wider debate on double standards in diplomacy and international law. These cases posed a democratic morality test to the international community and the effectiveness of diplomacy for democracy promotion. Few examples, such as Chile’s President Gabriel Boric, visibly passed this test. The good news from these election crises is that, despite the perception of a weakening of the international, rules-based liberal order in recent years, and the rise of isolationist policies and a bipolar world of autocracies versus democracies gain ground, the role of multilateralism and merits of the international community remains relevant. What the democratic international community does—and does not do—matters. It holds the power if it wants to wield it despite the costs and consequences. As democracy erodes and authoritarianism gains ground globally, assertive and coordinated responses from the democratic international community can still make a difference.

Championing democracy proves far more manageable when the stakes, both tangible and intangible, are low, as opposed to scenarios where the cost of diplomacy for democracy runs high.   Displays of democratic moral authority are discretionary, as responses vary according to the associated political, economic, and diplomatic costs. The consequences of exerting maximum international pressure on a fragile democracy are more bearable than the costs of exerting the same amount of pressure on a dictatorship. President-elect Edmundo González should have assumed power in January 2025, the same month that President Arévalo marked his first anniversary in office. The differences between the fates of these two Latin American president-elects from the opposition should serve as a cautionary tale of underestimating the responses from the democratic international community and of overestimating the worth of an authoritarian regime’s promises.

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