Understanding AMLO’s De-Securitization Towards Drug Trafficking Through a Human Security Lens [1]

In the shadow of escalating violence and entrenched insecurity, Mexico found itself at a critical juncture as it transitioned from the Felipe Calderón and Enrique Peña Nieto administrations to that of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). For years, Mexico grappled with the adverse effects of its anti-drug trafficking strategy, characterized by militarized force and law enforcement. Amidst this backdrop, a new paradigm emerged – one that sought to redefine security beyond the mere absence of violence, focusing instead on the presence of conditions conducive to human well-being.

Central to this novel approach is the concept of human security – a comprehensive framework that prioritizes the protection of individuals and communities rather than the traditional focus on state security. This article will apply human security theory to AMLO’s anti-drug trafficking policies. Furthermore, it aims to understand how theoretical constructs of human security are operationalized in practice, revealing insights into the complexities of Mexico’s security landscape and its departure from conventional policy frameworks.

Background

Security is often subjective, contingent on what a state or a statesperson defines as a “national security threat.” This securitization process justifies allocating significant financial, human, and strategic resources to address perceived threats. However, securitization can lead to militarization when security forces increasingly view the use of force, including lethal force, as an acceptable and routine response to these threats.

In Mexico, the militarized approach to combating drug trafficking has been the predominant strategy since Felipe Calderón’s presidency (2006–2012). Calderón’s administration launched a massive military-led campaign against drug cartels calling for a ‘War on Drugs’ in 2006, resulting in increased violence, human rights abuses, and a death toll surpassing 50,000 people. Calderón’s perception of the inadequacies of civil security institutions led to the Mérida Initiative — a security cooperation agreement between the United States and Mexico that reinforced this militaristic paradigm (p. 31). Although the military was perceived by society to be more efficient and less prone to corruption compared to other Mexican police and judicial institutions, Calderón’s reliance on military forces exacerbated internal power struggles within cartels, heightening violence and public fear.

This fear was compounded two-fold: on the one hand, the military’s aggressive “do first, ask questions later” approach destabilized criminal hierarchies, leading to the proliferation of smaller, more violent criminal organizations. On the other hand, the fear associated with military operations – especially “joint operations” combining military and police forces — was evident. Gaussens and Gonzalez highlight a clear link between said joint operations and increased homicide rates (p. 34). They also noted a 430% increase in complaints to the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) regarding the Army, Navy, Federal Police, and judicial institutions from 2006 to 2011, rising from 867 to 3,734 complaints (p. 35). This increase underscores the contradictory effects of military action on domestic security.

Enrique Peña Nieto’s administration (2012–2018) aimed to address underlying social factors driving drug-related crime instead of prioritizing armed confrontation. However, despite efforts to strengthen law enforcement and build public confidence in the justice system, complaints to the CNDH decreased slightly by 2014 but remained higher than pre-joint operations levels (p. 36). Additionally, violence and disappearances escalated, exposing deep-seated corruption and pervasive violence. The 2014 Tlatlaya case is a notable example: initially reported as an armed confrontation with cartel members, it was later revealed to have involved the military execution of 22 civilians who had surrendered, thus uncovering severe human rights abuses, cover-ups, and corruption.

Upon assuming the presidency in 2018, AMLO inherited a nation grappling with the consequences of decades of failed securitized policies and a disconnect between its citizens and the state. In response, AMLO’s plan to de-securitize anti-drug policies aimed to address broader societal insecurities while reducing the reliance on military force, reflecting a shift towards a more comprehensive approach to human security. Embracing a “hugs, not bullets” approach, he aimed to tackle the socio-economic root causes of organized crime by fostering job creation opportunities and social inclusion initiatives. This approach reflected a broader understanding of security grounded in understanding national insecurities from a bottom-to-top approach to address underlying vulnerabilities.

AMLO’s Shift to De-Securitization

De-securitization generally refers to shifting issues from an emergency state to a more regularized, political process. In the context of human security, this shift is even more profound, focusing on a multidisciplinary and people-centric approach that prioritizes the protection and empowerment of individuals and communities against various threats to their well-being.

Human security, as outlined in the 1994 United Nations Development Report, emerged in the late 20^th century as a response to the limitations of traditional, state-centric security paradigms. These paradigms often focus narrowly on external threats like military aggression, neglecting the broader spectrum of dangers that impact daily life. Key components of human security include: Freedom from Fear; Freedom from Want; Interdependent Components; and Empowerment and Resilience.

This concept is particularly relevant to Latin America and the Caribbean, where communities have long faced intersectional threats such as organized crime, systemic violence, and socio-economic inequalities that traditional state-centric security approaches have generally struggled to address. Over 12 years (2008–2020), Pearce and Abello Colak (2021) conducted research in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, and Mexico, collaborating with communities enduring persistent violence and criminal activity. They highlight the importance of refocusing security thinking on protecting human life and making security practices responsive to contemporary, interconnected human challenges.

AMLO’s Dual with Fear

The human security lens provides valuable insight into the challenges faced by Mexico during the administrations of Calderón and Nieto (2006–2018). Under these administrations, Mexico experienced widespread human rights abuses due to the militarization of anti-drug trafficking policies, including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and torture, with minimal civilian oversight and accountability. Significant military deployment failed to reduce violence, severely impacting communities embroiled in drug-related conflicts and leading to substantial loss of life—largely due to the military’s lack of domestic policing. Between 2007 and 2014, Mexican armed forces were reported to have injured or killed approximately 3,900 individuals in domestic operations. Consequently, Mexican citizens faced a dual fear – from drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and the military itself.

In 2018, the AMLO administration sought to address these fears by redefining the military’s role in domestic security. To mitigate the pervasive sense of insecurity, the Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (Secretariat of National Defense) and the Secretaría de la Marina (Secretariat of the Navy) were redirected to focus on national defense and border security, stepping back from direct law enforcement duties. Additionally, among other policies on criminal and prison reform and drug usage, the creation of the ‘National Guard’ marked a significant shift, introducing a new law enforcement structure that aimed to integrate military, police forces, and civilian authorities to enhance civilian oversight.

Equity is Security: AMLO’s Strategy

Following physical security, a sense of political security ensures citizens can live in a society that respects basic human rights. However, between 2006 and 2018, Mexico grappled with profound socio-economic insecurities, such as poverty, inequality, and lack of access to basic services like healthcare and education. For instance, Pearce and Abello Colak (p. 16) highlight the concept of a “safer space” in Latin American communities, including Mexico. It encompasses relational and material components, such as living with dignity, reliable access to services and employment, and supportive networks among residents and state institutions. This elucidates how human security extends beyond traditional collective objectives to address the Mexican population’s longing for equity.

In doing so, Pearce and Abello Colak also argue that security must be an equitable and accessible public good that responds to objective experiences and subjective feelings of deprivation (p. 10). During their research, they found that young people in Mexico expressed feelings of stigmatization and insecurity due to police presence and have expressed a need for dignified employment, educational opportunities that are tailored to the diverse needs of society, and an awareness of human rights at a young age to recognize abuse. These findings emphasize that human security is not merely about overarching policies but also about understanding and addressing specific needs and aspirations of individuals at the community level.

In Mexico, these insecurities have not only undermined individuals’ well-being but also contributed to the vulnerabilities exploited by drug cartels for recruitment and exploitation. Edgardo Buscaglia’s work critically analyzes the gaps of power and regulatory failures that perpetuate the influence of criminal groups. This dynamic of human security acknowledges the interdependence of various threats and vulnerabilities, where socio-economic inequalities and a lack of opportunities exacerbate security challenges. At the same time, violence and conflict can perpetuate cycles of poverty and marginalization. Women and young people in Mexico have expressed that militarized solutions did not address the daily violence they faced; instead, they were often stigmatized by the police and left vulnerable to forced recruitment into armed groups and DTOs. In Guadalupe, police actions such as beating or torturing young men pushed them further into criminality rather than deterring it, embedding citizens into vicious cycles of structural violence.

AMLO’s administration recognized that socio-economic insecurities are not only symptoms but also drivers of violence and criminal activity. During his presidential campaign, López Obrador highlighted the need to combat violence through education and employment, famously stating, “Becarios sí, sicarios no,” (scholars, not hitmen).

His administration launched several initiatives to tackle poverty, inequality, and limited access to basic services. The focus was on creating job opportunities, improving education, and enhancing social welfare programs, particularly targeting young people, who are often the most vulnerable to recruitment by drug cartels. Key programs such as Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro (Youth Building the Future) and Sembrando Vida (Sowing Life) were central to this strategy. Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro provided scholarships and training for young people, offering them a viable alternative to the lure of criminal organizations by creating pathways to stable employment. Meanwhile, Sembrando Vida aimed to revitalize rural areas by promoting sustainable agriculture and providing financial support to farmers, while also providing alternatives to migration into the United States in search of jobs. These programs were not merely economic initiatives but were also framed as integral to the empowerment and resilience of communities, recognizing that fiscal security is deeply interconnected with social stability and personal safety. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh’s exploration of human security underscores the importance of shifting from external protection to internal empowerment, an idea that AMLO’s policies seemed to embrace.

Evaluating AMLO’s Human Security Approach: Missed Opportunities and Limitations

AMLO’s intentions to reform Mexico’s security landscape have faced several criticisms, which highlight the limitations and contradictions of his policies:

Militarization of the National Guard

Although the National Guard was established as a civilian force, by 2020, over 70% of its members came from military backgrounds. Although mandated to operate under civilian control, most of its leadership, personnel, funding, and equipment came from the armed forces. Furthermore, AMLO expanded the military’s role into areas such as migration, seaport, airport administration, and infrastructure. This expansion was also criticized on the grounds of diverting the National Guard from its intended purpose and raising concerns about the military’s lack of training to handle vulnerable migrant populations.

Inadequate Response to Femicides and Gender-Based Violence

Critics argue that AMLO’s response to the escalating femicide crisis in Mexico has been marked by inadequate action and dismissiveness. With the surge in violence against women, with femicides increasing from 19.8% in 2015 to 24.7% in 2023, AMLO’s administration has been criticized for its lack of substantial measures. The president’s approach included significant budget cuts to women’s shelters and dismissive rhetoric about women’s rights issues, which fueled widespread protests and direct actions by feminists. His claims that most domestic violence calls are false, and that criticism of his policies could be considered gender-based violence highlights a troubling insensitivity to the severity of the crisis. Furthermore, his consistent focus on moral and value-based solutions, rather than targeted interventions, has been viewed as insufficient in addressing the systemic nature of gender violence.

Ineffectiveness of Initiatives

AMLO’s initiatives often fell short of expectations, disappointing the public with vague outcomes. For instance, the Sembrando Vida (Sowing Life) program, intended to promote job opportunities in reforestation, ironically led to deforestation as farmers cleared land to qualify for financial benefits. This program may have contributed to the loss of 72,830 hectares in its first year. Similarly, the Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro (Youth Building the Future) program, aimed at integrating young people into the workforce, has been criticized for lacking a comprehensive strategy with concrete parameters to measure its effectiveness. Notwithstanding significant investment, formal employment among young people decreased by 128,000 from 2018 to 2023, indicating that the program failed to achieve its objectives.

Achieving Peace Across Latin America: Convenient or Communal?

Much like Mexico, other Latin American countries have sought alternatives to traditional, militarized responses to violence and drug trafficking, a problem seen throughout the region. Brazil and Columbia offer comprehensive case studies of this trend. While these countries may vary in their specific policy approaches, they share a mutual understanding: moving beyond militarization requires investing in community engagement and social development. Both cases highlight the promise and complexities of such a paradigm shift, illustrating potential paths for Mexico, as well as shared challenges that underscore the need for structured bottom-up reforms across Latin America.

Starting from 2000, Brazil centered its strategy on community policing models, most notably through the Grupamento de Policiamento em Areas Especiais (GPAE, or Police Grouping for Special Areas) and the Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP, or Pacifying Police Units) in 2008. These programs aimed to establish an increased young police presence (p.7) within favelas (urban squatter settlements) to reduce violence through proximity policing as opposed to reactive force. This extended reach gave state visibility in certain areas; however, as they expanded, they suffered from under-resourcing, corruption, and eventually, consequences of police brutality. Wolff argues that the seeming decrease in violence owed to these initiatives was more likely due to informal agreements between police and local drug trafficking gangs to “share authority.”

The UPP fell short of its goals due to two major reasons: First, it was unable to fulfill the socio-economic roles of the gangs in the communities due to inadequate resources – supplying material aid, protection, and economic opportunities, that reinforced their influence in the favelas. This weakened the UPP’s legitimacy. Second, instead of building trust with the local youth, a critical demographic for long-term community stability, the UPP officers targeted young people (p.36) as the primary subjects of policing. This inevitably chipped away at the little trust between the police and the community.

The Bases Comunitárias de Segurança (BCS) was introduced in 2012 to shift from force-driven tactics to community outreach by fostering dialogue and trust between residents and police. In his interviews, in Nordeste de Amaralina, Coelho found that like the UPP, BCS struggled with accountability and inadequate officer training. The idea that “military police should not carry out social programs for ‘children of criminals’” (p.48) encompasses the inherent bias and insufficient preparation on both sides (police and community) that hampered the program’s effectiveness. Similar to Mexico’s National Guard, the failure of Brazil’s initiatives was primarily due to their militarization, with them existing as no more than a “form of theatre.” The apparent peace in the favelas was one of “silence” and fear. While human security means more than a mere absence of violence, this ‘peace’ seemed convenient to the program’s goals of reducing violence, rather than prioritizing that of the communities.

Colombia, long plagued with deep-seated violence and drug trafficking, took a historic step toward peace in 2016 by ending more than five decades of armed conflict with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP/FARC, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). The peace agreement sought to not only end the violence but also to address its consequences. Traditionally, as the world’s largest cultivator of the coca plant, Colombia had adopted the United States-backed “war on drugs” approach towards drug users and cultivators. The 2016 agreement, thus, acknowledged the links between poverty, marginalization, and the illicit drug economy. One of its major initiatives was the crop substitution program,whichfocused on helping farmers voluntarily substitute coca for legal agriculture by providing financial and technical resources to help with the transition. While it broadly aligns with AMLO’s Sembrando Vida program, it was more structured to dismantle the structural inequalities that allowed the drug trade to thrive. However, not unlike Mexico, the program has faced criticism due to the lack of results; nearly eight years into its 15-year plan, the UNODC reported a 53% increase in cocaine production in 2023. Similarly, the reintegration programs for ex-combatants aimed to create pathways back into civilian life through vocational training and community-building efforts. In addition to the United Nations, others have also shown support for Colombia’s peace process.

While its pursuit of peace is considered a model for conflict resolution, Colombia has faced its own set of challenges. One of the more significant hurdles has been ensuring the security of ex-combatants and local leaders from armed dissident groups that now operate in former FARC territories. Since 2016, 421 signatories have reportedly been killed by these groups. Like Mexico, there has also been criticism regarding the lack of a gender perspective and LGBTQIA+ community representation in decision-making processes and peace negotiations.

Discussion and Analysis

The shift from a militarized security approach to a de-securitized, human-centered one under President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) represented a significant departure from previous strategies. While Calderón and Nieto’s approaches targeted drug trafficking organizations to put an end to the “War on Drugs”, they failed to address the broader human security issues affecting the Mexican population. AMLO’s “Hugs, not Bullets” strategy aimed to break the cycle of violence through socio-economic development and community empowerment, moving from external protection to internal empowerment.

Pearce and Abello Colak highlight the necessity of “co-constructing” security measures with communities to effectively tackle the complex insecurities faced by marginalized populations. This promotes non-militarized, violence-reducing alternatives, aligning with AMLO’s emphasis on social reforms, youth scholarships, and community development projects like Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro and Sembrando Vida. These initiatives aimed to deter vulnerable populations from joining organized crime groups and mark a significant step towards “co-construction.” By providing these communities with the resources and opportunities to build more secure and resilient futures, AMLO sought to shift the focus from punitive measures to sustainable solutions.

Colombia and Brazil’s experiences similarly highlight the need for alternatives to traditional security models, though each faced challenges. Mexico can still draw useful lessons from both. On the one hand, while Brazil’s UPP and BCS initiatives suffered from the pitfalls of inadequate resourcing, training, and deep-seated institutional biases, they acknowledge the multi-dimensional nature of drug trafficking by addressing issues in stages rather than all at once. On the other hand, Colombia’s peace agreement with FARC exemplifies a few key practices that Mexico could consider: committing to accountability through third-party yearly progress reports and planning for the aftermath of conflict resolution. Subsequently, while initiatives in both countries highlighted the need to focus on the general youth, actual initiatives were not aimed towards them. Mexico incorporated youth social inclusion programs as crime prevention, which could be used in Colombia’s coca-growing areas or Brazil’s favelas. However, as per Pearce and Abello Colak, the true essence of human security lies in ensuring that the offered alternatives genuinely meet the needs and aspirations of those they are designed to protect. Since human security is a dynamic concept that evolves with socio-political changes, every country would need to apply structural and heavily customized considerations for future initiatives at their own pace.

Conclusion

In conclusion, understanding the major aspects of human security through Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia’s policies especially underscores that these efforts are a starting point for aligning security with the realities of vulnerable populations in Latin America. The success of these strategies will depend on the state’s ongoing commitment to addressing the root causes of insecurity and fostering an inclusive, sustainable security environment. This article is an attempt to bridge theory with real-world practice and realize that despite AMLO’s textbook approach to human security, there exists a dire need to recognize and empower the voices of those affected most by insecurity. Ultimately, the focus must shift from merely working for marginalized populations to working with them. Just as the Mexican, Brazilian, and Colombian governments set ambitious goals, a more integrated strategy would be required to address the ground realities of the local communities. Human security and well-being must be placed at the center of these efforts, no longer as an afterthought. This is only the beginning of a much-needed conversation on the future of security in Mexico and the broader Latin American region.