On July 17, 2024, British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer announced in the King’s speech[1] that he would bring in legislation to abolish the remaining hereditary peers’ rights to sit in the House of Lords. On October 15, 2024 the House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill[2] moved a step closer to becoming law with Second Reading in the House of Commons.
The UK House of Lords has long served as an essential component of the British constitutional framework. Over centuries, it has transitioned from a purely aristocratic institution to one that reflects, in part, the ideals of modern governance. However, questions about its role, legitimacy, and structure continue to surface, particularly in light of recent political shifts under the Labour government.
This essay delves into the historical context of the House of Lords, its gradual evolution under pivotal reforms, and why—in opposition to the current trajectory—a return to its traditional, hereditary, and non-elective structure may offer a more balanced democratic system. Through an examination of its current state and future proposals, the study argues that tradition, stability, and longevity provide essential safeguards to the modern UK constitution. This essay concludes that over time, House of Lords reform has represented an illusory modernization effort without a substantive rationale, prioritizing change for its own sake, and failing to deliver meaningful improvement.
Historical Background
The origins of the House of Lords can be traced back to the Anglo-Saxon period.[3] During this time, kings would convene assemblies known as the Witenagemot (or “meeting of the wise”), which included nobles, clergy, and other influential figures.[4] These gatherings advised the king on matters of governance, much like an early advisory council.[5]
After the Norman Conquest in 1066, the Witenagemot evolved into the king’s feudal court, known as the Curia Regis (King’s Council).[6] This body included prominent nobles and bishops who provided counsel to the monarch. Over time, the Curia Regis began to separate into two distinct bodies: one focused on administration (which eventually became the Privy Council) and another on legislative and judicial matters, forming the basis of what we now recognize as the House of Lords.[7]
It gradually formalized into a legislative body with a defined role in governance, especially following the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215 and the emergence of Parliament as a two-chamber system, with the Commons as the lower House and the Lords as the upper House, in the 14th century.[8] The House of Lords played significant roles during pivotal moments in British history, including the English Civil War (1642–1651) and the Glorious Revolution of 1688. This latter event solidified parliamentary supremacy[9] over the monarchy and established the foundations of modern constitutionalism, with the bicameral system[10] enshrined at its core.
During the medieval period, the House of Lords gained considerable power, particularly through its role in taxation and governance. The Magna Carta of 1215 formally involved the barons in the governance process, and the Lords continued to serve as a counterbalance to royal authority over the ensuing centuries. By the 18th and 19th centuries, the institution had entrenched itself as a stable, albeit unelected, body that provided oversight and a check on the Commons’ legislative powers (Cannadine, 1999).[11] However, this equilibrium began to shift as left-wing politics in the 20th century sought to reduce aristocratic privilege.
The Parliament Act of 1911,[12] enacted by the Liberal government under Prime Minister Herbert Asquith, was a landmark moment in the House of Lords’ history. The act was introduced following the repeated blocking of key reforms by the Lords, particularly those concerning social welfare and taxation. This legislation curtailed the Lords’ ability to veto bills outright and limited their delaying powers to a maximum of two years, granting greater legislative authority to the elected House of Commons (Dorey and Kelso, 2011).[13]
The Parliament Act of 1949,[14] enacted by the Labour government under Prime Minister Clement Attlee, reinforced this shift. The act further reduced the power of the House of Lords by limiting its ability to block legislation, allowing the House of Commons to bypass the Lords if they rejected a bill in two consecutive sessions. The act further shortened the period for Lords to delay legislation from two years to one. This reform solidified the primacy of the elected House of Commons in the legislative process (Power, 2007).[15]
The most significant reform in the modern era occurred under Tony Blair’s Labour government in 1999. The House of Lords Act[16] significantly reformed the House of Lords by removing most hereditary peers. Hereditary peerage refers to titles of nobility passed down through family lines, typically from parent to child. This system reflects feudal traditions of land and title inheritance, shaping Britain’s aristocratic hierarchy (Pike,1894).[17] Blair reduced the number of hereditary peers from 750 to 92. Of these, 90 seats are filled through elections among the House’s members: 15 by a vote of the entire House (including life peers), 42 by Conservative hereditary peers, two by Labour hereditary peers, three by Liberal Democrat hereditary peers, and 28 by crossbench hereditary peers. The remaining two hereditary peers maintain their positions by virtue of their hereditary roles as Earl Marshal and Lord Great Chamberlain, which are currently held by the Dukes of Norfolk and the Barons Carrington, respectively. These positions are the only hereditary peerages with an automatic right to sit in the House.
Tony Blair’s Lords Reform
Before Tony Blair’s reforms in 1999, the House of Lords embodied Britain’s aristocratic heritage, with its composition reflecting centuries of tradition. Hereditary peers, alongside life peers, Lords Spiritual, and Law Lords held seats, providing continuity through generations of land stewardship and governance experience. The Lords Spiritual, made up of the bishops of the Church of England, represented the nation’s ethical and moral concerns, contributing perspectives grounded in Christian teachings (Brader, 2024).[18] Meanwhile, Law Lords served as the highest court of appeal, interpreting the law and hearing cases until the Supreme Court was established in 2009.
Blair’s reforms were lauded by some as a step toward enhancing the institution’s democratic legitimacy by making it more meritocratic – with appointed life peers drawn from politics, business, the arts, and public service (Williams, 2023).[19] However, critics argue that the reforms created an imbalance, as life peers now dominated the House of Lords and accusations of political patronage became more pronounced (Russell, 2022).[20] The Life Peerages Act 1958[21] was a turning point in the history of the House of Lords. The act allowed for the appointment of life peers, who would sit in the House of Lords for the duration of their lifetime but would not pass their title onto their descendants.
The introduction of life peers fundamentally changed the composition of the House. It made room for the appointment of individuals based on their professional accomplishments, rather than their lineage. The act enabled successive prime ministers to recommend political, business, academic, and cultural figures for peerages, thereby increasing the diversity of expertise within the House. However, the act also opened the door to more political appointments, as prime ministers were able to recommend peers from their own party to the monarch, thus influencing the political balance of the House. This has led to concerns about the use of peerages as rewards for political loyalty rather than genuine public service (Aaronovitch, 2023).[22]
Over time, the life peerage system became a means by which political patronage could shape the upper chamber. In this way, the progressive abolition of the hereditary element of the House coincided with an increase in politically motivated appointments. While life peers have undeniably enriched the Lords with their expertise, the erosion of the aristocratic element raises questions about the House’s independence and its traditional role as a check on the Commons.
Reforming the Lords’ Judicial Function
An additional reform that profoundly affected the Lords was the removal of their judicial functions, culminating in the creation of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in 2009. This move was seen as necessary to reinforce the principle of the separation of powers. Prior to this, the House of Lords had served as the final appellate body, a role it had held since the 14th century. While the creation of the Supreme Court was intended to ensure judicial independence and streamline legal processes, the removal of judicial expertise from the Lords has been critiqued.
The new Supreme Court may lack the systemic depth of legal discourse traditionally fostered within the House of Lords, where experienced judges played a pivotal role in shaping and debating the law. (Malleson, 2020).[23] The separation of judicial functions has also raised concerns about a “democratic deficit.” The appointment of Supreme Court judges lacks the transparency and accountability seen in the appointment of peers to the judicial function (Delaney, 2016).[24] Moreover, concentrating judicial power in a single institution risks undermining the checks and balances provided by a system where judicial oversight is integrated into the legislative process (Wyatt and Ekins, 2020).[25] Overall, the judicial function of the House of Lords allowed for a deep, historically informed perspective on legal matters, with judges often possessing extensive expertise gained through years of public service. This gave the UK appellate jurisdiction a unique perspective, embodying a historically grounded approach to judicial decision-making that was integral to British exceptionalism. The House of Lords, with its deep-rooted traditions and wealth of legal expertise, ensured that legal rulings facilitated nuanced deliberations and reflected both the continuity of British law and a broader understanding of societal evolution (Barrett, 2000).[26]
Keir Starmer’s Proposed Reforms
In 2024, Keir Starmer’s Labour government unveiled plans to abolish the House of Lords and replace it with a new “Assembly of Nations and Regions.” This proposal aims to create a second chamber that better reflects the UK’s regional diversity, decentralizing power from Westminster and enhancing democratic representation. Starmer envisions a more transparent and accountable system, with elected members serving limited terms and representing a broader swath of the population (Labour Party Manifesto, 2024).[27]
While these proposals might seem to advance democratic ideals, critics argue that Starmer’s plan risks undermining the very purpose of the Lords as a revising chamber. By introducing elected members, the chamber could become more politically charged, leading to short-term thinking and diminishing the depth of expertise currently provided by life peers. The House of Lords has traditionally acted as a stabilizing force, offering a long-term perspective and restraint that the Commons, subject to electoral cycles, often lacks (Dennison, 2020).[28]
Additionally, Starmer’s proposal to replace the House of Lords with an assembly of nations and regions, resembling the U.S. Senate in its representation of states, is more suited to a federal system with two layers of governance, whereas the UK remains a unitary kingdom, not a federal state. The UK already has devolution to Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland through the Government of Wales Act 1998,[29] the Scotland Act 1998,[30] and the Northern Ireland Act 1998,[31] which grant these regions varying degrees of legislative power. Devolution refers to the transfer of specific powers from the central government to regional governments, while still maintaining the sovereignty of the UK Parliament (Bogdanor, 2001).[32] The blending of devolution and federalism would fundamentally alter the UK’s constitutional framework, undermining its historical unity and potentially creating confusion over legislative authority (MacKinnon, 2015).[33]
Returning to Tradition: The Case for a Non-Elective Lords
Rather than moving towards an elected chamber, reforms should restore the hereditary and non-elective nature of the House of Lords. This structure, far from being an anachronism, plays a vital role in ensuring the stability and continuity of the UK’s constitutional framework. Democracy should not be understood purely as a matter of elections; it encompasses broader ideals of governance that emphasize balance, representation, and institutional continuity (Lovett, 2023).[34]
The hereditary system ensures that individuals from long-standing traditions of governance can contribute to the legislative process, bringing a sense of stewardship and historical perspective that elected officials often lack. The presence of hereditary peers provides a counterweight to the rapid turnover and short-term interests that dominate the House of Commons, allowing for more measured, long-term decision-making.
Moreover, the role of the monarch in appointing peers enhances accountability and fosters a sense of national unity. It reminds citizens that governance is not merely transactional but rooted in the service of the public good, with the monarch serving as a custodian of national interests. This dual structure—the elected Commons and the non-elected Lords—preserves the delicate balance of democracy, ensuring that legislation reflects both the will of the people and the continuity of the nation’s history (Mc Manamon, 2012).[35]
Conclusion
Democracy is often misunderstood as solely reliant on elections. Instead, it encompasses a broader spectrum of governance that emphasizes balance, representation, and continuity. The UK constitution artfully combines democratic elements through the elected House of Commons with a noble element represented by the House of Lords, which provides invaluable stability and continuity.
For centuries, the House of Lords has acted as a stabilizing force, offering wisdom and restraint that political parties often lack. It serves as a counterbalance to the fluctuating tides of public opinion and short-term electoral pressures. In this way, the Lords can address complex issues without being swayed by immediate political considerations.
By maintaining a hereditary and non-elective structure, the House of Lords ensures that individuals—many of whom inherit titles tied to centuries of family service and governance—can contribute to the legislative process. Hereditary peers often cultivate their expertise through unique paths: exposure to political and legal traditions passed down within their families, governance roles at leading institutions such as Oxford or Cambridge, and roles in public life, including business leadership, charitable work, or military service. This deep-rooted connection to British history and societal roles fosters a sense of stewardship and continuity. Notably, hereditary peers represent a pool of families that have historically shaped policy, ranging from economic reform to empire administration. This institutional design mitigates the risks of a purely electoral system, where the emphasis on popularity or short-term political gains can overshadow the merit and long-term perspective provided by such individuals.’
In essence, the House of Lords reflects the idea that democracy can be enriched by a respect for tradition and wisdom, balancing the will of the people with the continuity of the nation’s history. While reforming the Lords in the name of modernism may seem appealing, it risks overlooking the unique strengths of a system rooted in tradition and stability. Placing an emphasis on modernity over heritage could diminish the value of historical continuity, which has long been a defining feature of British governance. Rather than pursuing further reforms that diminish the aristocratic element of the House, efforts should focus on preserving the unique qualities that make the House of Lords such a vital part of British governance. A return to a non-elective, hereditary-based system would ensure that the Lords remain an independent, stabilizing force in British politics. In doing so, the House of Lords would continue to serve its purpose as a guardian of the UK’s constitutional balance, offering a pivotal counterweight to the short-term political pressures that dominate the House of Commons.
Reference
[1] King Charles III. “King’’s Speech.” State Opening of Parliament, July 17, 2024. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-kings-speech-2024.
[2] House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill (UK), 2024.
[3] Freeman, Edward A. “The House of Lords”. Fortnightly 33, no. 194 (1883): 233-249.
[4] Blunden, Andy. “Anglo-Saxon England”. In The Origins of Collective Decision Making, (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2016) doi: https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004319639_005.
[5] Pike, Luke Owen. A Constitutional History of the House of Lords: From Original Sources. London: Macmillan and Co., 1894.
[6] Woodbine, George E. “Cases in New Curia Regis Rolls Affecting Old Rules in English Legal History.” Yale LJ 39 (1929): 505.
[7] Morris, William A. “The Lesser Curia Regis Under the First Two Norman Kings of England.” The American Historical Review 34, no. 4 (1929): 772–78. https://doi.org/10.2307/1836781.
[8] Shell, Donald. “The History of Bicameralism.” In Second Chambers, 1st ed. London: Routledge, 2001. Pages 1-14. eBook ISBN 9780203045541.
[9] “Parliament and Sovereignty.” UK Parliament. Accessed October 28, 2024. https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/sovereignty/.
[10] “The UK Political System.“ UK Parliament. Accessed October 28, 2024. https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/system/.
[11] Cannadine, David N. The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy. New York: Vintage Books, 1999.
[12] Parliament Act 1911 (UK).
[13] Dorey, Peter, and Alexandra Kelso. House of Lords Reform Since 1911: Must the Lords Go? London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
[14] Parliament Act 1949 (UK).
[15] Power, Greg. “The politics of parliamentary reform: Lessons from the House of Commons (2001–2005).” Parliamentary Affairs 60, no. 3 (2007): 492-509.
[16] House of Lords Act 1999 (UK).
[17] Pike, supra, note 5.
[18] UK Parliament. “Lords Spiritual in the House of Lords: Explained.” House of Lords Library. Last modified August 22, 2023. https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/lords-spiritual-in-the-house-of-lords-explained/.
[19] Williams, Ben. “What’’s the Future for the House of Lords?” Political Insight 14, no. 1 (2023): 22-25. https://doi.org/10.1177/20419058231167266.
[20] Russell, Meg. “Why Abolishing the House of Lords Is Not the Answer.” Prospect Magazine. Accessed October 28, 2024. https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/politics/60267/why-abolishing-the-house-of-lords-is-not-the-answer.
[21] Life Peerages Act 1958 (UK).
[22] Aaronovitch, David. “Why the British Honors System Is Broken.” The Atlantic, August 2023. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/08/britain-honors-system-peerage-lords/674963/.
[23] Malleson, Kate. The New Judiciary: The Effects of Expansion and Activism. London: Routledge, 2020.
[24] Delaney, Erin. “Searching for Constitutional Meaning in Institutional Design: The Debate over Judicial Appointments in the United Kingdom.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 14, no. 3 (July 2016): 752–768. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mow044.
[25] Wyatt, Derrick QC, and Richard Ekins. Reforming the Supreme Court. Foreword by Rt Hon. the Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. London: Policy Exchange, 2020.
[26] Barrett, Maxwell. The Law Lords: An Account of the Workings of Britain’s Highest Judicial Body and the Men who Preside Over it. New York: Springer, 2000.
[27] Labour Party. Change: Labour’’s 2024 Manifesto. London: Labour Party, 2024. https://labour.org.uk.
[28] Dennison, James. “A Proposal for Simultaneous Reform of the House of Commons and House of Lords.” The Political Quarterly 91, no. 2 (April–June 2020): 442–447. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12840.
[29] Government of Wales Act 1998 (UK).
[30] Scotland Act 1998 (UK).
[31] Northern Ireland Act 1998 (UK).
[32] Bogdanor, Vernon. Devolution in the United Kingdom. Oxford Paperbacks, 2001.
[33] MacKinnon, Danny. “Devolution, state restructuring and policy divergence in the UK.” The Geographical Journal 181, no. 1 (2015): 47-56.
[34] Lovett, Adam. “Should the House of Lords be More Democratic?” LSE Philosophy Blog, November 10, 2023. https://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/blog/2023/11/10/should-the-house-of-lords-be-more-democratic/.
[35] McManamon, Anthony. The House of Lords and the British Political Tradition. PhD diss., University of Birmingham, 2012.
