Matthew D. Hearn is a senior manager at Social Impact, a global development management consulting firm providing monitoring, evaluation, strategic planning, and capacity-building. He is also a mid-career master’s candidate at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. Matthew focuses on the nexus between international development and security.
In Pushkin’s 1822 poem, Prisoner of the Caucasus, the epilogue proclaims, “And the violent cry of war fell silent: All is subject to the Russian sword. Proud sons of the Caucasus, You have fought, you have perished terribly.”[1] The political overtones of the poem’s dénouement are jarring compared to the poem’s earlier verses on romance, natural beauty, and the heroism of the Caucasian people. But the poem’s ending reveals the complicated position of the region in Russian history and culture. The Caucasus is simultaneously a place to be controlled, otherized, and romanticized.
The conflict in the Russian Republic of Chechnya is unique as the only violent secessionist movement within the Russian Federation.[2] Russian conflict management strategies to date have been security-centric, focusing on peacemaking, peace enforcement, and now peacekeeping. The violence has ebbed and flowed for the past two hundred years, ingraining stigma, hostility, and dehumanization. These elements of structural violence hardened the identities of Russians and ethnic Chechens to the point where the barriers to a durable peace are quite high. However, peace is possible. To achieve conflict resolution in Chechnya, leaders in Grozny and Moscow must move to peacebuilding strategies that address the basic identity needs of the Chechen people.
Edward Azar’s framework theory of protracted social conflict is a useful analytical tool to explore the linkages between intractability and Chechen identity.[3] All four of the theory’s pre-conditions for intense violence are present: communal content, deprivation of human needs, poor governance, and international linkages.[4]
Communal Content
The communal content of religious identity in Chechnya is a permissive driver of conflict, but it is not the underlying cause of the conflict. Nor are the religious dynamics static; the conflict continues despite fundamental changes in the religious identities of the combatants.
The conflict in Chechnya cannot be simplified into a Huntington-esque clash of civilizations between Islam and Christianity. The Chechen variant of Sunni Sufism, highly adapted to local culture, has been under intense pressure from the fundamentalist Wahhabi sect’s influence of Salafist Sunni Islam since the 1990s. Russian religious identity moved from Czarist-era Eastern Orthodox Christianity to Communism’s militant-secularism, then back to a version of Eastern Orthodox Christianity that is less politically powerful but still a potent element of Russian nationalism. Czarist Russian Christians allied at times with Sufi clans in the 18th and 19th centuries. Stalin deported and killed hundreds of thousands of rebellious Sufi Chechens after World War Two, yet their grandchildren now ally with Russian Christians to fight Salafists.
All these examples illustrate that while the combatants’ religious identities exhibit some fluidity, the overall narratives of each side retained the zero-sum dyad of victory or defeat. Religion acts as a permissive driver of conflict in Chechnya, functioning as a trigger mechanism for ethnonationalist violence rather than a root cause of conflict.
Political Needs
The second of Azar’s pre-conditions for protracted social conflict, deprivation of needs, manifests itself as a lack of political voice for ethnic Chechens. Russians have never been an ethnic majority in Chechnya, yet they have dominated Chechen politics since Russia’s victory in the long and brutal Caucasian War of 1817-1864.
The Soviet Union organized territory along ethnic lines through the creation of autonomous republics (in name only). This approach worked to some extent. James Hughes notes that by 1989, younger generations of Chechens “were thoroughly Sovietized, urbanized, and secularized,” and that 55% of the population self-identified as Slavic—not Chechen.[5][6] But by the 1980s, waning Soviet power to police the system exposed fault lines. When the Soviet Union devolved in 1991, many former Soviet republics, Chechnya included, saw an opportunity for self-rule. Chechnya’s geographic distance on the Russian frontier gave it significant capacity to act on its political grievances and seek self-determination, and it did not join the Russian Federation in 1992.
Poor Governance
Azar’s third pre-condition for protracted social conflict is poor governance leading to frustrated identity group needs.[7] The Russian government’s response to Chechnya’s bid for sovereignty is a textbook example of how an authoritarian response can polarize and radicalize a conflict.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Dzhokhar Dudayev won a referendum for president of Chechnya and declared independence. Despite Yeltsin’s encouragement to former Soviet peoples to “take all the sovereignty you can swallow,” Russia countered with a half-hearted military intervention at Grozny airport in November 1991.[8] The operation was quickly aborted without violence, but lasting damage was done. The Chechen independence movement galvanized at Moscow’s signal that it would not let Chechnya go without a fight.[9]
In 1992 Chechnya adopted a constitution as a fully independent, secular state with its own parliament and president. The newly formed Russian Federation never recognized Chechnya’s independence, but could do little about it as the former Soviet empire unraveled. By 1994 Moscow’s policy shifted from an attitude of neglect to neo-imperial consolidation of the former Soviet republics into the Russian Federation.
President Boris Yeltsin imposed an economic blockade and actively sought to undermine, overthrow, and even assassinate Dudayev.[10] A November 1994 coup by anti-Dudayev volunteers supported by Russian troops failed miserably. Captured Russian soldiers were paraded on Chechen television while Moscow simultaneously broadcast farcical official denials of involvement. Shortly after this humiliating defeat, Moscow escalated with a large ground invasion of Chechnya in December 1994.
The 1994 military intervention was a turning point. The Russian government opted for a policy of forceful repression instead of addressing the needs and interests of the Chechen identity group. There were several factors in the decision to take this approach. First, the breakaway republic of Chechnya came to be seen among Moscow’s policymaking elites as a litmus test for their resolve to staunch the decline in Russian power. Second, there was well-founded fear that western countries and oil companies were moving into the Caucasus to exploit its petroleum and natural gas reserves.[11] Third, Yeltsin was politically weak and viewed Chechnya as a way to shore up his domestic support.
Rather than engage constructively to address the needs of the Chechen people, Russia opted for destabilizing, destructive intervention. The authoritarian Russian tools of repression, assassination, and military force were key elements that turned Chechnya from an ethnonationalist secessionist movement into a violent, protracted social conflict.
International Linkages
The fourth of Azar’s pre-conditions for violent protracted social conflict, international linkages, is satisfied in Chechnya by its dependence on Russia and its cultural-religious ties to the broader Islamic world.
After the Soviet collapse, the Russian Federation’s inability to fill the vacuum ushered in political and economic instability in Chechnya. The absence of Soviet governing institutions and revenue, however unrepresentative they may have been, meant that Chechnya did not have effective institutions for its own governance.
The other important international linkage was the growing presence of the Wahhabi Salafist sect of Islam in Chechnya in the 1980s and 1990s. Wahhabism is doctrinally opposed to Sufism and intolerant of the local religious traditions in Chechnya. It has a straightforward, black and white worldview that appeals to many Chechens disillusioned by instability and secularism. These conditions make Chechnya ripe for radicalization.
While displacing local religious traditions, Wahhabism provided linkages to a growing Salafist Jihadi network around the world. This network mobilized thousands of fighters and millions of dollars to conflicts in Afghanistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina.[12] Similarly, in Chechnya the global Salafist Jihad movement provided money, arms, technical expertise and—most importantly—a unifying worldview that linked the Chechen conflict to a global ideology.
Summarizing the permissive drivers of conflict in Chechnya, one finds latent mobilization potential for separatist identity based on religion and ethnicity, political grievance and under-representation, repressive governance, and international support. When these pre-conditions were combined with Chechnya’s significant capacity to pursue ethnonationalist independence, the mold for a violent and protracted social conflict was cast.
Conflict Management Strategies: What Hasn’t Worked
Most of Russia’s conflict management strategies in Chechnya since the fall of the Soviet Union have been heavy-handed and security-centric, and fall within the narrow range from war to crisis on the conflict management spectrum.[13][14] However, Russia also used economic blockade, proxy forces, negotiation, and compromise. None of these strategies have been successful in resolving the conflict, yet Russian policies are the key to peace.
The invasion of Chechnya in 1994 was “peacemaking”: using force to compel Chechen secessionists to back down.[15] Despite overwhelming force, Russia lost the first Russo-Chechen War and was forced to sign a ceasefire agreement and withdraw in 1996.[16] The war was an unmitigated military and political disaster for Russia.[17]
Unfortunately, rebel rulers in Chechnya could not consolidate their victory and turn to state-building. The fractured and radicalized groups in the resistance fought amongst themselves, plunging Chechnya into further political and economic instability. Despite the ceasefire with Russia, some Chechen rebel groups escalated the conflict. They kidnapped and murdered several top Russian officials and staged incursions into the neighboring Russian republic of Dagestan.[18] The linkage to the global Salafist Jihad is important to note. The earlier victory against Russia and the connection to al-Qa’ida encouraged some rebels to seek further gains and create a unified Islamic state in the Caucasus.
These provocative escalations, combined with the humiliating defeat in the first war, compelled Russia to invade once again in 1999. The Russian military was better organized and equipped this time and had learned hard lessons from the first Chechen war. By 2000, Russian troops captured Grozny—destroying it in the process. But this peacemaking did not end the conflict.
Offensive combat operations transitioned to peace enforcement. Russian forces waged a brutal counterinsurgency campaign until 2009, destroying most urban centers in Chechnya and killing tens of thousands of civilians through indiscriminate attacks. Widespread human rights abuses were reported during this era. Nevertheless, Russia succeeded in driving a wedge between the Salafist and Sufi rebel groups. The resulting alliance with a Sufi Chechen militia eventually led to an unstable peace in 2009.[19]
From 2009 until the present, the current Russian-backed Chechen government has been engaged in peacekeeping, continuing the heavy-handed counterinsurgency and counterterror tactics used by Russian forces to suppress violence. The conflict management strategies of the Russian federal government and the Chechen republic government have largely succeeded in tamping down violence and achieving stability. They have not. however, addressed the underlying conflict dynamics and pre-conditions for protracted social conflict.
Conflict Management Strategies: What Could Work
Russia only has three remaining conflict management strategies in Chechnya. First, continue with authoritarian repression combined with a policy of Russification. Second, cede independence to Chechnya. Third, implement gradual political and social reforms.
A policy of repression and Russification may be able to suppress violence for the near to medium term but is unlikely to fully resolve the conflict. From the standpoint of pure efficacy, this approach is limited because it requires constant pressure and a large resource commitment for an extended period. If at any time the pressure lets up, the conflict has the potential to re-escalate to intense violence.
The second option is to grant Chechnya complete independence. This has the advantage of releasing Russia from resource commitments and giving the Chechens what they fought for in two wars; political independence and full self-rule. But this strategy is unlikely to produce a durable, stable peace because the current republican government of Chechnya relies on Russian financial and military support to suppress violent Salafist insurgents. Without this support, these groups would likely escalate the conflict in Chechnya and probably cause spillover into neighboring Dagestan, Ingushetia, Stavropol Kray, and Georgia. Also, a 2017 survey by the Prague-based Caucasus Times found that a majority of Chechens trust Russian federal authorities more than the republican institutions of strongman President Ramzan Kadyrov’s government, which is blamed for corruption, dismal socio-economic conditions, and frequent violations of basic rights.[20] Even assuming that polling is fraught in a region without freedom of expression, the study raises doubts over whether most Chechens still even want full independence. The unintended consequences could be severe.
The best means to an enduring peace is for Russia to implement a policy of gradual political and social reform that addresses the four pre-conditions for protracted social conflict but does not move so fast to create instability.
The social and political standing of ethnic Chechens should be equalized with Russians at elite levels of society and in government. To address religious tension between Salafists and Sufis, the Chechen government should fund interfaith dialogues to break down enmity and increase understanding, while at the same time quietly promoting and funding traditional Chechen Sufi institutions to promote the native faith of Chechnya.
There is no denying the current government of President Ramzan Kadyrov is repressive, corrupt, violent, and authoritarian. But Moscow has significant economic leverage; Russian subsidies account for around 80 percent of the Chechen government’s annual budget.[21] Throttling the cash flow could be used to induce institutional reforms that produce better governance outcomes for the Chechen people.
Lastly, the Chechen government needs to address the international linkage to violent Salafist groups abroad. The government needs to prevent foreign extremist clerics, preachers, and charities from working in Chechnya. It should set up a joint working group with Russian law enforcement, Interpol, and other international law enforcement agencies to identify and screen returning Chechen fighters from violent conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and the Philippines. Concurrently, the government should work with local religious leaders to promote tolerance, non-violence, and coexistence within the Chechen state.
The complexity and intractability of Chechnya does not lend itself to easy conflict management solutions. The viability of genuine post-conflict peacebuilding is questionable given the authoritarian natures of the regimes in both Moscow and Grozny. The alternative to conflict resolution is a slow-burning insurgency with the potential to flare up, repeating the cycles of death and destruction. It behooves all sides in Chechnya to take a fresh look.
Footnotes
[1] John Lyles, “Bloody Verses: Rereading Pushkin’s Prisoner of the Caucasus,” Pushkin Review 16 (2014): 1, doi:10.1353/pnr.2014.0001.
[2] James Hughes, “Chechnya: The Causes of a Protracted Social Conflict,” Civil Wars 4 (2001): 11.
[3] The field of conflict management considers Chechnya to be an intractable conflict because all attempts at settlement thus far have at best only tamped down violence rather than producing a transformative peace.
[4] Oliver Ramsbothan, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution (Cambridge: Polity 2011), 17-118.
[5] James Hughes, “Chechnya: The Causes of a Protracted Social Conflict,” Civil Wars 4 (2001): 22.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 118.
[8] Gail Lapidus, “Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy of Chechnya,” International Security 23(1): 6.
[9] Ibid: 8.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Hughes, “Chechnya: The Causes of a Protracted Social Conflict,” 24.
[12] Juan C. Zarate, Treasury’s War (New York: Public Affairs, 2013): 69-70, 110.
[13] Michael Lund’s conflict cycle encompasses durable peace, stable peace, unstable peace, crisis, and war.
[14] Sinisa Vukovic, Presentation on March 23rd, MAGP Conflict Management and Negotiation, Session 1, Johns Hopkins University, SAIS, Washington, DC.
[15] In conflict management studies, “peacemaking” emphasizes “making,” i.e. using direct violence to address conflicts. “Peacekeeping” attempts to halt violence, and “peacebuilding” addresses the underlying drivers of conflict.
[16] “Timeline: Chechnya,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/2357267.stm.
[17] Top-end estimates place the number of deaths at 100,000 people, where 30,000-50,000 civilians were killed.
[18] “Timeline: Chechnya,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/2357267.stm.
[19] “Timeline: Chechnya,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/2357267.stm.
[20] Medium-Orient Agency, “Public Opinion Poll in the North Caucasus 2017,” Caucasus Times, November 2, 2017.
[21] Liz Fuller, “Kadyrov’s Chechnya Appears Exempt From Russian Funding Cuts,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 30, 2017.
