Violent clashes between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the infamous paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have plunged Sudan into crisis and renewed instability. In mid-April of 2023, brief gun battles in the streets of Khartoum and other strategic areas around the country quickly escalated. Reports indicate that both sides had been preparing for an armed confrontation and possible future escalations.¹
Pinpointing the exact trigger for Sudan’s plunge into violence is complicated by the historical tensions and intense competition between the paramilitary RSF and Sudan’s armed forces since the former’s founding in 2013.² In the aftermath of the 2019 Sudanese coup d’état, a ‘relative’ truce emerged as both factions temporarily substituted distrust with artificial amity to advance mutual interests—namely, subverting the civilian-led provisional government and resuscitating a shadow government of military holdovers from the Bashir era. When that failed, the ensuing escalatory rhetoric, coupled with the questionable mobilization of forces by both parties, precipitated the hostilities that began in April. To date, the conflict has since claimed over 600 Sudanese lives, with thousands more wounded and an estimated 700,000 individuals internally displaced.³
It is, however, believed that both the head of the SAF, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and his deputy who heads the RSF, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (or ‘Hemedti’), are vying for control over a newly consolidated military and, ultimately, Sudan’s political landscape.⁴ Neither leader is willing to subordinate themselves to the other in a new hierarchy that integrates the paramilitary RSF into the state forces, ensuring that only the state holds a monopoly over the use of force.⁵
Surprisingly, the two have worked together before on at least two major occasions. First, during the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir in 2019, and two years later in a coup usurping Sudan’s civil-military transition government. However, when it came to the intense negotiations on a potential merger, Burhan and Hemedti’s frail partnership of convenience soon collapsed. Both sides disagreed on the timing and sequencing of the planned integration as well as what its final command structure would look like.
By late last year, it became apparent that both generals had lost all confidence in Sudan’s deeply flawed political process and the protracted talks on security sector reform. Both sides sought to upend a debilitating stalemate by resorting to the force of arms, only to end up locked in a bitter, bloody feud that will derail Sudan’s nascent democratization and stability. The intensifying power struggle has raised concerns about a deadly civil war on scale reminiscent of the War in Darfur.
Sudan’s post-independence history has consistently been marred by long episodes of violence, conflict, and prolonged instability within its borders. State-sponsored marginalization and discrimination of non-Arab Sudanese and other minority ethnic groups ultimately resulted in a nearly 17-year-long conflict in Darfur when rebel groups took up arms against the government.
To put this into perspective, the Darfur region covers just over a quarter of Sudan’s total land area, yet a protracted conflict there registered such a devastating toll and contributed to the near-neighborhood’s volatility. Thus, an all-out war encompassing Sudan’s riparian regions, the borderlands, and the peripheries in between, will far eclipse the horrors witnessed throughout the Darfur war that lasted between 2003 and 2020. Worse, this is only assuming the conflict remains relegated only to the belligerents inside Sudan, with little to no external interference.
However, in the last two decades alone, conflicts between or within nations have become increasingly interconnected, with local disputes quickly escalating into regional and international crises. The civil wars in Libya, Yemen, and Syria clearly show how seemingly isolated conflicts can attract foreign interest, resulting in broader geopolitical consequences. The same can be said for Sudan, making it possible to extrapolate lessons and preview the potential ramifications of a runaway crisis turning into an extra-territorial affair.
In Libya, interchanging episodes of political upheaval and violent eruptions following the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in 2011 attracted significant foreign interest and involvement. Countries such as Russia, Turkey, and Egypt back opposing factions, leading to a proxy conflict that exacerbates the woes and prolongs the suffering of average Libyans.⁶ Additionally, intense external meddling has not only deprived Libya of a functioning, unified government. It also came with transformative effects within Libya and outside its borders, creating an opportunity for extremist groups, such as Daesh, to exploit the chaos, porous borders, and security vacuum to gain a foothold.⁷
Elsewhere, Syria’s civil war became one of the most complex and protracted conflicts of the 21st century, a near-perfect encapsulation of what happens when civil wars go global. Many actors, including the United States, Russia, Iran, Turkey, and non-state actors (e.g., Hezbollah and ISIS), have become involved, each pursuing their interests and agendas.⁸ As a result, the Syrian conflict morphed from a localized struggle into a global crisis with reverberations felt far beyond the Middle East, including the destabilization of neighboring countries and a vast refugee crisis affecting Europe.⁹
The crisis in Sudan, marked by political instability, economic collapse, and violence in peripheral regions among militia groups, presents a potential new flashpoint for foreign interest.¹⁰ Sudan’s strategic location, bordering several countries, makes it an attractive target for regional powers seeking to expand their influence or for far-off meddlers to profit in the world’s last remaining ungoverned spaces.
Additionally, Sudan’s vast natural resources, including oil, gold, and fertile land, could draw the attention of international investors and corporations. As seen in Libya, Yemen, and Syria, foreign involvement in local conflicts can exacerbate violence, prolong suffering, and create new opportunities for extremist groups to remain an ever-present threat. In the case of Sudan, the risk of foreign interference could lead to a similar pattern, further destabilizing the region and undermining prospects for peace and development.
Russia’s Wagner Group, Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar, and Egypt are the most prominent, active foreign actors on either side of the conflict. Wagner PMC, a Kremlin-backed mercenary organization, has been involved in Sudan for years in various capacities, such as guarding mineral resources and providing military support to the former regime.¹¹ The primary motivation behind Wagner’s involvement in Sudan’s crisis is to monopolize the country’s rich gold resources and to cultivate interests that align with Russia’s geopolitical goals.¹²
In addition to Wagner’s financial interests, the group—now designated a transnational criminal organization by the U.S. Treasury Department—provided military, political, and material support to al-Bashir, ingratiating itself with regime loyalists now heading up the military and further deepening its involvement in Sudan’s affairs.¹³ As the conflict between the SAF and the RSF escalates, Wagner is one of the most likely to intervene in the power struggle to protect its interests. The group may use disinformation campaigns, recruitment of desperate Sudanese and its demonstrated combat capabilities to shape the outcome of the conflict in its favor.¹⁴
Khalifa Haftar’s involvement in Sudan’s crisis is primarily linked to his role as the Libyan National Army (LNA) leader and his strategic alliance with Sudan’s RSF leader, Hemedti.¹⁵ Haftar intends to actively support the RSF in its fight against the SAF, providing them with military assistance and resources.¹⁶ His motivations for backing the RSF are likely connected to his broader ambitions of consolidating power in Libya and expanding his regional influence. However, Egypt’s support for the SAF and Haftar’s backing of the RSF creates a complicated dynamic between Egypt and Haftar, as both essentially support opposing sides in Sudan’s crisis,¹⁷ complicating the former’s involvement in Libya, where it supports Haftar’s LNA against the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA).¹⁸
Despite these conflicting interests in Sudan, Egypt and Haftar could still maintain a pragmatic alliance in Libya due to their shared strategic interests which includes countering the growing influence of Turkey in the region and ensuring stability in the eastern Mediterranean. Nonetheless, any shift in the balance of power in Sudan and Libya may inflame tensions between Cairo and Haftar, complicating their relationship with possible implications for regional security and stability.¹⁹
Meanwhile, Egypt’s involvement in Sudan’s crisis can be traced back to several key events and decisions that reveal its motivations. Egypt’s wariness of losing control over the Nile River’s water resources is responsible for Cairo’s outsized role in Sudanese politics. An untethered, stable, and self-reliant Sudanese government could challenge Egypt’s dominance over the Nile, especially if Khartoum sides with upstream countries like Ethiopia, which could spark new conflicts over water-sharing agreements deemed unfair.²⁰
Egypt’s support for the military in Sudan, instead of backing the civilian-led government, also contributed to the ongoing crisis, as evidenced by how Egypt backed the Transitional Military Council (TMC) after al-Bashir’s removal. The TMC was responsible for the subsequent violent crackdown on pro-democracy protesters, causing further unrest and chaos in the country.²¹ The October 2021 coup also highlighted Cairo’s desire for a pliant Sudanese government that can subordinate its foreign policy and the trajectory of its post-2019 political process to Egyptian interests.²²
Besides the pursuit of either narrow mercenary objectives or grander national interests by the belligerents mentioned above, other actors are less keen on seeing the crisis in Sudan devolve into an all-out war. While these actors are somewhat involved, their motivations and support are not necessarily tied to the SAF or the RSF. Instead, they are primarily focused on de-escalating to initiate a peaceful, practicable conflict resolution process that would ensure stability in Sudan and the Horn of Africa.²³
The United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), United States, and Gulf States are all calling for an end to hostilities and a speedy return to negotiations.²⁴ As international organizations, the UN and the AU are deeply concerned about the potential impact of the conflict on regional stability and the well-being of Sudan’s population. The AU, in particular, is also keen on avoiding further destabilization on the African continent and would like to prioritize a dialogue process before developments spiral out of control.²⁵
For Washington, maintaining stability in the region and preventing the crisis from escalating is a key to averting a catastrophic humanitarian and refugee crisis. The Gulf States, on the other hand, may be driven by their existing relationships and alliances with the military factions in Sudan and their interest in maintaining a stable environment for their strategic and economic interests in the region.
Looking ahead, it is somewhat premature to fully predict how the crisis in Sudan will unfold over the coming months. What is clear, however, is that Sudan stands at a critical juncture, and one of two potential scenarios could play out amidst its worsening economic struggles, social divisions, and unsettled grievances.
In this first scenario, Sudan’s belligerents and their external backers will resist calls for dialogue, turning brief skirmishes limited to RSF and SAF personnel into an all-out war as either side sees escalation as the only way to secure a decisive advantage or assert dominance.²⁶
The other scenario is Sudan muddling through towards a gradual stabilization more akin to a stalemate rather than a concerted effort by both sides to de-escalate and settle on a fragile political compromise that may or may not have a civilian component this time.²⁷
However, such a scenario will only be possible if a unified international community plays a critical role by facilitating meaningful dialogues or other peace-building initiatives. Although this outcome may not result in a complete resolution of Sudan’s underlying issues, it could provide an indefinite reprieve from worsening violence, allowing for more engagement, economic assistance, support for governing institutions, and provisions of humanitarian aid.
Roughly a third of Sudan’s population (about 15.8 million people) needs humanitarian assistance, an increase of about 1.5 million people compared to last year. Just over 11 million people need emergency assistance related to nutrition, health care, water, and livelihoods.²⁸ More than half remain concentrated in areas that would be hardest hit should a civil war break out.
Furthermore, this crisis has highlighted the importance of external support shoring up domestic institutions, by providing technical assistance, capacity-building, and resources. Aside from chaperoning affairs in the political and security sphere, the global community could also stabilize the situation by investing in the country’s development to ensure convergent struggles do not create fertile grounds for extremist groups, aspiring despots, or malign actors.
Failing to cleanse the post-2019 government of holdovers from the Bashir regime all but predicted future troubles to come.²⁹ What was a mere tinderbox is now on the verge of a conflagration that could engulf Sudan and its immediate neighborhood for years to come.
Footnotes
[1] Stigant, S. (n.d.). What’s Behind the Fighting in Sudan? United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/04/whats-behind-fighting-sudan
[2] Mishra, Abhishek. “Understanding Sudan’s Civil War.” ORF, 24 May 2023, www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/understanding-sudans-civil-war.
[3] Deutsche Welle [DW]. “Sudan Death Toll Climbs, With 700,000 Internally Displaced.” dw.com, Deutsche Welle, 9 May 2023, www.dw.com/en/sudan-death-toll-climbs-with-700000-internally-displaced/a-65561649#:~:text=More%20than%20604%20people%2C%20including,injured%2C%20a%20UN%20agency%20said. Accessed 5 June 2023.
[4] Pichon, P. (n.d.). Sudan crisis: Developments and implications | European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_ATA(2023)747884
[5] Lynch, J. (2023, May 2). How Failed Armed Forces-Paramilitary Reforms Sparked 2023 Sudan Clashes. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/20/sudan-civil-war-biden-burhan-hemeti-foreign-policy/
[6] Wehrey, F. (2020). Proxy War in Libya: From Revolution to Civil War. Journal of North African Studies, 25(4), 561-577. https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/this-war-is-out-of-our-hands/
[7] Lacher, W. (2014). Libya’s Fractious South and Regional Instability. Small Arms Survey, SANA Briefing Paper. Retrieved from https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SANA-Dispatch3-Libyas-Fractious-South.pdf
[8] Kozak, C. (2015). An Army in All Corners: Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria. Middle East Security Report 26. Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved from https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/An%20Army%20in%20All%20Corners%20by%20Chris%20Kozak%201.pdf
[9] Betts, A., & Collier, P. (2017). Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee System. Oxford University Press.
[10] International Crisis Group. (2021). Sudan’s Perfect Storm. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/sudans-perfect-storm
[11] Siegle, J. (2022). Russia in Africa: Resurgent Great Power or Bellicose Pretender? South African Journal of International Affairs, 29(4), 571–573. https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2022.2154832
[12] Doxsee, C. (2023, April 25). How Does the Conflict in Sudan Affect Russia and the Wagner Group? CSIS – Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-does-conflict-sudan-affect-russia-and-wagner-group
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] ELDoh, M. (2023, May 1). Sudan Crisis Sets Stage for Possible Egypt Intervention | Geopolitical Monitor. Geopolitical Monitor. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/sudan-crisis-sets-stage-for-possible-egypt-intervention/
[16] Ibid.
[17] Faucon, B., Said, S., & Malsin, J. (2023, April 19). Libyan Militia and Egypt’s Military Back Opposite Sides in Sudan Conflict. WSJ. https://www.wsj.com/articles/libyan-militia-and-egypts-military-back-opposite-sides-in-sudan-conflict-87206c3b
[18] Elbagir, N., Qiblawi, T., & Orie, A. (2023, April 26). Rival Generals Are Battling for Control in Sudan. Here’s A Simple Guide to The Fighting. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/26/africa/sudan-conflict-explained-intl/index.html
[19] Faucon, B., Said, S., & Malsin, J. (2023, April 19). Libyan Militia and Egypt’s Military Back Opposite Sides in Sudan Conflict. WSJ. https://www.wsj.com/articles/libyan-militia-and-egypts-military-back-opposite-sides-in-sudan-conflict-87206c3b
[20] Al-Anani, K. (n.d.). How Egypt lost Sudan. Middle East Eye. https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/sudan-egypt-lost-how
[21] Mohyeldeen, S. (2020, June 11). The Egypt-Sudan Border: A Story of Unfulfilled Promise. Carnegie Middle East Center. https://carnegie-mec.org/2020/06/11/egypt-sudan-border-story-of-unfulfilled-promise-pub-81995
[22] BBC News. (2023, April 22). Sudan crisis: Egypt’s dilemma over the fighting. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65351460
[23] Magdy, S. (2023, April 17). What sparked the violent struggle to control Sudan’s future? AP NEWS. https://apnews.com/article/sudan-clashes-military-rapid-support-forces-444d37ec93ccc813b2ba4abba24aca5c
[24] Ibid.
[25] Hudson, C. (2023, April 27). What Is Driving Violent Unrest in Sudan? CSIS – Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-driving-violent-unrest-sudan
[26] Sudan: Scenarios. (2022, April 14). ACAPS. https://www.acaps.org/special-report/sudan-scenarios
[27] Ibid.
[28] Sudan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023 (November 2022) – Sudan. (2022, November 7). ReliefWeb. https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-needs-overview-2023-november-2022
[29] A Breakthrough in Sudan’s Impasse? (2022, August 12). Crisis Group. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/breakthrough-sudans-impasse
References
Al-Anani, K. (n.d.). How Egypt lost Sudan. Middle East Eye. https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/sudan-egypt-lost-how
Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS).(2022, April 14). Sudan: Scenarios. https://www.acaps.org/special-report/sudan-scenarios
BBC News. (2023, April 22). Sudan crisis: Egypt’s dilemma over the fighting. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65351460
Boswell, A. B. (2022, August 12). A Breakthrough in Sudan’s Impasse? Crisis Group. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/breakthrough-sudans-impasse
Doxsee, C. (2023, April 25). How Does the Conflict in Sudan Affect Russia and the Wagner Group? CSIS – Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-does-conflict-sudan-affect-russia-and-wagner-group
Elbagir, N., Qiblawi, T., & Orie, A. (2023, April 26). Rival generals are battling for control in Sudan. Here’s a simple guide to the fighting. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/26/africa/sudan-conflict-explained-intl/index.html
ELDoh, M. (2023, May 1). Sudan Crisis Sets Stage for Possible Egypt Intervention | Geopolitical Monitor. Geopolitical Monitor. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/sudan-crisis-sets-stage-for-possible-egypt-intervention/
Faucon, B., Said, S., & Malsin, J. (2023, April 19). Libyan Militia and Egypt’s Military Back Opposite Sides in Sudan Conflict. WSJ. https://www.wsj.com/articles/libyan-militia-and-egypts-military-back-opposite-sides-in-sudan-conflict-87206c3b
Hudson, C. (2023, April 27). What Is Driving Violent Unrest in Sudan? CSIS – Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-driving-violent-unrest-sudan
Lynch, J. (2023, May 2). How Failed Armed Forces-Paramilitary Reforms Sparked 2023 Sudan Clashes. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/20/sudan-civil-war-biden-burhan-hemeti-foreign-policy/
Magdy, S. (2023, April 17). What sparked the violent struggle to control Sudan’s future? AP NEWS. https://apnews.com/article/sudan-clashes-military-rapid-support-forces-444d37ec93ccc813b2ba4abba24aca5c
Mohyeldeen, S. (2020, June 11). The Egypt-Sudan Border: A Story of Unfulfilled Promise. Carnegie Middle East Center. https://carnegie-mec.org/2020/06/11/egypt-sudan-border-story-of-unfulfilled-promise-pub-81995
Pichon, P. (n.d.). Sudan Crisis: Developments and Implications. European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_ATA(2023)747884
ReliefWeb.(2022, November 7). Sudan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023 (November 2022) – Sudan. https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-needs-overview-2023-november-2022
Siegle, J. (2022). Russia in Africa: Resurgent Great Power or Bellicose Pretender? South African Journal of International Affairs, 29(4), 571–573. https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2022.2154832
Stigant, S. (n.d.). What’s Behind the Fighting in Sudan? United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/04/whats-behind-fighting-sudan
