Linda McMullen is a proud Wisconsinite and Foreign Service Officer. She would like to thank Gia Cromer and Kristina Young for their invaluable advice regarding this piece.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and not necessarily those of the U.S. Government.
Overview
This paper examines the African Union’s (AU) institutional approach to transnational terrorism. Specifically, its approaches in combating Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, and al-Shabaab. While the three groups are AU-designated terrorist organizations, they actually behave more like insurgencies. Thus, this paper uses a comparative case study methodology study to assess the AU’s counterinsurgency-style responses from January 2014- February 2019, using a DIMEFIL (diplomatic, intelligence, military, economic, financial, informational, and law enforcement) analysis.
The AU’s intervention to combat al-Shabaab was critical in permitting Somali state formation and preventing al-Shabaab from realizing its insurgent goals. The AU used its institutional prowess to encourage cooperation and raise funds in the fight against Boko Haram and its offshoots, but financial management difficulties and over-reliance on flawed AU member states proved notable challenges. Finally, AU support for the GS Sahel helped raise crucial military and development funds, but its failure to push affected member states to work together risked undermining the organization’s contributions. In each case, AU support for military intervention remained necessary, but insufficient, to defeat the insurgent organizations.
This paper recommends that the AU augment its non-military engagements: increasing internal diplomacy, improving intelligence-sharing, expanding sharing of best practices in economic governance, reforming internal AU financial management and expanding efforts to counter terrorist finance, improving its strategic messaging, and escalating efforts to promote responsible law enforcement and good governance. It also encourages AU-endorsed military interventions to focus on controlling the hinterlands. It further recommends that the United
States should consider expanding capacity-building activities in non-military domains. Globally, this paper suggests these recommendations could improve burden-sharing and could encourage the AU’s continued pursuit of African solutions to African problems.
The African Union (AU), the successor to the Organization of African Unity (OAU), is a continental international institution, comprised of 55 member states.[1] Established in 2002, it marked the transition of the pan-African entity from an organization focused on decolonization to one dedicated to advancing peace, security, and prosperity for the continent as a whole. The change in name also included a marked shift in the organization’s mandate: while the OAU prescribed “non-interference” in members’ internal affairs, the AU embraced “nonindifference” after the devastating conflicts of the 1990s.[2]“Non-indifference” explicitly signaled the creation of an organization empowered to intervene in member state crises and to promote public goods across the continent, whether in complex military, political, or economic domains.[3]
The AU embraced its new activist institutional mandate and created the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to serve as an institutional framework for continental security goals. Under the APSA, the AU embraces early warning and conflict prevention; peacemaking, peace support operations[4], peace-building, and post-conflict reconstruction; promotion of good governance and respect for human rights; and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. [5] The APSA’s embrace has expanded since its inception, to encompass engagement in both traditional and non-traditional security areas, including counterterrorism (CT). The organization formalized its new, pragmatic approach under its new moniker: specifically, by adopting the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in September 2002. This guiding document shapes the AU’s institutional engagement and lays out explicit roles for AU bodies,[6] roles that grow in successive protocols.[7] CT also appears prominently in the current APSA roadmap, covering 2015-2020.[8]
Yet, despite these efforts, the organizations have persisted and continue to launch attacks.
Over the last 5 years, the AU has actively engaged in the fight against terrorism across the continent, most notably in the case of the three major transnational terrorist organizations operating in Africa: al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Intense military pressure from African governments, French intervention, and U.S. drone strikes resulted in these terrorist organizations losing much of their leadership to death or capture, as well as substantial reductions territories and membership. Yet, despite these efforts, the organizations have persisted and continue to launch attacks. This endurance suggests that non-military measures were and are required to reduce their power in African states, and to eliminate their pernicious attacks on civilians and military personnel. Moreover, these organizations’ goals remained intact: to wrest governmental control from what they deem corrupt, apostate governments, and to institute fairer, sharia-based states in their place.[9]
The AU’s public-facing documentation has focused heavily on counterterrorism and its public rhetoric has condemned al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and AQIM as terrorist organizations. Nevertheless, the AU’s engagement actually more closely resembles a counterinsurgency campaign. A traditional counterterrorism campaign would focus on threat elimination through primarily kinetic means. The AU worked in that space, but not exclusively. In practice, the AU used different institutional combinations of DIMEFIL-like (diplomatic, intelligence, military, economic, financial, informational, and law enforcement) tools and engagements to combat these groups. Its goal, in so doing, is to reinforce the stability and legitimacy of its member states. Counterinsurgency in short. The United States is doing a substantial amount to partner with the AU in these counterinsurgency efforts, with a manifest basis in policy: the 2017 National Security Strategy, in its section on Africa, highlighted the importance of confronting Africa’s security threats and the challenges they pose to the African continent and U.S. interests.[10]
In critically examining the AU’s approach to CT, this essay looks at the AU through an institutionalist lens. Harrison argues persuasively for the broad application of Kant’s liberal institutionalist model, arguing that it explains trends and changes in the post-Cold War world more accurately than realism does.[11] Ikenberry concurs, adding that countries now exist within “a broader international order … [that] is highly developed, expansive, integrated, institutionalized, and deeply rooted in the societies and economies of both advanced capitalist states and developing states.”[12] This is true of the AU, which recognizes that institutions can not only help states escape the prisoners’ dilemma,[13] but can offer more symmetric information, reinforce commitments, reduce uncertainty, promote cooperation, and facilitate coordination.[14] Institutions can also improve dispute resolution, provide an architecture for collective action, and provide resources in times of crisis.[15] Examining the AU under an institutionalist framework provides an opportunity to measure its accomplishments against a purpose-built metric.
It is important to consider that African and Western ideas on institutionalism are not identical. While Western institutionalism emphasizes the importance of collective action, dispute resolution, and cost reduction for wary states in an anarchic world,[16] African institutionalism both recognizes and challenges these definitions. It encompasses not only Western institutional priorities, but also explicitly embraces proscriptive values that apply to Africa’s nations and its citizens. The AU imbues these values with principles of liberation theology.[17] unity, solidarity, and a principled purpose of creating better lives for African peoples.[18]
The African Union in Context: Normative and Strategic Shifts in Changing from the OAU to the AU, and the Counterterrorism / Counterinsurgency Conundrum
The African continent’s deliberate institutional shift from the OAU to the AU gave the AU the normative, legal, and practical heft to intervene in member states. The OAU had long embraced normative and law-creating functions,[19] but “the principle of non-interference was prioritized over a duty to protect.”[20] The AU described this shift as a consensus by AU leadership that Africa needed to “refocus attention from the fight for decolonization and ridding the continent of apartheid, which had been the focus of the OAU, towards increased cooperation and integration of African states to drive Africa’s growth and economic development.[21] This shift is most marked in the AU’s advancement of its continental peace and security agenda.
Specifically, the advent of the AU introduced the concept of a common defense policy,[22] (the Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP) [23] wherein “sacred” [24] member state authority [25] may, at times, be subordinated in pursuit of collective security. According to Nagan and Hammer, “Africa is in the process of formulating a new idea of sovereignty” [26] in which states’ domestic powers are not absolute, and policies must not create negative externalities for populations or neighbors. This can be understood as “cooperative sovereignty” [27] on a continental scale. Under the Constitutive Act, the AU reserves the right to intervene within its Member States, even while ultimately aiming to “defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States.”[28] Taking these documents and principles incombination, it is evident that the AU has a prescribed mandate that includes undertaking political, military, diplomatic, and other interventions to fight transnational terrorism and its origins.
On the question of terrorism specifically, the OAU, and subsequently the AU, developed a series of inter-related policy and strategy documents including the Ouagadougou,[29] Tunis,[30] and Algiers[31] declarations; the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Countering of Terrorism;[32] the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism,[33] underwritten by the African Peace and Security Architecture; that collectively make up the AU CT Framework.[34] Despite the fact that “[t]he AU was never conceived as a counter-terrorism agency,”[35] the AU has nevertheless used these documents to establish the legal and normative parameters of AU intervention in cases of terrorism.
Assessment of the AU’s Counterterrorism / COIN Interventions
Galula, the noted counterinsurgency expert, defined insurgency as “a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order,”[36]and counterinsurgency as ”the reaction of the counterinsurgent aiming to keep his power.”[37] He specifically notes the counterinsurgent’s resources as including “diplomatic recognition; legitimate power in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches; control of the administration and police; financial resources … use and control of the information and propaganda media; command of the armed forces and the possibility of increasing their size.”[38] By identifying these sources of legitimacy as resources, Galula indicates that the state conducts counterinsurgency as a war for moral as well as physical authority.
There is no single, accepted definition of terrorism; as Schmid rightly observes, “Terrorism is a contested concept.”[39] Most scholarly definitions converge around a number of commonalities: the threat or use of violence, a political objective, a psychological purpose (intimidation), noncombatant or incidental victims (so-called collateral damage) in the conveyance of a message, and frequent use by violent, non-state groups.[40] Both the U.S. Department of State and the U.S.Department of Defense [41] definitions converge around these ideas. The AU takes still another approach to the question of terrorism.[42] Its definition likewise excludes the threat of violence, but otherwise expands the range of potential victims, to include the environment and cultural properties, disruption to public services and creation of general insurrection. The actions of AQIM, Boko Haram, and al-Shabaab fit under each of these definitions of terrorism. But, as each transnational organization is attempting to replace or displace AU member state governments by appealing to constituents and offering alternative governance, they are more aptly described as insurgencies.
Numerous examples demonstrate that the AU has embraced counterinsurgency. Okeke, for example, highlighted the African Union Mission in Somalia’s (AMISOM) use of a three-. pronged ‘clear, hold and build’ approach, with ‘build’ referring obliquely to the restoration of state services and authority, in Somalia. In the fight against Boko Haram, the AU endorsed[43] the (essentially counterinsurgent[44]) Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery & Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin, which has a strong state building focus.[45] In the fight against AQIM, currently centralized in northern Mali, Bamidele provides a compelling synthesis of the AU, French, and international responses as “helping Malian authorities recover the areas in the north of its territories under the control of insurgent groups, restoring state legitimacy and preventing the total collapse of the country.”[46] Okeke observes that while the joint response was established as a peace operation, “the tactics used by these operations are synonymous with counter-insurgency.”[47] Meanwhile, Williams implicitly highlights the AU’s commitment to counterinsurgency, noting that the AU has been deploying “record numbers of peacekeepers … with a range of mandates to use deadly force beyond self-defense, usually to protect civilians, degrade spoiler groups, or extend and consolidate state authority.” [48]
A literature review of AU counterterrorism and counterinsurgency effectiveness assessments indicate that scholars’ views vary widely. AU supporters note the organization’s increased pace of operations since its institutional shift, and the fact that Somalia (in particular) might be substantially worse off without AU intervention. AU critics note that interventions have been insufficient (both in number and in quality); that the AU has frequently failed to address the root causes of conflicts,[49] and that, in failing to respond or to deal with the underlying problems, the AU has demonstrated insufficient political will. Princeton Lyman took a balanced view, noting that “African deployments have not been without problems, but they are bearing the brunt of peacekeeping and peace enforcement on the continent;”[50] he added that “the Africans are very much in the lead on the ground.”[51] Scholars’ assessments suggest the AU is making some progress in combating al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and AQIM, but must address its institutional weaknesses to improve its rate of success.
Methodology
For the study of the African Union’s counterterrorism approach, this paper uses a comparative case study, including use of a DIMEFIL framework[52] to facilitate comparisons of the AU’s qualitative efforts in fighting three major transnational terrorist groups. The paper considers AQIM and its offshoots (now resorbed into JNIM), al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram – three organizations that originated in African conflicts, operate across national borders, are not exclusively focused on one country, launch attacks with regional implications, and have consistently gained recognition from the African Union (as expressed in official communications) as a threat to continental peace and security. The comparative case study model was critical to permit apples-to-apples comparisons of the AU’s responses to three very different organizations. As Yin suggests, comparing descriptive cases is appropriate given the multiplicity of variables, the possibility of exploring numerous sources of evidence, and the importance of the study’s building on previous theoretical work.[53]
The use of the DIMEFIL allows careful examination of military and non-military instruments of power – diplomatic efforts, information promulgation, economic measures, financial measures, intelligence, and legal work- to assess the AU’s comprehensive efforts. The DIMEFIL model also permitted consideration of the varied sources of transnational terrorist groups’ power and how the AU leverages institutional resources to attempt to degrade them. The DIMEFIL framework is utilitarian because it allows examination of the relationship between the ways and means the AU is using to achieve its stated ends.[54] Moreover, the DIMEFIL framework also gains currency in this assessment because it aligns with numerous– and disparate–sources of U.S. support to the AU and its member states.
Due to time constraints, it is not possible to consider the African Union’s entire history of effort in the counterterrorism or counterinsurgency spaces. The specific period for this study – January 2014-February 2019 (the AU Summit took place later than usual this year)- permits examination of recent and more mature CT/COIN effort. The bookends are the two African Union Summits that took place during that time period. Additionally, given resource and time constraints, it was not possible to obtain a complete sampling of every instance of support or effort offered by the African Union. In using the DIMEFIL framework, however, it is possible to gamer illustrative instances of each type of intervention from primary source documents (the AU’s own extensive documentary output), scholarly research and analysis, and news reports from reputable sources.
The AU’s Approach to Countering Transnational Groups in Africa
Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram (and its off-shoots the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) and Jama’atu Ahl al-Sunnah lil-Dawa wal-Jihad (JAS)), and AQIM use terrorism as a method to support their plans to erect states rooted in sharia law. Benefitting from the prevalence of weak states and uneven governance, these groups not only launched terrorist attacks, but also conducted informational and propaganda campaigns, created alternative justice structures, implemented economic development tools, and made a commitment to the rule of law to win over populations. They also made use of various forms of financing to fund their activities, using both more legitimate means like taxation, and less legitimate means, like criminality. These groups worked across the DIMEFIL spectrum in an attempt to release themselves and local populations from the grip of what they viewed as corrupt, apostate governments.
The AU, in response, also engaged in activities across the DIMEFIL framework to rebut, degrade, counter, oppose, and discredit these groups. Its interventions were designed to support the legitimacy of member state governments, support the emergence of functional institutions, and create space for other partners, ranging from other states to international organizations to nongovernmental organizations, to work with member states to promote stability. In the absence of a unified counterterrorism or counterinsurgency tenet, the AU has not used its nascent response mechanisms.[55] Instead, the AU has relied primarily on ad hoc arrangements driven to varying degrees by affected member states.
The African Union has a mixed record in its response to transnational terrorism across the continent. The AU’s fundamental challenge in combating al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and AQIM is a mismatch among its public policy, its practical approach, its carefully negotiated partnerships, and its inconsistent funding. It has demonstrated significant political will and pragmatism, but the limits of its internal and external partners and resource constraints mean that implementation has been variegated. The AU’s admittedly imperfect efforts have nevertheless supported fragile or failing member states and their populations. These efforts are, and have been, critical to combating the violent organizations also employing DIMEFIL-like tools to advance their aims.
A tempting high-level characterization of the AU’s counter insurgency efforts against al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and AQIM would be to say that the AU is having its greatest success in countering al-Shabaab, some success in supporting the fight against Boko Haram, and struggling in efforts to counter AQIM. While this broad characterization is truthful, a more granular assessment demonstrates there are successes and shortcomings in each counterinsurgency effort.
Al-Shabaab
The AU’s efforts to fight al-Shabaab merit high praise. Though the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has not defeated al-Shabaab, it has pushed the insurgency out of Somali cities and economic hubs, and has given the Federal Government of Somalia time and space to develop political/military structure and capacity. Without AU-AMISOM support, it is plausible Somalia would have remained a failed state, rather than a failing one.
Diplomacy
The AU’s tenacious diplomatic engagements helped AMISOM gain legitimacy, critical military enablers, and funding. The AU encouraged diplomatic support from a wide array of partners: Somalia’s neighbors; the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, or IGAD; the European Union which provided AMISOM funding,[56] the United States which offered troop capacity building and military support;[57] and other countries around the world. The AU has also supported international diplomatic action, including United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) condemning al-Shabaab: UNSCRs 2431[58], 2372[59], 2297[60], 2232[61], and 2182[62]. In contrast, al-Shabaab attracted only a narrow range of diplomatic partners (unconfirmed support from Eritrea[63] and other Middle Eastern countries).[64] Nevertheless, its allies (al Qaeda and its Maghrebine and Arabian affiliates)[65] remained highly lethal, and partnerships with them helped grow al-Shabaab’s cachet within terrorist circles. While clearly the AU has garnered far more international support than al-Shabaab, disagreements over AMISOM’s funding and strategy pose a significant threat to the operation. While none of these clashes is likely to derail AMISOM entirely, they can further complicate and hinder the mission, as well as its eventual drawdown.
Intelligence
Intelligence and information sharing has enabled AMISOM to foil several of al-Shabaab’s plots, including an imminent attack in Kampala in 2014 [66], a potential suicide attack in Adado in 2015,[67] and a potential vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in 2018.[68] This information sharing allowed AMISOM to protect its forces, and extend protection outward to the citizenry. Al-Shabaab, meanwhile, also maintained a worrisome intelligence capability. Despite concerted international effort, it was able to attack well-defended AMISOM bases [69] and the DusitD2 Hotel Complex in January 2019.
Military
On the military front, the AU-AMISOM-Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) partnership saw significant success in driving al-Shabaab out of the major cities; the joint concept of operations[70] proved fruitful, as did robust partnership with the United States. AMISOM helped remove terrorists from the battlefield, a traditional counterterrorism focus, but also helped to clear supply routes, secure cities, create security, and enable service delivery[71] to assist the FGS in wresting moral control of the territory away from al-Shabaab. Nevertheless, al-Shabaab retained significant control in the hinterlands. Moreover, the AU-UN-AMISOM goal of handing over Somali security to Somalia’s own forces remained precarious.
Economics & Finance
The AU is doing very little on the economic or financial fronts that benefit Somalia directly, as its attention has been focused on development of the Continental Free Trade Area. Nonetheless, AMISOM’ s presence has provided security for the evolution of macroeconomic stability within the country. This was one of the major reasons the IMF and the World Bank were able to return to Somalia to help Somalia manage its debt load[72] and to implement projects to improve institutions and services.[73] Al-Shabaab, in contrast, represented an economic detriment. They used economic activity as a source of financing by charging “more frequent and more pervasive zakat fees (normally ‘alms’; here ‘taxes’).”[74] Broadly, their macroeconomic effect was a net negative: their attacks “result[ed] in a decline in foreign investments, tourism and confidence among the general population.”[75]
Further on the financial front, the AU attracted funding to sustain AMISOM with some degree of success, though international contributions remained unpredictable.[76] Al-Shabaab, however, enjoyed success in the financial arena, siphoning funds from the charcoal trade,[77] erecting road blocks, charging “taxes,” and running protection rackets;[78] obtaining “angel investor” funding from al-Qaeda [79] and foreign governments (reportedly) [80] piracy [81] and other criminal engagements, including smuggling sugar.[82] The AU was not able to institute significant counter terrorist financing activity.
Information
In the information space, the AU and other international institutions used traditional [83] and new media [84] to underscore AMISOM successes and to denigrate and discredit al-Shabaab, as when the AU referred to al-Shabaab as “losing [and] desperate.”[85] They also continually emphasized that the Federal Government of Somalia represents the nation’s best chance for political normalcy. While its messaging has remained clear and consistent, the AU has done little to engage in counter-messaging to repel al-Shabaab’s propaganda or recruitment efforts. In contrast, Al-Shabaab had success in demonstrating the weaknesses of the Mogadishu government (referring to them as “daba dhilif [a government set up for a foreign purpose]”[86] i.e., a puppet government). They effectively used video and audio propaganda to increase recruitment among vulnerable populations[87] despite challenges to remaining on Twitter.[88]
Legal
The law enforcement/legal fight against al-Shabaab remained particularly challenging for the AU and the AU-supported FGS, given al-Shabaab’s existential focus on the law and legal issues. The AU offered practical support to the Somali government as it re-created a legal system in the image of the new constitution. Nevertheless, given that al-Shabaab often served as the only source of justice in an anarchic Somalia, some Somalis traveled to al-Shabaab held territory to have their cases heard in a trusted venue.[89] Furthermore, some troops under the AU aegis committed crimes, as in the 2014 AMISOM rape scandal.[90] This behavior undermined the AU’s credibility on justice and legal issues.
Overall
The AU clearly faces strains in its support for Somalia. Most significantly, the slow and contentious evolution of Somalia’s politics and military mean AMISOM and its partners are in the unfortunate position of guaranteeing security for an AU member state that, so far, cannot do so on its own. This renders the Somali situation transparently precarious: AMISOM’s promised withdrawal in 2021 will threaten to destroy what little stability has evolved. Military handover is part of AMISOM’s mandate, but implementation has been weak, partly due to AMISOM’s own insufficiencies, but largely due to the Somali National Army’s failure to assume responsibility. Nevertheless, while the AU’s engagement to fight al-Shabaab faces significant challenges and some significant deficiencies, the balance sheet favors continuing intervention.
Boko Haram (JAS and ISWA)
African nations were truly the front line in the fight against Boko Haram and its offshoots, and the AU stood in steadfast support. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), operating under an AU-approved mandate, has seen considerable success. Due to a strategically and structurally sound military exerting effective pressure, the MNJTF has succeeded in cutting Boko Haram’s numbers in half.[91] The MNJTF has seen its adversaries divide into two factions, further reducing their strength. According to these metrics, the MNJTF has enacted positive change, although only the military portion of its holistic strategy was comprehensively implemented. Thurston notes that “regional authorities lack long-term solutions for restoring peace and security, reflecting the tendency of many policymakers to treat Boko Haram solely as a security threat, while neglecting its political and religious dimensions.[92] Thus, though it worked across the DIMEFIL spectrum, the MNJTF has focused primarily on winning the war and less on winning the peace.
Diplomacy
The AU played an important diplomatic role in helping formalize the Boko Haram response, signing a formal agreement with the Lake Chad Basin Commission for the operationalization of the MNJTF in 2015.[93] The AU continued to offer diplomatic and technical support throughout the study period, particularly in embracing the MNJTF’s Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin.[94] The AU also helped the MNJTF garner support from international partners within Africa, from international partners outside of Africa, and from international institutions such as the UN. In contrast, neither Boko Haram nor its offshoots gained formal diplomatic partnerships with any nation-state or legitimate international institution, though they did establish a formal linkage to ISIS.[95]
Intelligence
In the intelligence space, MNJTF cooperation has improved substantially during the study period, with regional competition giving way to cooperative intelligence-enabled operations, as in their cooperative response to the Ngoshe attack.[96] The MNJTF also benefitted from support from foreign partners, including the United States, which offered training on how to best utilize current intelligence as a collective.[97] The MNJTF has not had universal success in intelligence gathering, however. The Nigerian military in particular has faced challenges in gathering intelligence from local civilians due to its human rights abuses and lack of urgency or efficacy in response to Boko Haram attacks.[98] Boko Haram and its off shoots successfully harnessed civilian observations, so much so that the Nigerian military suspected some local civilians of “providing support and intelligence on troop movements to the terrorists, pointing to instances of well targeted ambush operations.”[99] Boko Haram has also leveraged women as sources and spies to effectively gain access to information.[100] Rumors have also persisted that Boko Haram has infiltrated Nigerian forces for tactical and strategic advantage.[101]
Military
In the military arena, the MNJTF has made significant progress in regaining territorial control and inflicting losses of land, resources, and fighters on Boko Haram,[102] but has not defeated either branch of the terrorist organization conclusively. The AU offered direct support to the MNJTF in the form of an AU “mission support team,” which provided technical assistance and coordinated partner support.[103] Specifically, the MNJTF “blocked escape routes and safe havens and ultimately ret[ook] most of the territories controlled by the group.”[104] This success was mitigated by ongoing challenges. Boko Haram remains active, having shifted to guerrilla warfare [105] and other asymmetric strategies.[106] The Nigerian military in particular suffered what the New York Times called “crippling failures on the battlefield” [107] well into 2018 and 2019. Last but not least, these challenges may not have an easy solution: the MNJTF countries did not always work effectively together, due to problems in cooperation. Experts assessed that they operated as “a coordinated force, not an integrated or fusion force.”[108]
Economics & Finance
The AU did not intervene directly in member state economies, though MNJTF member countries worked with institutions like the African Development Bank[109] and the World Bank[110] to support dozens of development projects. Individual AU member state governments, however, faced perceptions that the results of their economic efforts were poorly distributed: Salihu observed that poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and unchecked population growth [in the Nigerian northeast] could not be ruled out as possible causes of Boko Haram’s terrorism.[111] In contrast, the ISWA offshoot of Boko Haram endeavored to spur and manage economic activity in the area under its control. It “d[ug] wells, police[d] cattle rustling, [and] provide[d] a modicum of health care,” and, reportedly, “its taxation [was] generally accepted by civilians, who credit[ed] it for creating an environment where they [could] dobusiness.”[112]
In the financial arena, the AU helped attract MNJTF funding from major partners such as the United States[113] and the European Union,[114] although slow disbursement of the latter set of funds proved to be a major intra-AU challenge.[115] Boko Haram maintained diverse sources of funding including membership fees,[116] Persian Gulf charities,[117] kidnap for ransom and demands for protection money,[118] extortion (usually associated with threat of harm),[119] cyber scams and raiding,[120] trafficking in cattle [121] and arms,[122] and possibly drugs as well.[123] The AU was not able to effectively counter Boko Haram’s legitimate or illegitimate sources of funding, in part due to the fact that many effective counter-terrorist financing tactics needed to be handled at the domestic level.[124]
Information
The AU also played an important role in using messaging to counter Boko Haram. The AU continually expressedsupport for the member states participating in the MNJTF.[125] They also consistently alluded to Boko Haram as a terrorist group and condemned Boko Haram’s “barbaric attacks.”[126] It also attracted support from international players to echothese messages. Boko Haram used propaganda effectively to emphasize their own righteousness,[127] to demonstrate that they were victims of state-sponsored persecution,[128] and to emphasize a need for justice in alignment with their particular brand of Islam, specifically, a “fundamentalist Islamic state with sharia criminal courts.”[129] While Boko Haram “struggled to maintain a stable media outlet online,”[130] it gained messaging capacity by allying itself with the Islamic State.[131] The AU did not successfully counter-message to discredit Boko Haram’s narratives.
Legal
In the legal domain, the AU advocated for a robust legal environment to sustain successes, by embracing a regional strategy with an explicit transitional justice mandate and rule of law tenets.[132] It also repeatedly and explicitly condemned Boko Haram’s many crimes and mobilized support for the MNJTF’s efforts to counter them.[133] Nevertheless, AU support for the Nigerian government and security forces remained problematic, as the ICC openly stated it has “a reasonable basis tobelieve”[134] Nigerian security forces committed crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction. In supporting a flawed security partner, the AU opened itself to challenges to its credibility. Boko Haram was, of course, founded with an emphasis on sharia law, citing the Nigerian government’s historic corruption, lack of accountability, and impunity.[135] Of the two offshoots, ISWA “polices cattle rustling… and sometimes disciplines its own personnel whom it judges to have unacceptably abused civilians. In the communities it controls [civilians] compare its governance favorably to that of the Nigerian state.”[136]
Overall
The AU demonstrated that it remained invested in the Lake Chad Basin. Nevertheless, the AU’s support for the MNJTF is not without complications. Its primary challenges are that Boko Haram, despite reduced strength, remains active and dangerous, and the AU’s support for the deeply flawed Nigerian state, Nigerian political class, and Nigerian security forces invites accusations of hypocrisy. Legitimate grievances, and few efforts by the central government to provide redress, keep Boko Haram, and ISWA in particular, relevant. While JAS’s tactics are causing defections and reducing its support, ISWA has made a sincere effort to provide a modicum of civil and economic governance.[137] Human rights violations by the Nigerian military and police forces further underscore these challenges. While the MNJTF remains the best mechanism available for fighting Boko Haram, the AU and its member states face challenges across the DIMEFIL spectrum.
AQIM
The AU’s engagements to counter Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are the least direct and consequently the most difficult to assess. In light of the inability of any of the relevant sub-regional organizations to take charge of the AQIM challenge, the African Union endorsed the G5 and progressively shouldered more responsibility for its political and financial well-being. The AU’s efforts in other DIMEFIL areas have been small but important. Overall, the AU has had some modest achievements, but has adopted an intrinsically insufficient strategy.
Diplomatic
Since April 2017, the AU offered official diplomatic and material support to the G5 Sahel group, which unites Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania and Chad, to reduce the threat of terrorism in the Sahel.[138] It reaffirmed this mandate in 2018.[139] The AU has also been successful in other parts of the diplomatic space, namely rallying international partners and institutions to provide direct or indirect support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force and its Priority Investment Programme for 2019-2021.[140] The AU was not, however, successful in obtaining a Chapter VII UN resolution[141] for the G5 Sahelforce.[142] It has also not managed to persuade its member states, including regional players Algeria and Morocco, to work together on counterterrorism. Algeria preferred its own trans-Saharan counterterrorism mechanism, CEMOC;[143] the Moroccans favored other mechanisms, such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum.[144] AQIM, in contrast, garnered no institutional support, but established key relationships with other transnational terrorist organizations like central Al-Qaeda.
Intelligence
In the intelligence space, the AU, through the G5 Sahel force, had some successes: the GS Sahel Security Cooperation Platform [145] achieved “significant progress.”[146] Further, after extensive negotiations, the GS Sahel reached an agreement with INTERPOL to increase information sharing on “current and emerging terrorist threats across the [Sahel] region.”[147] Nevertheless, intelligence collection is far from robust,[148] and dissemination and analysis remain substantial problems. AQIM has been able to take advantage of what Ogbogu calls the “failure of the intelligence network across concerned security agencies and neighboring countries” [149] in the Sahel, and they can buy information cheaply.[150] AQIM lacked, however, the kinds of far-reaching networks that make the organization’s previous incarnations so powerful.[151]
Military
The AU supported the GS’s military endeavors; its Peace and Security Council (PSC) authorized the GS Sahel force, and approved its concept of operations (CONOPs).[152] The AU also worked to bolster the GS Sahel countries’ security cooperation through the AU Nouakchott process.[153] The GS Sahel force won some plaudits as a “novel [way of] dealing with collective defense”[154] a new type of force “at the heart of the strategy adopted by the AU.”[155] The GS Sahel carried out successful operations[156] initially focused on the Mali / Burkina Faso/ Niger tri-border region. Skeptics noted, however, that the GS Sahel structure left much to be desired. It had “no time limit, no focused objectives, no exit strategy, no mandate, and no [capability for] force generation.”[157] Analyzing the practical response, skeptics also noted that, despite facing a weakened organization at the beginning of the study period, “violence in the Sahel [was] spreading at alarming rates.[158]
AQIM’ s, and other jihadists’, expansion into coastal states had expanded substantially [159] by the end of the study period: they could conduct attacks in the area bordered by the Mediterranean coast and the Gulf of Guinea. [160] Further, the military success the GS forces had enjoyed was somewhat negated by AQIM’s ability to embed itself in new communities.[161] Last but not least, some G5 military operations drove refugees into areas “already wracked by food insecurity, banditry, and growing communal conflict.”[162] AQIM, despite having lost its territorial base, remained armed and dangerous. It successfully “operate[d] in historically ungoverned or under governed spaces and forged local alliances with rebel groups.”[163] It also moved into rural areas “abandoned by states… areas located largely beyond the reaches of the states are perfectly suited for government adversaries to regroup and move around freely.”[164] AQIM also became “the best-armed terrorist group in the region due to loosened state control over military arsenals in Libya.”[165] AQIM expanded its reach even as it lost its territorial base.
Economics & Finance
In the economic realm, the AU had little direct role, although its efforts to create a free trade area for the continent are designed to boost intra-African trade and to help landlocked countries like Mali and Niger increase their trade volume. AU member states lead the direct response. The countries most affected by AQIM attacks tended to be near the very bottom of the economic spectrum: per the World Bank, of 192 countries, Mauritania ranked 160th, Mali 172nd, Burkina Faso 179th, and Niger 185th.[166] As Clingendael observed, “poverty and destitution are among the most common reasons for young people becoming associated with armed groups in the Sahel.”[167] Further, as Lacher noted: “there [were] few sources of income in the Malian Sahara besides smuggling”[168] and the lack of livelihood options[169] remained a challenge. As a result, AQIM was not slow to take advantage of opportunities to win hearts, minds, or recruits through economic means. As Ghanem observed, “[b]ecause these poor socio-economic conditions foster resentment towards the central state, AQIM stepped in as a generous provider, an attractive employer, and a source of income for neglected communities.”[170]
In the financial arena, the African Union was heavily implicated in soliciting funds for the G5 Sahel joint force and counterinsurgency efforts. The AU helped launch the AU/EU/UN/GS Sahel Joint Force-sponsored[171] conference in Brussels in February 2018.[172] Additionally, the AU and its member states solicited €2.4 billion[173] in funds to address the root causes of terrorism and insurgency, in support of the GS Sahel Priority Investment Program for 2019-2021.[174] While these efforts are significant, they do not represent comprehensive funding for the military or non-military response. On the military side, obtaining the full $300-$500million GS Sahel annual budget has proven challenging.[175] AU Peace and Security Director Small Chergui complained publicly about the lack of support, stating that terrorism was increasing across the Sahel and noting, “The troops are ready, but there is no equipment.”[176] On the non-military side, funding for the GS Sahel Priority Investment Program was necessary, but not sufficient. Additional funding was required for military endeavors to help countries clear and hold the countryside, and to implement the Priority Investment Program fully.
In contrast, AQIM has access to rich and diverse sources of funding; experts estimate that it “may make tens of millions of dollars per year.”[177] It engages in a wide array of mostly illegal activities: kidnapping for ransom (KFR);[178] taxes on drug shipments;[179] smuggling and trafficking in people,[180] arms, cigarettes,[181] and fuel;[182] looting and collecting spoils;[183] taxes; and extortion.[184] While “the AQIM’s expenditures are opaque, [they] appear to go mostly towards paying… fighters, funding and developing a network… and spreading [their] influence by providing governance.[185] The AU did not sustain efforts to reduce AQIM’ s many illicit sources of funds.
Information
On the information front, the AU sent unambiguous, consistent messages that AQIM was a terrorist group, often with overtones suggesting they were also criminals. The organization routinely condemned acts of terrorism in the Sahel, as when then-AU Commission Chairperson Dlamini-Zuma blasted a “cowardly terrorist attack” in Bamako.[186] AQIM has had mixed success: its message followed the broad contours of al-Qaeda’s narrative, but included local nuance and grievances. While AQIM’s messaging did not always resonate with local populations,[187] others found it persuasive. The lack of a concerted AU or AU member state counter-messaging campaign meant AQIM’s messages did not always receive significant challenges on the ground.
Legal
The AU worked primarily through its member states, particularly the G5 Sahel, to support justice initiatives, broad rule of law efforts, and legal reform. Affected AU member states made efforts to improve the rule of law domestically (from a low base). AQIM, however, was thus able to exploit the difference between AU member states’ aspirations and attainment, and to position itself as a source of justice (via sharia law). Mali, for example, attempted to buttress local security against jihadists by offering support to “armed proxies;”[188] unfortunately, those groups also stoked inter-communal conflict[189] and the Malian government failed to hold its perpetrators accountable.[190] AQIM, though largely unable to advance its own law enforcement program, saw success in spoiling others’.[191] Moreover, the AU’s support of weak states like Mali, and its failure to hold Mali to account when Mali’s security forces or militias committed human rights abuses, undermined the AU’s statements of its commitment to the rule of law.
Overall
Globally, the AU faced significant obstacles to achieving decisive success in countering AQIM, a resurgent transnational organization with territorial ambitions. The AU’s strategic posture, largely focused on supporting the G5 Sahel structure and affected member states, was not designed to respond to this challenge, as the AQIM threat possessed a larger geographical, financial, and political scope than the five participating states. Moreover, AQIM’s unimpeded financial flows, regional alliances, and recruitment ability meant that it remained a real threat. Combating AQIM would requires a holistic strategy that restores governance and the rule of law to under-governed areas and addresses grievances in all affected member states. Additionally, the AU-endorsed response excluded Morocco and Algeria. While much of the blame for failing to degrade AQIM belongs to the AU member states in north and west Africa, the AU’s failure to help the region coalesce belongs to it alone. Overall, the AUsupported GS Sahel mission is a laudable attempt to respond to a difficult transnational challenge, but without a concerted effort by all affected AU member states to combat AQIM, the region will face major difficulties in eliminating AQIM’s influence.
Conclusion and Recommendations
AQIM, Boko Haram, and al-Shabaab are not simply transnational terrorist groups, but rather transnational insurgencies. These groups have all endeavored to create counter-states, and provided at least minimal governance to support their claims to legitimacy. These groups publicly juxtaposed their successes against the incompetence, corruption, and fragility of the governments of the states in which they operated. The AU endeavored to address this challenge directly, using DIMEFIL-like (diplomatic, intelligence, military, economic, financial, informational, and law enforcement) means to directly and indirectly counter the threat these organizations pose, with mixed success.
In the future, the AU’s efforts will be most successful if they span the DIMEFIL spectrum more evenly, rather than concentrating heavily on military intervention. Mali’s ambassador to Washington, Mahamadou Nimaga, emphasized that terrorism cannot be defeated by military intervention alone, and called for a pragmatic agenda that balances security, development, governance, and counterterrorism, while taking into account the short-, medium-, and long-term effects ofeach proposal.[192]
The AU should sustain its areas of strength: demonstrating the political will to respond, treating transnational terrorist groups as insurgencies, doing the most possible with minimal financing, pursuing diplomatic engagements with international partners, advancing intelligence cooperation, conducting kinetic activity against transnational groups, offering consistent and unambiguous messaging, affirming the importance of the rule of law, and capitalizing on external expertise.
The AU should also alleviate weaknesses, including unqualified support for member states, particularly when those member states conduct the same kinds of activities the AU condemns in transnational groups. It should also amplify its internal diplomacy (particularly in the Sahel), and include Africa’s Regional Economic Communities (RECs) more in CT/COIN efforts. It should increase the frequency and vibrancy of its messaging and counter-messaging. The AU must insist that member states stress the importance of issues related to law and justice, as complaints in these areas have fueled grievances and insurgent messaging. In the financial space, the AU struggles on three fronts: the institution is critically weak in its internal financial management; it faces challenges in its fundraising for AU-mandated or AU-supported missions, while impeded by donor-imposed stipulations; and it lacks institutional capacity to combat terrorist finance. The organization should endeavor to reform its financial management, improve fundraising, and increase its capabilities to disseminate best practices in combating terror finance. On the military front, the AU should encourage member states–via diplomatic negotiations, PSC decisions, and mandate formation –to concentrate on dismantling terrorist networks in rural areas, outlying areas, and the hinterlands.
The United States can assist in each of these areas by sustaining efforts to build capacity within the AU and its member states, offering diplomatic support to AU efforts, sharing information as appropriate, continuing military partnerships, continuing development work, partnering on efforts to counter terrorist finance, training the AU and member states on counter-messaging and sustaining U.S. messaging efforts, and supporting the rule of law in AU member States.
References
[1] 54 UN-recognized states, plus Western Sahara.
[2] Murithi argues that the UN’s “Agenda for Peace” as well as major crises on the continent in the 1990s – the Rwandan genocide and conflicts within Angola, the Deinocratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan- spurred the OAU’s recognition of a responsibility to protect and a concurrent need to intervene in sovereign states. See Tim Murithi, “The African Union’s Transition from Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: An Ad Hoc Approach to the Responsibility to Protect?” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft Vol. 1 (2009): 90-106, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/ipg/ipg-2009-l/08 a murithi us.pdf.
[3] For example, by sending AU troops to the Central African Republic to stabilize it in the face of sectarian violence in 2013, by engaging politically during/after the popular uprising in Burkina Faso in October 2014 (and helping to shape international response), and by promoting establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area in 2018.
[4] Peacekeeping.
[5] The main pillar of the APSA is the PSC, which is supported, in the discharge of its mandate, by various structures, namely: the Commission, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund. See: African Union Peace and Security Council, African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (Addis Ababa: African Union, 2012), http://www.peaceau.org/en/topic/the african-peace-and-security-architecture-apsa.
[6] Including the AU Peace and Security Council and the AU Commission [Secretariat].
[7] Such as the Dakar Declaration Against Terrorism.
[8] African Union Peace and Security Council, African Peace and Security Architecture APSA Roadmap 2016-2020 (Addis Ababa: African Union Peace and Security Council, December 2015, http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/2015-en-apsa-roadmap-final.pdf.
[9]For AQIM, as then-AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel said,
Our general goals are the same goals of Al Qaeda the mother, and you know them. As far as our goals concerning the Islamic Maghreb, they are plenty. But most importantly is to rescue our countries from the tentacles of these criminal regimes that betrayed their religion, and their people.[9]
AQIM couches its most successful messages in the language of religion, justice, and liberation:
jihadists can present themselves as protectors against the state’s indiscriminate practices, as pious saviours against corruption, and emancipatory social liberators in socially stratified societies, renders them appealing to vulnerable and disadvantaged groups.
“An Interview with Abdelmalek Droukdal,” New York Times, July 1, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript-droukdal.html?pagewanted=all. Natasja Rupesinghe, The Joint Force of the G5 Sahel: An Appropriate Response to Combat Terrorism? (Durban, South Africa: African Centre for the constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), September 18, 2018), https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/the-joint-force-of-the-g5-sahel/.
For Boko Haram, they make the case that the state is evil: Boko Haram’s case that the state is is evil (taghut)).[9] They instead propose a state in alignment with their particular brand of Islam – specifically, a “fundamentalist Islamic state with sharia criminal courts.”[9] Hussein Solomon, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa: Fighting Insurgency from Al Shabaab, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 99. Claire Felter, Nigeria’s Battle With Boko Haram (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, August 8, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/nigerias-battle-boko-haram.
For al-Shabaab, Jihadists [in Somalia] appear to have preyed upon pervasive anti-establishment sentiment and economic woes, including some of the country’s worst poverty rates,” in their information/recruitment campaigns. The group, in another example, pairs its dismissal of the Somali government as puppets with references to them as “the apostate group”.[9] It calls the AMISOM and Ethiopian troops “‘crusaders’ and ‘infidels’” while also to their invasions of Somali lands.[9] They propose instead institutionalizing sharia law, as part of their establishment of an Islamic emirate in greater Somalia.[9]
Hussein Solomon, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa: Fighting Insurgency from Al Shabaab, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 52. James Rosen, “A Confident Force: Tracking Trump’s Shadow War in Somalia,” Fox, May 16, 2019, https://foxlexington.com/news/nation-world/a-confident-force-tracking-trumps-shadow-war-in-somalia.
[10] The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017- 0905.pdf.
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[13] For a helpful discussion of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and its implications, please see Alessandro Bravetti, and Pablo Padilla, “An Optimal Strategy to Solve the Prisoner’s Dilemma,” Nature, Scientific Reports 8, Article 1948 (2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/s4l598-018-20426-w.
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[15] G. John Ikenberry, “The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism After America,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 90, No. 3 (May/June 2011): 56-68, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23039408.
[16] 16 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
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[19] Tiyanjana Maluwa, “The OAU/African Union and International Law: Mapping New Boundaries or Revising Old Terrain?” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 98 (2004): 232- 38, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25659924.
[20] Jeremy Sarkin, “The Role of the United Nations, the African Union and Africa’s Sub-Regional Organizations in Dealing with Africa’s Human Rights Problems: Connecting Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect,” Journal of African Law 53, no. l (2009): 1-33, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40646824.
[21] African Union Commission, African Union Overview, accessed May 15, 2019, https://au.int/en/overview.
[22] Konstantinos D. Magliveras and Gino J. Naldi, “The African Union: A New Dawn for Africa?” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 51, no. 2 (2002): 415-25, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3663236.
[23] Solomon A. Dersso, “The quest for Pax Africana: The case of the African Union’s peace and security regime,” African Journal on Conflict Resolution, Vol. 12, No. 2, (2012): 24.
[24] Konstantinos D. Magliveras and Gino J. Naldi, “The African Union: A New Dawn for Africa?” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 51, no. 2 (2002): 415-25, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3663236.
[25] Kristiana Powell, “The African Union’s Emerging Peace and Security Regime,” (working paper, The North-South Institute, May 2005), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/The%20African%20Union’s%20Emerging%20Peace%20and%20Security%20Regi me.pdf.
[26] Winston P. Nagan and Craig Hammer, “The Changing Character of Sovereignty in International Law and International Relations,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 43, no. l (2004): 141-187, http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/595.
[27] Winston P. Nagan and Craig Hammer, “The Changing Character of Sovereignty in International Law and International Relations,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 43, no. 1 (2004): 141-187, http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/595.
[28] “African Union Overview,” African Union, last modified 2019, https://au.int/en/overview.
[29] Organization of African Unity, Ouagadougou Declaration (Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso: Organization of African Unity, June 8-10, 1998), https://caert.org.dz/AU-Res-Dec-Decl/AHG-decl-I ouagadougou%20declaration.pdf.
[30] Organization of African Unity, Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter African Relations (Tunis Declaration) (Tunis, Tunisia: Organization of African Unity, June 13-15, 1994), https://caert.org.dz/AU-Res-Dec Decl/AHG-decl-2-Tunis.pdf.
[31] Organization of African Unity, Algiers Declaration (Algiers, Algeria: Organization of African Unity, July 12-14, 1999), https://caert.org.dz/official-documents/declarations/Algeria%20Declaration.pdf.
[32] Organization of African Unity, OAU Convention on the Prevention and Countering of Terrorism
(Algiers, Algeria, July 12-14, 1999), https://caert.org.dz/official-documents/conventions/convention-terrorism.pdf.
[33] African Union Commission, AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (Algiers, Algeria, September 11-14, 2002), http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-anti-terrorism-plan-of-action.pdf.
[34] African Union Commission Peace and Security Department, The African Union Counter Terrorism Framework (Addis Ababa: African Union Peace and Security Department, 2019), http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/64-counter-terrorism-ct.
[35] Martin Ewi, Peace in an Age of Terrorism: Can the AU Achieve Vision 2020? (Addis Ababa: Institute for Security Studies, 2019), https://issafrica.org/amp/iss-today/peace-in-an-age-of-terrorism-can-the-au-achieve-vision- 2020.
[36] David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 3.
[37] David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 1.
[38] David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 4.
[39] A. P. Schmid, Handbook of Terrorism Research (London: Routledge, 2011), 86-87.
[40] Bruce Hoffman, “Defining Terrorism,” in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, Readings and Interpretations, eds. Russell D. Howard and Bruce Hoffman (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2012): 33.
[41] Annual Country Reports on Terrorism Law, U.S. Code, Title 22, Chapter 38, Section 2656f(d).
[42] OAU Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, OAU member states, Algiers, Algeria, July 14, 1999,
UNTS 2219, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7779-treaty-0020 – oau convention on the prevention and combating of terrorism e.pdf.
[43] African Union Peace and Security Council, 816t h Meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council on the Renewal of the mandate of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram and the Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, December 5, 2018),
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.8 l 6.comm.renewal.mandate.mnjtf.5.12.2018.pdf.
[44] This strategy contains nine pillars, only three of which – the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation, Reinsertion and Reintegration of Persons associated with Boko Haram Pillar, the Security and Human Rights Pillar, and the Prevention of Violent Extremism and Building Peace Pillar – have an explicitly military bent. The remaining six pillars are focused on governance and service provision: they include items such as political cooperation, humanitarian assistance, governance, other socio-economic topics.
[45] This strategy serves as as the basis of the MNJTF mandate. African Union Commission and the Lake Chad Basin Commission, Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery & Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin (Addis Ababa, African Union Commission and the Lake Chad Basin Commission, December 12, 2018), http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/rss-ab-vers-en..pdf.
[46] Seun Bamidele, “Regional Approaches to Crisis Response, the African Union (AU) Intervention in African States: How Viable Is It?” India Quarterly, A Journal of International Affairs, Vol 73, Issue 1 (March 3, 2017), https://iournals.sagepub.com/doi/10.l 177/0974928417690085.
[47] Jide Martyns Okeke, Repositioning the AU’s Role in Countering Terror (Addis Ababa: ISS Today, May 3, 2019), https://issafrica.org/iss-today/repositioning-the-aus-role-in-countering-
terror?utm source=BenchmarkEmail&utm campaign=ISS Weekly&utm medium=email.
[48] Paul D. Williams, “Continuity and Change in War and Conflict in Africa,” PRISM 6, no. 4 (2017): 32-45, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26470480.
[49] This may not be an entirely fair criticism, as most of the root causes are local/national, for which the national government is better positioned to respond. Then again, had the national government responded effectively, there would likely not have been conflict in the first place.
[50] Princeton N. Lyman, Johnnie Carson, and Michael Miklaucic, “An Interview with Ambassador Princeton
N. Lyman and Ambassador Johnnie Carson: The Struggle for Security in Africa,” PRISM, Vol. 6, No. 4, (2017): 2- 13, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26470478.
[51] Princeton N. Lyman, Johnnie Carson, and Michael Miklaucic, “An Interview with Ambassador Princeton
N. Lyman and Ambassador Johnnie Carson: The Struggle for Security in Africa,” PRISM, Vol. 6, No. 4, (2017): 2- 13, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26470478
[52] United States Department of Defense, United States Army, Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) Unconventional Warfare 2008 doctrine. (FM 3-05.130), 2008, https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/amd-us archive/fm3-05.130%2808%29.pdf.
[53] Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 5t h edition (Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications, 2014), 17.
[54] Arthur F. Lykke, “Defining Military Strategy,” Military Review 77, no. 1 (Jan, 1997): 182, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref7collection/p124201coll I/id/425.
[55] Mechanisms that exist under African Peace and Security Architecture, such as the African Standby Force or the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis.
[56] AMISOM, EU Pledges Continued Support to AM/SOM on the Implementation of Key Programmes Under the Somalia Transition Plan (Mogadishu: AMISOM Press release, April 5, 2019), http://amisom au.org/2019/04/eu-pledges-continued-support-to-amisom-on-the-irnplementation-of-key-programmes-under-the somalia-transition-plan/.
[57] “U.S. Military Mission in Somalia Could Take Seven Years to Complete,” Fox, April 13, 2019, https://fox13now.com/2019/04/13/us-military-mission-in-somalia-could-take-seven-years-to-complete/.
[58] United Nations, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2431 (2018), Security Council Extends Mandate Of African Union Mission in Somalia, Authorizes Troop Reduction (New York: United Nations Security Council, SC/13439, July 30, 2018), https://www.un.org/press/en/20l8/sc13439.doc.htm.
[59] United Nations, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2372 (2017), Security Council Extends Mandate of African Union Mission in Somalia, Authorizes Troop Reduction (New York: United Nations Security Council, SC/12972, August 30, 2017), https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12972.doc.htm.
[60] United Nations, Security Council Extends Mandate of African Union Mission in Somalia, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2297 (2016) (New York: United Nations Security Council, SC/12436, July 7, 2016), https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12436.doc.htm.
[61] United Nations, Adopting Resolution 2232 (2015), Security Council Authorizes Ongoing African Union Deployment in Somalia, Extends Mandate for United Nations Assistance Mission (New York: United Nations Security Council, SC/11982, July 28, 2015), https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/scl1982.doc.htm
[62] United Nations, Adopting Resolution 2182 (2014), Security Council Extends Mandate of African Union Mission in Somalia for One Year, Amends Sanctions Regime (New York: United Nations Security Council, SC/11613, October 24, 2014), https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/scl 1613.doc.htm.
[63] Gabe Joselow, “Who’s Supporting Al-Shabab?,” VOA News, November 3, 2011, https://www.voanews.com/a/ga-whos-supporting-al-shabab-l33240378/l59l35.html.
[64] LTC Geoffrey Kambere, UPDF, “Financing Al-Shabaab: The Vital Port ofKismayo,” CTX Journal Vol.
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[65] U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2017 – Foreign Terrorist Organizations: al Shabaab (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, September 19, 2018), www.state.gov/reports/country reports-on-terrorism-2017/.
[66] Amy Fallon, “Uganda Foils Imminent al-Shabaab Attack, U.S. Says,” PRJ, September 13, 2014, https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-09-13/uganda-foils-imminent-al-shabaab-attack-us-says.
[67] David Goldman, AM/SOM Foils al-Shabaab Suicide Attack in Adado Somalia (Intelligence Briefs, June 18, 2015), https://intelligencebriefs.com/amisom-foils-al-shabaab-suicide-attack-in-adado-somalia/.
[68] “Al Shabaab Suicide Bombers Killed As Security Forces Foil Attack on Mogadishu,” Epukagaidi, April 9, 2018, http://epukaugaidi.com/2018/04/09/al-shabaab-militants-killed-as-security-forces-foil-attack-on mogadishu/.
[69] “Al Shabaab Attacks an African Union Base in Somalia,” Reuters, April I, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-somalia-security/al-shabaab-attacks-an-african-union-base-in-somalia idUSKCN lH8 l 5F.
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[74] Vanda Felbab-Brown, Developments in Somalia (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, November 14, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/developments-in-somalia/#footnote- l l.
[75] Anne Speckhard and Ardian Shajkovci, As al Shabaab Continues Attacks, Can Disillusioned Terrorists Help Fight the Group? (Oakton, VA: Homeland Security Today, January 22, 2019), https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/terrorism-study/as-al-shabaab-continues-attacks-can-disillusioned terrorists-help-fight-the-group/.
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[78] Sam Kiley, “Funding al-Shabaab: How aid money ends up in terror group’s hands,” CNN, February 12, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/12/africa/somalia-al-shabaab-foreign-aid-intl/index.htmL
[79] Amanda Sperber, “Al-Shabab Wants You to Know It’s Alive and Well,” Foreign Policy, January 19, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/19/al-shabab-wants-you-to-know-its-alive-and-well-kenya-somalia terrorisrn/.
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[81] Alex Ward, “Pirates and Terrorists Are Working Together Now in Somalia,” Vax, July 13, 2017, https://www.vox.corn/world/20 l 7/7/l 3/15948184/pirates-terrorists-somalia-isis-shabaab.
[82] Claire Felter, Jonathan Masters, and Mohamed Aly Sergie, Backgrounder: Al-Shabab, (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, January 31, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab
[83] Mohamed Olad Hassan, “AMISOM Unveils Plan to Flush al-Shabab From Somalia Hideouts,” VOA,
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[84] African Union (@AU_pSD), “Tripartite Agreement between the Government of#Uganda, the #AU and the #UN; as Uganda offers to provide military utility helicopters to @amisomsomalia, in order to enhance
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[85] Jill Namatsi, “Al-Shabaab losing, desperate, AU says after UN base attack,” The Nation (Kenya), Wednesday, January 2, 2019, https://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/AU-condemns-Al-Shabaab-attack-at-UN base/ l 066-49191OO- l 42pc4pz/index.html.
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[87] Muhsin Hassan, Understanding Drivers of Violent Extremism: The Case of al-Shabab and Somali Youth (West Point, New York: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 5, Issue 8, February 2018), https://ctc.usma.edu/understanding-drivers-of-violent-extremism-the-case-of-al-shabab-and-somali-youth/.
[88] Hamza Mohamed, “Al Shabab In Long-Running Battle With Twitter,” Al Jazeera, December 18, 2013, https://www .aljazeera.corn/indepth/features/2013/12/al-shabab-long-running-battle-with-twitter- 20131217ll27l555968.html.
[89] Caroline Goodson, The Fight Against Al-Shabaab Isn’t Over (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, Critical Threats, January 15, 2019), https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/fight-against-al-shabaab-isnt- over.
[90] Human Rights Watch, “The Power These Men Have Over Us”: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by African Union Forces in Somalia (New York City, NY: Human Rights Watch, September 8, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/09/08/power-these-men-have-over-us/sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-african union-forces.
[91] “Brief Overview of the Expansion ofISIS in West Africa (ISWA),” Elint News, November 15, 2018, https://elintnews.net/2018/11/15/brief-overview-of-the-expansion-of-isis-in-west-africa-iswa/.
[92] Alex Thurston, ‘The Disease is Unbelief’: Boko Haram ‘s Religious and Political Worldview, Analysis Paper No. 22 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, January 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/wp content/uploads/2016/07/Brookings-Analysis-Paper Alex-Thurston Final Web.pdf.
[93] African Union Commission, The AU and LCBC Sign An Agreement for the Operationalization of the MNJTF, (Addis Ababa: African Union Commission in Consultation with the Lake Chad Basin Commission, October 21, 2015), http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-au-and-the-lcbc-sign-an-agreement-for-the operationalization-of-the-mnjtf.
[94] African Union Peace and Security Council, Communique of the 8Jfi1h Meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council, (Addis Ababa: December 5, 2018) http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.8l 6.comm.renewal.mandate.mnjtf.5.12.2018.pdf.
[95] Atta Barkindo, “Nigeria,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 8, no. 1 (2015): 116, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26369578.
[96] ADF Staff, “A Region Rallies,” Africa Defense Forum, April 4, 2018, http://adf-magazine.com/a-region rallies-the-multinational-joint-task-force-shows-the-strengths-and-limits-of-collective-security-action/.
[97] United States Department of Defense, U.S. Army, Coriference brings together Lake Chad Basin Military Intelligence Directors: Senior intelligence officials from Lake Chad Basin countries, Europe, and the United States met during the Lake Chad Basin Directors of Military Intelligence Coriference, June 19 -20 in Abuja, (Stuttgart, Germany: AFRlCOM, July 2, 2018), https://www.africom.mil/tags/mnjtf.
[98] “Analysis: Scrutinising the Boko Haram Resurgence,” (London, UK: SB Morgen, August 22, 2017), https://www.sbmintel.com/2017/08/analysis-scrutinising-the-boko-haram-resurgence/.
[99] “Analysis: Scrutinising the Boko Haram Resurgence,” (London, UK: SB Morgen, August 22, 2017), https://www .sbmintel.com/2017/08/analysis-scrutinising-the-boko-haram-resurgence/.
[100] Idayat Hassan, The Role of Women in Countering Boko Haram, (Washington, D.C.: Inclusive Security, March 20, 2017), https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/20l 7/03/20/role-women-countering-boko-haram/.
[101] Hussein Solomon, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa: Fighting Insurgency from Al Shabaab, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram, (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 92.
[102] Vincent Foucher, “Boko Haram Is Losing Ground- But Will Not Be Defeated By Weapons Alone,” The Guardian, May 13, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/20l 6/may/13/boko-haram-losing ground-will-not-be-defeated-by-weapons-alone-lake-chad-basin-summit.
[103] ADF Staff, “A Region Rallies,” Africa Defense Forum, April 4, 2018, http://adf-magazine.com/a region-rallies-the-multinational-joint-task-force-shows-the-strengths-and-limits-of-collective-security-action/.
[104] Atta Barkindo, “Nigeria,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 8, no. 1 (2015): 116, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26369578.
[105] Atta Barkindo, “Nigeria,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 8, no. 1 (2015): 116, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26369578.
[106] Atta Barkindo, “Nigeria,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 8, no. 1 (2015): 116, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26369578.
[107] Dionne Searcey and Emmanuel Akinwotu, “Nigeria Says Soldiers Who Killed Marchers Were Provoked. Video Shows Otherwise,” New York Times, December 17, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/17/world/africa/nigeria-military-abuses.html.
[108] ADF Staff, “A Region Rallies,” Africa Defense Forum, April 4, 2018, http://adf-magazine.com/a region-rallies-the-multinational-joint-task-force-shows-the-strengths-and-limits-of-collective-security-action/.
[109] African Development Bank, African Development Bank and Nigerian Government Launch Multimilion Dollar Initiative to Support Recovery Efforts in the Northeast. (Abuja: African Development Bank, December 6, 2018), https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/african-development-bank-and-nigerian-government-launch multimillion-dollar-initiative-to-support-recovery-efforts-in-northeast-18791.
[110] Nigeria: Projects (Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2019), http://projects.worldbank.org/search?lang=en&searchTerm=&countrycode exact=NG.
[111] Hamisu Salihu, “Is Boko Haram a “child” of economic circumstances?,” International Journal of Social Economics, Vol 45, Issue 8, https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1108/IJSE-12-2017-0573
[112] Facing the Challenge of the Islamic State in West Africa Province, Report 273, Africa (New York: International Crisis Group, May 16, 2019), https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/273-facing challenge-islamic-state-west-africa-province.
[113] U.S. Department of State, Taking the Fight to Boko Haram: Global Security Contingency Fund Strengthens Chad’s Security Sector, by Katherine Dukarm, (Washington, D.C., October 9, 2018), https://blogs.state.gov/stories/2018/10/09/en/taking-fight-boko-haram-global-security-contingency-fund strengthens-chad-s.
[114] William Assanvo, Jeannine Ella A Abatan, and Wendyam Aristide Sawadogo, West Africa Report: Assessing the Multinational Task Force Against Boko Haram (Addis Ababa: Institute for Security Studies, Issue 19, September 2016), https://issafrica.s3 .amazonaws.com/site/uploads/war19.pdf.
[115] William Assanvo, Jeannine Ella A Abatan, and Wendyam Aristide Sawadogo, West Africa Report: Assessing the Multinational Task Force Against Boko Haram (Addis Ababa: Institute for Security Studies, Issue 19, September 2016), https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/warl9.pdf.
[116] Virginia Comolli, Boko Haram Nigeria’s Islamist Insurgency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 78.
[117] Hussein Solomon, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa: Fighting Insurgency from Al Shabaab, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram, (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 89
[118] “Boko Haram – Overview,” Counter Extremism, 2019, https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/boko-
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[119] Amy Pate, Boko Haram: An Assessment of Strengths, Vulnerabilities, and Policy Options (College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2015), 24, www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START %20SMA-AFR1COM Boko%20Haram%20Deep%20Dive Jan2015.pdf.
[120] Boko Haram: Coffers and Coffins; A Pandora’s Box- The Vast Financing Options for Boko Haram (Tracking Terrorism, 2019), https://www.trackingterrorism.org/article/boko-haram-coffers-and-coffins-pandoras box-vast-fmancing-options-boko-haram.
[121] Ndahi Marama, “Boko Haram Now Sells Stolen Cattle to Fund Terror,” Vanguard News, March 5, 2016, http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/03/boko-haram-now-sells-stolen-cattle-to-fund-terror/.
[122] Jason L. Rock, “Funding ofBoko Haram and Nigeria’s Action to Stop It” (master’s thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, December 2016), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=8l2545.
[123] Hearing before the US. House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services Task Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing, A Survey of Global Terrorism and Terrorist Financing 114th Cong., April 22, 2015, http://financialservices.house.gov/ uploadedfiles/042215 tf memo.pdf.
[124] Jason L. Rock, “Funding ofBoko Haram and Nigeria’s Action to Stop It” (master’s thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, December 2016), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=8l2545.
[125] African Union Peace and Security Council, Communique of the 816th Meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council, (Addis Ababa: December 5, 2018) http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.816.comm.renewal.mandate.mnjtf.5.l2.20l8.pdf.
[126] African Union Commission, Statement by the Chairperson of the Commission on the Barbaric Attack Recently Perpetrated by the Boko Haram Terrorist Group in Chad (Addis Ababa: African Union Commission, July 22, 2018), http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-com-chad-bh-20 l 8-july-22.pdf.
[127] Alex Thurston, ‘The Disease is Unbelief’: Boko Haram ‘s Religious and Political Worldview, Analysis Paper No. 22 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, January 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/wp content/uploads/2016/07/Brookings-Analysis-Paper Alex-Thurston Final Web.pdf.
[128] The Theory and Reality of Boko Haram (London, UK: Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, January 2016), https://institute. global/sites/default/files/articles/The-Theory-and- Reality-of-Boko-Haram.pdf.
[129] Claire Felter, Nigeria’s Battle With Boko Haram (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, August 8, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/nigerias-battle-boko-haram.
[130] Mina al-Lami, “Analysis: How Boko Haram is Ripping Off Islamic State Branding,” BBC, November 14, 2018, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c200exu9.
[131] Mina al-Lami, “Analysis: How Boko Haram is Ripping Off Islamic State Branding,” BBC, November 14, 2018, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c200exu9.
[132] African Union Commission, Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery & Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin, (Addis Ababa: African Union Commission in Consultation with the Lake Chad Basin Commission, December 12, 2018), http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/rss-ab-vers-en..pdf.
[133] African Union Commission, Statement by the Chairperson of the Commission on the Barbaric Attack Recently Perpetrated by the Boko Haram Terrorist Group in Chad (Addis Ababa: African Union Commission, July 22, 2018), http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-com-chad-bh-20 l 8-july-22.pdf.
[134] Nigeria is a party to the Rome Statute; the ICC therefore has jurisdiction. International Criminal Court, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2018 (The Hague, Netherlands: International Criminal Court, Bureau of the Prosecutor, December 5, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/l81205-rep-otp-PE-ENG.pdf
[135] C. Nna-Emeka Okereke, “The Resilience ofBoko Haram: Myth or Reality?” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 6, no. 7 (2014): 8, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26351269.
[136] Facing the Challenge of the Islamic State in West Africa Province, Report 273, Africa (New York: International Crisis Group, May 16, 2019), https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/273-facing challenge-islamic-state-west-africa-province.
[137] “Boko Haram Administering Territories, Imposing Taxes In Yohe, Bomo – Report,” Sahara Reporters, April 30, 2018, http://saharareporters.com/2018/04/30/boko-haram-administering-territories-imposing-taxes-yobe bomo-report.
[138] Natasja Rupesinghe, The Joint Force of the G5 Sahel: An Appropriate Response to Combat Terrorism? (Durban, South Africa: African Centre for the constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), September 18, 2018), https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/the-joint-force-of-the-g5-sahel/.
[139] African Union Peace and Security Council, Communique of the 759th Meeting on the Situation in Mali and in the Sahel, as well as the Operationalisation of the G5 Sahel Joint Force. (Addis Ababa: African Union Peace and Security Council, March 23, 2018), http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-759.comm.g5sahel.23.03.2018.pdf.
[140] Government of France, G5 Sahel Joint Force and the Sahel Alliance, 2019, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/defence-security/crisis-and-conflicts/g5-sahel-joint-force and-the-sahel-alliance/.
[141] Jennifer G. Cooke, Understanding the G5 Sahel Joint Force: Fighting Terror, Building Regional Security? (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, November 15, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-g5-sahel ioint-force-fighting-terror-building-regional-security.
[142] Jennifer G. Cooke, Understanding the G5 Sahel Joint Force: Fighting Terror, Building Regional Security? (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, November 15, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-g5-sahel ioint-force-fighting-terror-building-regional-security.
[143] The Joint Operational Army Staffs Committee, in English
[144] Interviewee C, interview by author, Washington, D.C., June 12, 2019.
[145] Known by its French acronym PCMS.
[146] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, G5 Sahel – UNODC partnership: a Rich Track Record For the First Half of2018 (New York: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, August 1, 2018), https://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/2018-08-0l -partenariat-g5-sahel.html.
[147] Agreement Strengthens Counter Terrorism Efforts in the Sahel (Oakton, VA: Homeland Security Today, May 21, 2019), https://www.hstoday.us/subiect-matter-areas/counterterrorism/agreement-strengthens-counter terrorism-efforts-in-the-sahel/.
[148] Jennifer G. Cooke, Understanding the G5 Sahel Joint Force: Fighting Terror, Building Regional Security? (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, November 15, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-g5-sahel joint-force-fighting-terror-building-regional-security.
[149] Jennifer Ogbogu, “Impact of Middle East Terrorism on North Africa,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 7, no. 7 (2015): 11-17, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26351371.
[150] Gregory Chauzal, Fix the Uefvcable: Dealing with full-blown crisis and instability: How to bring greater stability to the Sahel? (The Hague: Clingendael (Netherlands Institute of International Relations, December 2015), https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/PB%20Fix%20the%20unfixable.pdf.
[151] Sergei Boeke, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism, insurgency, or organized crime?,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 27, Issue 5 (August 2016): 914,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/095923l 8.2016.1208280.
[152] African Union Peace and Security Council, Communique of the 679th PSC Meeting on the draft Strategic Concept of Operations (CONOPs) of the Joint Force of the G5 Sahel (Addis Ababa: African Union Peace and Security Council, April 13, 2017), http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/679th-com-g5sahel-13-04-2017.pdf.
[153] Zoe Gorman and Dr. Gregory Chauzal, Establishing a Regional Security Architecture in the Sahel (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research.Institute, June 25, 2018), https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2018/establishing-regional-security-architecture-sahel.
[154] Comfort Ero, A Changing Environment Brings Opportunities and Threats for the African Union (New York: International Crisis Group, July 26, 2017), https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/changing-environment-brings opportunities-and-threats-african-union.
[155] Comfort Ero, A Changing Environment Brings Opportunities and Threats for the African Union (New York: International Crisis Group, July 26, 2017), https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/changing-environment-brings opportunities-and-threats-african-union.
[156] Government of France, G5 Sahel Joint Force and the Sahel Alliance, 2019, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/defence-security/crisis-and-conflicts/g5-sahel-joint-force and-the-sahel-alliance/.
[157] Interviewee B, interview by author, Washington, D.C., May 21, 2019.
[158] Joe Penney, “The G5 Sahel Force, Failing the Region and Failing Itself,” Pass Blue, December 16, 2018, https://www.passblue.com/20l8/l2/l6/the-g5-sahel-force-failing-the-region-and-failing-itself/.
[159] Lori-Anne Theroux-Benoni and Nadia Adam, Hard Counter-Terrorism Lessons From the Sahel for West Africa’s Coastal States, (Addis Ababa: Institute for International Security, June 5, 2019), https://issafrica.org/iss-today/hard-counter-terrorism-lessons-from-the-sahel-for-west-africas-coastal states?utm source=BenchmarkEmail&utm campaign=ISS Today&utm medium=email.
[160] Katherine Zimmerman and Alix Halloran, Warning From the Sahel: Al Qaeda’s Resurgent Threat (Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute, Critical Threats Project, 2019), https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/warning-from-the-sahel-al-gaedas-resurgent-threat.
[161] Omar S. Mahmoud, Rethinking Strategy to Stop the Spread of Terrorism (Addis Ababa: Institute for Security Studies, June 12, 2019), https://issafrica.org/iss-today/rethinking-strategy-to-stop-the-spread-of-terrorism.
[162] Andrew Lebovich, G5 Sahel: Much Done, More to Do (London, UK: European Council on Foreign Relations, March 8, 2018), https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentru:y g5 sahel much done more to do.
[163] Financial Action Task Force, Terrorist Financing in West and Central Africa (Paris: Financial Action Task Force, October 2016), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Terrorist-Financing-West Central-Africa.pdf.
[164] 164 Finding the Right Role for the G5 Sahel Joint Force, Report 258, Africa (New York: International Crisis Group, December 12, 2017), https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/burkina-faso/258-force-du-g5-sahel trouver-sa-place-dans-lembouteillage-securitaire.
[165] Prem Mahadevan, “Jihadism in Africa: Marching Together, Striking Separately,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 6, no. 7 (2014): 4-7, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26351268.
[166] World Bank, GDP Per Capita, PPP (Current International$): World Bank, International Comparison Program Database (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2019), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?view=chart.
[167] Gregory Chauzal, Fix the Urifixable: Dealing with full-blown crisis and instability: How to bring greater stability to the Sahel? (The Hague: Clingendael (Netherlands Institute oflnternational Relations, December 2015), https://www.dingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/PB%20Fix%20the%20unfixable.pdf.
[168] Wolfram Lacher, Organized Crime and Coriflict in the Sahara-Sahel Region (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 13, 2012), 13.
[169] Robert Muggah and Jose Luengo Cabrera, The Sahel is Engulfed by Violence. Climate Change, Food Insecurity and Extremists Are Largely to Blame (New York: World Economic Forum, January 23, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/0l /all-the-warning-signs-are-showing-in-the-sahel-we-must-act-now/.
[170] Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck, “Jihadism in the Sahel: AQIM’s Strategic Maneuvers for Long-Term Regional Dominance,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, June 23, 2017, https://www.georgetownjournalofmtemationalaffairs.org/online-edition/jihadism-in-the-sahel-aqims-strategic maneuvers-for-long-term-regional-dominance?rq=sahel.
[171] Government of France, G5 Sahel Joint Force and the Sahel Alliance, 2019, https://www.diplomatie. gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/defence-security/crisis-and-conflicts/g5-sahel-joint-force and-the-sahel-a1liance/.
[172] It raised pledges of€431 million of which €267 had actually been paid a year later. See G5 Sahel: Financing to be Realized,” Africa News Agency, June 2, 2019, https://www.africanewsagency.fr/g5-sahel-des financements-a-concretiser/?lang=en.
[173] Security Council Report, January 2019 Monthly Forecast: West Africa and the Sahel (New York: Security Council Report, December 27, 2018), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2019- 0 l /west-africa-and-the-sahel.php.
[174] The G5’s own development priorities list. See Government of France, G5 Sahel Joint Force and the Sahel Alliance, 2019, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/defence-security/crisis-and conflicts/ g5-sahel-joint-force-and-the-sahel-alliance/.
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[176] “Terrorism ‘expanding’ in Sahel, African Union security chief warns,” Defense Post, February 11, 2019, https://thedefensepost.com/2019/02/11/african-union-terrorism-sahel/.
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