The Silent Parallels of US-China Rivalry: A Clash of Power, Not Models

Despite stark contrasts—if not outright opposition—between modern China and the United States, subtle yet undeniable parallels have emerged across society, economy, and politics. These similarities are shaped by mutual influences and shared challenges, even as the two nations remain locked in strategic competition. They stem from a long history of borrowing and appropriation, shaping both nations in frequently overlooked ways. This article initially explores the intricate parallels between Chinese and American political ideals and governance. It serves as a heuristic tool to understand both states’ trajectories better. In no way does it seek to predict rapprochements or conflicts. Instead, it highlights that their struggles are, at their core, a mere contest of power.¹

In a 2017 article, sinologist Geremie Barmé draws parallels between Mao Zedong and Donald Trump at the outset of his first administration, emphasizing key similarities between the two autocrats.² Indeed, both Mao and Trump rose to power by challenging the established order in their respective nations, creating significant disruption. Additionally, Mao ruled as Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), while Trump operated with a ‘Chairman of the Board’ mentality as a businessman, exhibiting extreme authoritarian tendencies. Both leaders were also known for their polemical excess. However, despite these similarities, Trump’s presidency was most unlikely at that time to align with China’s ideological ambitions, as Barmé notes.

This contribution presents a broader perspective on the comparison, offering a different interpretation of the political similarities between the US and China. The interwoven trajectories of modern China and the U.S. reveal a complex dynamic where scientific, economic, and management strategies have been studied, adapted, and, at times, mirrored between the two powers. Post-Mao China, in particular, has been a laboratory for building a political economy model supposedly made of exceptional Chinese characteristics, ostensibly anti-Western but not anti-American. The key factors that propelled the United States to global superpower status—beyond its constitutional democracy—have been meticulously examined and, to varying degrees, replicated by the CCP leadership, with mixed but largely successful results. Particularly intriguing is that Marxism-Leninism has always remained on the fringes of extremist political thought in the “Land of Liberty” despite its deep roots as an established European philosophy. One might expect this intellectual lineage to align China more closely with Europe—paradoxically, it does not.

The start of Trump’s second administration has led to surprising shifts, with China’s model notably influencing American tech business with the support of mainland Chinese conservatives and first-generation Chinese migrants in the US, who reinforce Trump’s policies and doctrines. This situation is particularly intriguing and warrants closer scrutiny, given the growing similarities between Xi Jinping’s politically authoritarian, socially conservative, and techno-nationalist vision and the governance principles of the ‘Make America Great Again’ (MAGA) doctrine. The situation is all the more interesting given that analysts have often viewed China’s soft power and model as unconvincing, except perhaps in a few countries of the Global South.³

Genuine cooperation between Beijing and Washington is unlikely to be a sustained goal. However, as they increasingly align in certain essential aspects of their trajectories, this paradoxical shift requires closer examination—especially regarding its implications for the European Union and the future of the global order.

U.S.-China, a long history of appropriations and mutual influences

Historically, the United States and China could hardly be more different. China, home to one of the world’s oldest civilizations, struggled with failed democratic experiments throughout the 20th century. In contrast, the U.S., one of the youngest nation-states, upholds the world’s oldest active constitutional democracy. A Marxist, atheist state stands in opposition to a profoundly religious, staunchly anti-communist nation.

China has become a scientific superpower only in the past decade, driven primarily by engineers and techno-utopian visionaries.⁴ In contrast, the United States has maintained global scientific leadership for a century. However, in recent years, its political landscape has been marked by the rise of leaders openly opposed to scientific facts, alongside a ‘war’ on evidence-based national policymaking and science diplomacy in foreign affairs.⁵

Since the Opium Wars, the two nations have deeply intertwined their political trajectories. This foundational era marked the beginning of their engagement beyond the shadow of Europe’s then-dominant economic and scientific colonial order. At its core, U.S.-China relations have since been shaped by mercantilism—the relentless pursuit of wealth—and a broader ideological mission. While both nations have embraced a mercantilist impulse—from the California Gold Rush of the 1850s to WTO integration in the 2000s and today’s Silicon Valley boom—their ideological approaches have sharply diverged. In contrast to the messianic themes of religious, human rights, and democratic ideals—often tinged with a racist undertone reminiscent of the “Yellow Peril” narrative—that have historically shaped the United States’ nativist approach to China,⁶ Beijing’s strategy has been marked by a more consistent narrative, positioning itself as the genuine defender of so-called “tangible” human rights.⁷ Nevertheless, an underlying sense of envy has always accompanied this position. All these elements have fostered an extraordinarily complex love-hate relationship in which moments of rapprochement and periods of crisis continuously expose the profound inner contradictions between the two empires.

U.S. political philosophy has influenced China’s elite since the late 19th century, and the U.S. political model has left a lasting imprint on Chinese governance. Sun Yat-sen, the Christian revolutionary who established the first Chinese Republic in 1912, viewed America as a blueprint for China’s advancement. He was inspired by U.S. ideals of popular sovereignty, which influenced his Three Principles of the People—a doctrine now enshrined in Taiwan’s constitution. Similarly, Chiang Kai-shek’s U.S.-educated wife was pivotal in fostering close ties and support between the U.S. Congress and China’s Nationalist Party from the 1920s to the 1970s.

Even during the Maoist era, when anti-American rhetoric was at its peak, Mao Zedong demonstrated a paradoxical relationship with the United States. While Mao publicly expressed solidarity with movements like Black Power after Martin Luther King’s assassination, his early writings and political vision reflected a profound admiration for the U.S.’s founding fathers and their revolutionary ideals—most notably George Washington. After the Sino-Soviet split, at the height of the Cold War, the U.S. and China found themselves strategically aligned in their shared goal of countering Soviet influence. The Kissinger-Nixon doctrine paved the way for a quasi-alliance, culminating in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqués and the eventual mutual diplomatic recognition in 1979. Just months later, Deng Xiaoping’s triumphant visit to the U.S.—complete with his iconic cowboy hat—suddenly symbolized a new era. His tours of Coca-Cola, Boeing, and Ford Motor Company reinforced his vision for China’s new ‘reform and opening-up policy,’ drawing inspiration from the American business and science-driven model.

Since then, China’s middle class has embraced the American way of life. Generations of CCP leaders and their families have been educated at elite U.S. universities, further deepening institutional and personal exchanges. This fascination was also powerfully symbolized in June 1989, when pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square erected the Goddess of Democracy—a direct homage to the Statue of Liberty. Over decades, CCP’s leadership has strategically built a powerful techno-military complex, established local elite universities modeled after the Ivy League, promoted ‘soft power à la Joseph Nye,’ championed a ‘Go West’ development policy, and introduced ‘new public management’ reforms—borrowing all these terms directly from US-led governance ideals. Even China’s ‘social credit system,’ designed to monitor and assess citizens’ trustworthiness, originates in the U.S. financial credit and banking system.⁸ Initially conceptualized in 1999 by the China Academy of Social Sciences, it was adapted and reinterpreted to fit China’s governance model.⁹ Xi Jinping’s China Dream (中国梦) centered on the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation (中华民族伟大复兴), can be viewed as a distinctly Chinese counterpart to MAGA—a vision of national revival and restored global influence, shaped in the early 2010s.¹⁰

Challenging common preconceptions, daily life in the U.S. and China reveals remarkable similarities in their contemporary core values. Both societies strongly emphasize money and wealth, consumerism, hard work, competitiveness, and individualism, which are deeply rooted in their close-knit communities—known as “guanxi” (关系) in Chinese culture. In both nations, the welfare system is minimal, and the educational system is highly driven by financial resources, often resulting in an extremely elitist structure.¹¹ There is a pervasive myth that success is equally attainable for all in the United States and China and that social classes, castes, or oligarchies constrain neither country. Trump is seen as a model of success because his supporters aspire to achieve a similar level of prosperity, imagining it to be within reach for themselves and their children. This belief is firm among evangelical and Pentecostal prosperity gospel adherents.¹² A parallel can be drawn with today’s China: despite its communist framework, individuals there understand that they must rely solely on themselves—that the law of the jungle prevails, whether they are impoverished rural migrants or startup founders striving to survive in an intensely competitive environment and secure generational wealth for their families, according to traditional Confucianist values. Kai-Fu Lee, former president of Google China and a close advisor to the CCP on AI policy, captures this reality in his bestseller AI Superpowers, widely available in airports across China and the United States.¹³ ‘There is much complementarity between the U.S. and China, and we face many similar challenges. Many approaches could be transferred, he explains. ‘Everyone sees this as competition, but it isn’t.’ Lee frequently highlights that while platforms encounter ‘copycats’ in the U.S., competition typically ends once one company secures the largest market share.

In contrast, in China, ‘the Yelp of China had to compete with the Groupon of China, with the OpenTable of China, with the DoorDash of China—until eventually, only one survived,’ he notes. The result is the emergence of giant super-apps that dominate the market. According to Lee, Europe’s primary challenge is not that its regulatory system stifles innovation but rather that it fails to foster the kind of fierce, Darwinian-style competition—unlike in the U.S.—where only the strongest outlast the weakest.

Chinese and U.S. political leadership embrace a worldview often described as G2+0, a framework encapsulated by the Thucydides Trap—the theory that an emerging power inevitably clashes with an established one. This concept is so deeply embedded in Chinese strategic thought that Xi Jinping and generations of CCP applicants must articulate its significance through essays as part of the rigorous selection process for cadre or civil servant positions across various state-party institutions. Leading up to the 2024 U.S. elections—and even in their aftermath—Chinese social media platforms have been inundated with uncensored, positive sentiments toward ‘Trump’ (特朗普) and his disruptive policies.¹⁴ Furthermore, both countries are intertwined with a robust sense of nationalism and exceptionalism, viewing themselves as having universal visions, albeit expressed in contrasting ways. For instance, Xi Jinping’s China focuses on a ‘community of common destiny for mankind’ (人类命运共同体), a fundamental element of ‘Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy,’ which shapes Chinese foreign policy in the so-called ‘New Era,’ emphasizing ‘collective well-being and shared global development.’ At the same time, the United States under Trump envisions its role as setting the global agenda, even while adopting a protectionist stance. While their approaches may differ, China and the United States project their visions with a profound sense of exceptionalism and universal ambition, ultimately serving as a mirror to one another. Each nation wishes to shape the global narrative in its unique terms.

Interwoven contemporary and highly sensitive political debates

The debate on ‘wokism’ exemplifies the intertwined political trajectories between China and the United States. The term has become a divisive topic, eliciting strong reactions from various groups. On one side, nationalists in mainland China, first-generation Chinese migrants in the United States, and American conservatives oppose it. Conversely, Chinese youth and liberal intellectuals who navigate between the U.S. and China tend to support it.¹⁵ The last group interprets ‘wokism’ through the lens of the literal translation ‘juexing wenhua‘ (觉醒文化), meaning “enlightened culture.” This group tends to be less vocal on platforms like Weibo due to increased censorship. It may also represent a minority opinion among the second or third-generation Chinese migrants in the United States. The term ‘Baizuo‘ (白左), which translates to “white left,” is commonly employed by the other group to describe liberals and leftists. Notably, the term ‘Baizuo’ has found resonance among conservatives in the US, indicating a growing cross-cultural exchange of political ideologies. This now derogatory term is believed to have emerged from discussions among Chinese netizens, particularly on Weibo, during the 2010s, with some attributing its inception to an article that satirized wealthy foreign leftists who supported Communist revolutions worldwide in the 1960s-70s from their privileged positions, particularly during the Great Cultural Revolution in China, which resulted in millions of deaths. Others,such as Zhang Chenchen, Assistant Professor at Durham University, argue that the term gained popularity around 2015, coinciding with the European refugee crisis and the rise of right-wing populism in the United States.¹⁶

Anti-‘Baizuo critics target what they see as the overly tolerant stance of Western liberals on issues like immigration, social matters, and sexuality. These critics commonly accuse ‘Baizuo’ proponents of being hypocritical, claiming they promote peace and equality mainly to elevate their sense of moral superiority. They are perceived as overly focused on issues such as minority rights and LGBT rights while tolerating what they consider the “regressive values” of Islam in the name of multiculturalism. As Wu Guo, an Associate Professor of History at Allegheny College who studies US-China comparisons, notes, many are concerned about their children being ‘corrupted’ by non-mainstream gender pluralism and prefer that ‘they remain uninvolved with abstract concepts such as social justice and environmental protection.’¹⁷

The term ‘Baizuo’ has evolved into an insult on China’s internet, directed at individuals whose views are perceived as conflicting with social stability and national security. However, its interpretation varies significantly depending on one’s position within broader U.S.-China relations. On either side, the term may reference entirely different notions and ideologies. Initially, as Wu Guo explains, the meaning of ‘Baizuo’ expanded over time, with ‘white’ no longer tied to race but symbolizing pure naivety or imbecility.

Among the anti-Chinese Communist Party diaspora and Trump supporters, the term is weaponized against Asian supporters of movements like Black Lives Matter, for example. This association with Trump has led some commentators to view the term as emblematic of a confrontational approach to China, one rooted in pragmatism rather than human rights or democracy concerns. Chinese Trump supporters admire his perceived strength and resolve, seeing him as the only dominant political figure capable of challenging the CCP. The anti-CCP segment of China’s diaspora, as well as US conservatives such as Tucker Carlson or Rod Dreher, draw parallels between Critical Race Theory and the U.S. woke culture, between former Red Guards and American progressives, feminists, or environmentalists.¹⁸ Conversely, within China, nationalist supporters of the CCP use ‘Baizuo’ to advocate for a post-Western, post-white supremacy world. For these nationalists, the term conveys a sense of competition, ridiculing Western concerns about the global implications of China’s rise. They criticize Western liberals for their incapacity to navigate the harsh, zero-sum geopolitical realities of international competition. As Wu Guo explains, this perspective emphasizes a “no pain, no gain” ethos, dismissing Western liberal democracy idealism as unrealistic and outdated. Interestingly, this nationalist critique aligns closely with Donald Trump’s anti-woke rhetoric, creating an unexpected overlap between Chinese nationalist ‘Baizuo’ critics and Trump’s anti-liberal crusade. The conservative thinker Rod Dreher coined the term ‘baizuocracy’ to describe a ‘white leftist government,’ the same he has expressed his admiration for Viktor Orban’s Hungary.¹⁹ These ideological twists are not purely tactical motives. Reciprocal admiration emerges between these factions, as both share a rhetoric that also often includes a strong sexist undertone.

Along with academics and historians mainly, wokism serves as a tool for ‘cultural awakening,’ encouraging individuals to ‘re-examine Western culture’ and boldly confront the notion of ‘taboos’ associated with the West. However, another crucial dimension of China’s wokism debate is rooted in traditional Chinese culture. It promotes a return to the country’s core social values—its own ‘spiritual civilization’—as a rejection of what is perceived as a decadent Western influence. This is not new; similar rhetoric was prominent in the 1980s and 1990s during campaigns against the West’s ‘spiritual corruption.’ Starting in 2015, the People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the CCP, has notably discussed the phenomenon.²⁰ Following the 20th CCP Congress in October 2022, Xi Jinping repeatedly emphasized that ‘the long-standing and rich Chinese civilization is the foundation of contemporary Chinese culture, and a treasure trove inspiring cultural innovation.’ For Xi, ‘China’s excellent traditional culture is the root and soul of the Chinese nation.’²¹ Since then, academic work surrounding gender studies has encountered challenges, while post-colonial studies often receive harsh criticism when they do not simply replicate the state-party narrative. Studies on climate change typically fall under the umbrella of public policy or engineering technology. They are generally accepted if they do not undermine the existing political ecosystem. However, any attempts to push these restricted boundaries lead to censorship. The perception, fear, and instrumentalization of wokism in the Chinese context bear clear parallels with the MAGA doctrine, both advocating a return to a supposedly pure tradition that is defined from the top down—traditional, authoritarian, and patriarchal, to say the least.

Trump’s lieutenants, a blend of resentment and admiration for China

Elon Musk, now head of Donald Trump’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), has maintained deep business ties with China for years, shaping a unique dynamic in U.S.-China relations. His most significant investment in China—Tesla’s Gigafactory in Shanghai—has grown into the company’s most productive facility, accounting for more than half of Tesla’s global deliveries.²² Nearly 40% of Tesla’s battery supply chain relies on Chinese companies, with the Shanghai government providing long-standing tax incentives to support Tesla’s operations. Additionally, Musk’s public statements often echo Beijing’s interests. He has repeatedly lauded China’s infrastructure, space program, and leadership in green energy while opposing economic decoupling, characterizing the U.S. and Chinese economies as ‘conjoined twins,’ as noted by Kong Linggong. His stance on Taiwan—proposing it be designated as a special administrative zone under Beijing’s control, akin to Hong Kong or Macao—was naturally well received by Chinese officials, further cementing perceptions of his alignment with the PRC.

Beyond Tesla, reports indicate that wealthy Chinese investors have discreetly funneled millions into Musk’s private ventures, including SpaceX, Neuralink, and xAI, through complex financial structures.²³ Meanwhile, his mother, Maye Musk, has become a beloved figure in China, frequently collaborating with top Chinese brands and praising the country’s infrastructure and way of life. Her book A Woman Makes a Plan（人生由我）became a bestseller in China, and she is now affectionately referred to as an “old friend of China” (老朋友) on Chinese social media platforms like Xiaohongshu, Douyin, and Douban—a term traditionally reserved for key figures in U.S.-China relations.²⁴

Quinn Slobodian, in his book Hayek’s Bastards: Race, Gold, IQ, and the Capitalism of the Far Right, argues that the extreme right forces currently dominating U.S. politics are the inheritors of neoliberalism’s core project—the ongoing effort to safeguard capitalism from democracy.²⁵ Here, democratic rules are often perceived as inefficient and obstacles to the most capable business minds in the United States. In an exchange with Minnesota Senator Angus King just before his confirmation, Hegseth stated, ‘Our boys should not fight by rules written by dignified men in mahogany rooms 80 years ago’—an apparent reference to the Geneva Conventions. Instead, he asserted, America should fight by its own rules, and we should fight to win or not go at all.’ He dismisses constitutional constraints and ‘burdensome rules of engagement’ favoring more aggressive and uncompromising methods.

Slobodian further clarifies that the second Trump administration follows a political trajectory consistent with the reactionary program of the ‘Dark Enlightenment,’ which seeks to establish an absolute state under the leadership of a ‘CEO-President.’ In this context, China’s ascendance is regarded as a historic transformation, comparable to pivotal shifts such as the transition from monarchies to democracies or even the very founding of the United States itself!

Libertarian thinkers Nick Land and Curtis Yarvin offer theories that converge on deregulation in favor of maximizing entrepreneurial freedom, coupled with socially conservative, supposedly anti-woke stances. This paradoxical hybrid—of libertarianism and strong state power—envisions a new order in which a monarchy-like state facilitates the free flow of economic activity while simultaneously dismantling the media, constitutionalism, and ‘ideological’ establishments. In this vision, a powerful state must ensure a deregulated market that benefits the socially and politically proclaimed conservative elite. In this view, an ‘efficient’ government should disregard democratic safeguards, with the long-term goal of rapidly transforming American democracy into an effective corporate state. J.D. Vance has cited Yarvin, indicating that he has read his writings; however, Yarvin considers him too moderate. Furthermore, Peter Thiel, co-founder of PayPal and a close associate of Trump, has funded a startup by Curtis Yarvin. The libertarian ideology, primarily driven by Silicon Valley’s tech giants, advocates for a vision prioritizing individual freedom over the fundamental constitutional principles of democracy and the system of checks and balances.

Interestingly, both Nick Land and Curtis Yarvin draw on the ideas of Carl Schmitt, a Nazi-era jurist whose influence extends to Chinese intellectual circles—particularly among legal scholars aligned with Xi Jinping’s administration since 2012.²⁶ As mentioned by David Ownby and others, Carl Schmitt has offered in China a philosophical foundation for neo-authoritarian thought and found resonance in the work of Wang Huning, a pivotal political ideologue who has been instrumental in shaping Xi Jinping’s policies on politics on cybersecurity and military-civil fusion. In his influential book, America Against America(美国反对美国), Wang Huning critically examines the structural vulnerabilities of democracies, with a particular focus on the United States.²⁷ He questions the widely accepted notion of the inevitability of liberal democracy’s global spread, suggesting that this belief may be overly simplistic. Wang advocates for ideological unity and cultural conformity as essential components for the stability of political systems. He also promotes a robust anti-liberal-Western stance, which could be translated today as ‘anti-woke,’ reflecting a reaction against perceived cultural excesses and liberal ideologies that challenge traditional values.

Wang Huning’s vision calls for top-down control, underscoring the importance of traditional social and cultural values and purely economic development as central pillars of any society’s future. With some differences, these are key common aspects of Trump’s doctrine. Wang Huning could find common ground with the MAGA doctrine, arguing that democracies merely claim to represent the people while, in reality, entrenched elites and the establishment manipulate power, remaining indifferent to the fundamental needs of ordinary citizens. Meanwhile, the CCP strategically utilizes purges to consolidate a new political order that the emerging ‘Musk-oligarchy’ views as particularly advantageous. Interestingly, this ‘Muskoligarchy^’ or ‘JackMa-oligarchy,’ an alliance of influential, politically engaged tech elites – could, for different reasons, present a formidable challenge to the political ambitions of both Trump and Xi.²⁸

Different styles, same playbook: how Donald Trump and Xi Jinping converge on strategy and goals

The disparity in political styles between the U.S. and China remains profound, even when they fundamentally align on specific issues. This contrast was particularly evident in the speeches delivered at the historic February 2025 Munich Security Conference, which profoundly shook European nations to their core. Despite conveying similar messages, JD Vance’s address was confrontational, whereas Wang Yi’s was legitimist in tone. A few days later, on the third anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. aligned with Russia in opposing a United Nations resolution that called for the immediate withdrawal of troops. At the same time, China chose to abstain from the vote.²⁹ However, there are also various currents and dynamics within China’s foreign affairs. For instance, in February 2025 the PRC appointed Lu Shaye as its new Ambassador to the EU. Known for his blunt rhetoric toward Western civilization and European nations, Lu has become one of the most vocal advocates of the ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy—a group of Chinese diplomats who support a more assertive stance. In response to Donald Trump’s remark that ‘the EU was formed to screw the United States,’ Lu retorted, ‘When you look at how the Trump administration has imposed a brazen and domineering policy toward Europe, treating its allies in this way, it’s frankly appalling from a European perspective’.³⁰

Indeed, Donald Trump’s persistently racially charged rhetoric toward Beijing since 2017 has inadvertently bolstered Xi Jinping’s standing, casting him as a dignified and stabilizing force—both within China, across the Global South, and on the world stage. However, beyond the COVID-19 pandemic, American right-wing authoritarian and libertarian populist elites have been increasingly captivated by China’s social and economic resilience, technological advancements, and innovation-driven ascent. From Beijing, Trump’s disregard for human rights discourse in foreign policy, associated with his consistently pro-Russian stance, could create strategic openings for transactional deals amid ongoing global conflicts. This evolving dynamic fosters a neo-realist alliance that both Trump, Poutine, and Xi appear to favor, as they share a common ambition to reshape the post-1945 world order—challenging established old democratic frameworks in pursuit of safeguarding elite-driven, ‘national-capitalism,’ as Thomas Piketty puts it.³¹

The traditional American approach to foreign policy is undergoing a paradigm shift. Historically, it has embraced a messianic role in promoting liberal democracy, a stance that persisted despite differences between Republicans and Democrats. The first Trump administration strengthened its ties with authoritarian regimes, such as Russia. The second Trump administration reinforces this partnership and dismantles the policies of exporting the rule of law and development aid, as evidenced by the USAID shutdown.³² Therefore, a fundamental difference between China and the United States now lies in China’s pursuit of a truly global vision, which used to be the foreign policy DNA of the United States in the past century. The Belt and Road Initiative, a central component of this vision, often likened to the Marshall Plan, actively promotes a model that extends essential aspects of China’s approach beyond its borders. This initiative is referred to as the ‘dual mission’ and is understood as the process of ‘globalization with Chinese characteristics.’³³

Both Xi and Trump, albeit through different approaches, adhere to the principle of ‘bilateral multilateralism’—prioritizing exclusive, personalized bilateral relationships and, when necessary, within a broader multilateral framework of flexible alliances. This strategy is evident in the Belt and Road Initiative, which aims to expand influence through strategic infrastructure projects and control over natural resources. It involves direct engagement with specific countries and leaders, leveraging such tactics to fragment and exert pressure on regional blocs and more integrated entities like the European Union. China’s establishment of the 16+1 platform in 2012 is a notable example of this strategy, illustrating how China’s unconventional inter-state negotiations can shape geopolitical landscapes, manage disruptive alliances, and redefine traditional trade structures.³⁴ Trump’s ‘Big North’ initiative, which encompasses Canada, Mexico, and Greenland, can be seen as an extension of his ambition to project pure strength in foreign affairs. Similarly, under Xi Jinping, Beijing has become increasingly assertive in its claims over Taiwan, reinforcing its ‘One China Policy.’ Given Trump’s strategic priorities—including strengthening ties with Russia, framing Ukraine as the aggressor in the war, pursuing giant business deals, and advancing his ‘Big America’ agenda—the future of the Republic of China, Taiwan is positively uncertain. TSMC’s $100 billion investment in the U.S. in March 2025 may have responded to tariff threats from the Trump administration. In Taiwan, the decision has sparked political division, with segments of society expressing concerns that it could undermine Taiwan’s ‘silicon shield’ without any explicit guarantees of defense by the United States in case of an attack from mainland China.

China’s state-driven strategies under initiatives like Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025) have undeniably influenced U.S. policymaking, mainly as the two nations compete for dominance in critical technological sectors.³⁵ While the U.S. has traditionally relied on market-driven, deregulated innovation, China’s success in leveraging centralized policies to foster technological giants has prompted Washington to adopt similar approaches in certain areas. China’s MIC 2025 initiative focuses on strategic investments in industries like AI, quantum physics, and advanced manufacturing, using subsidies, incentives for local suppliers, and administrative barriers for foreign competitors. This model has inspired the U.S. to rethink its approach to technological governance. For example, the CHIPS and Science Act of 2024 allocated significant funding to strengthen the U.S. semiconductor supply chain, mirroring China’s focus on securing critical industries. The U.S. Innovation and Competition Act provided substantial scientific research and innovation funding, reflecting a more centralized and strategic approach to technological development. China’s rise as a full-spectrum digital competitor has also pushed the U.S. to adopt measures to safeguard its technological edge. For instance, the National Security Presidential Memorandum 33 (NSPM-33) was introduced to protect U.S. research and development from foreign interference, responding to concerns about China’s exploitation of U.S. innovation. China’s dominance in this area has influenced efforts to secure supply chains for critical materials, such as rare earths, underscoring its centralized model’s strategic foresight.

China’s emphasis on technological self-reliance has also shaped U.S. strategies. For example, Donald Trump’s Stargate Initiative echoed MIC 2025’s focus on reducing dependence on foreign technology and fostering domestic innovation. This shift highlights how China’s model has encouraged the U.S. to adopt a more proactive and holistic strategic stance in tech governance.

Forging alliances with adversaries while dismantling partnerships with allies: A Baroque landscape

Genuine cooperation between Beijing and Washington is unlikely to be a constant objective. Aligning with the ‘small yard, high fence’ (小院高墙) doctrine, the U.S. seeks to limit China’s access to technologies critical to national security, aiming to implement a decoupling strategy from Beijing. The blunt reality is that with its vast influence over crucial issues such as nuclear security, technology, and global health, China is both an indispensable trading partner and a formidable national security threat. The United States and China remain locked in intense competition as the world’s two largest economies (and polluters). Their interdependence is staggering: China holds approximately $800 billion in U.S. Treasury securities, while the U.S. runs a monthly trade deficit of around $25 billion with China, fueled by decades of low-middle-class, often anti-China consumers purchasing inexpensive “Made in China” goods from Walmart or equivalent.

However, despite prevailing tensions, China and the United States do not continuously pursue fundamentally opposing objectives; in other words, their core interests are not inherently in conflict. Shortly after taking office, Trump imposed a 10% tariff on Chinese imports, triggering swift retaliation from Beijing. He also floated the possibility of revoking China’s permanent normal trade relations status. Yet, despite his confrontational rhetoric, Trump’s actions have, in practice, been less aggressive toward China than toward some of the United States’ longstanding allies, such as Canada and Europe. Additionally, he has been more critical of the Biden administration for failing to enforce the 2020 Phase 1 trade agreement—his signature deal—than of China for its non-compliance, which Beijing attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Trump has repeatedly expressed interest in a comprehensive agreement with President Xi that extends beyond trade to include business commitments and nuclear security. This occurs in the context of D. Trump’s steadfast and loyal ties with Russia, a factor that could counterbalance the China-Russia economic interdependence, which also has sought to challenge the dominance of the U.S. dollar in global trade.

Interestingly, as in other domains, Donald Trump has surrounded himself with a team of staunch ideologues and conservative chiefs of staff, each bringing distinct perspectives—often accompanied by conflicting interests. The presence of Chinese hawks among Washington’s top decision-makers is undeniable, with Marco Rubio standing out as a key figure. However, influential Trump advisers on China, including Elon Musk and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, express confidence in negotiating a deal on terms favorable to the U.S. The only effective strategy for both Trump and Xi Jinping to address internal discord within the U.S. would be to engage directly at the bilateral level and through personal, one-on-one agreements between Xi and Trump.

From Beijing’s perspective, China is ramping up exports amid a struggling property market while remaining deeply apprehensive about Trump’s unpredictable tactics, especially his weaponization of trade policy.³⁶ However, Chinese officials are exploring potential proposals, including minority stakes in U.S. ventures, technology licensing, increased imports of American goods, and cooperation on geopolitical issues such as North Korea, Iran, Israel, and Ukraine’s reconstruction. They recognize that appealing to Trump’s transactional, deal-making approach and retaliating more forcefully with tit-for-tat measures can serve their interests.

Conclusion

Edward Luttwak’s recent analysis suggests that Donald Trump’s apparent closeness with Moscow is a strategic move to create a rift between Russia and China. This theory, known as a ‘reverse Nixon policy,’ mirrors Richard Nixon’s 1970s maneuver, in which the U.S. exploited the Sino-Soviet split to align China with the West and isolate the Soviet Union.

Those surprised by the strengthening ties between Trump and Russia and the deepening Sino-Russian relationship since the 2000s should also consider the potential for a (renewed) U.S.-China rapprochement when necessary. Trump’s second term emphasizes forging disruptive strategic alliances more than his first presidency, using tactics that echo Beijing’s authoritarian governance. Over the 20th century, these three powers frequently shifted alliances to counterbalance each other.

After Nikita Khrushchev took power, ideological struggles led to military clashes and the Sino-Soviet split. The 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation marked a pivotal moment in Sino-Russian relations, alongside Russia’s integration into the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In 2004, both countries settled their longstanding border dispute. In 2014, Beijing’s tacit support for Russia’s annexation of Crimea further solidified this strategic alignment—largely unseen for almost a century. In 2022, just days before Russia invaded Ukraine, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin issued a joint statement asserting that their bilateral ties transcended Cold War-era alliances, emphasizing that their partnership had ‘no limits’ and ‘no forbidden areas of cooperation.’³⁷ However, unlike the 1970s, when China and the Soviet Union were ideologically and territorially at odds, today’s Russia and China have built a pragmatic and deepening partnership, and the war in Ukraine has only brought Russia closer to China.

The main shift in the geopolitical landscape signals that U.S.-China relations are no longer mainly defined by ideological clashes but by a stark contest for global power. While moments of rapprochement and diplomatic honeymoons may arise, the European Union must anticipate short-term rapprochements and protracted conflicts between Trump’s Washington and Xi’s Beijing while skillfully navigating the uncertainty of which scenarios will pose the most significant risks to its future.

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